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I. INTRODUCTION
To every action there is always opposed an equal reaction: or, the mutual
actions of two bodies upon each other are always equal, and directed to
contrary parts. I
The principal theme of this article is simple: In a system of law, as in nature,
changes do not occur in a vacuum. Changes to one part of a legal system may
stimulate compensating adjustments elsewhere, and the equilibrium position will
depend both on the initial action and on the legal system's reaction. Attention to
the initial changes alone will conceal their likely ultimate consequences.
This article begins by presenting three examples of the legal system's equili-
brating tendencies. The examples are drawn from criminal law (perhaps the
field where these tendencies are most familiar), the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),2 and torts. The article then explores the
extent to which the antitrust treble damages remedy has shaped substantive and
procedural antitrust law.3 The availability of treble damages has had an effect
on substantive antitrust law, but not a unidirectional one; at times trebling has
expanded the law's coverage, at times narrowed it. On procedural aspects of
1. I. NEWTON, Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, LAW OF MOTION III (A. Motte trans.
1934).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
3. This is not the first article to suggest a connection between the treble damages remedy and substan-
tive and procedural antitrust law. I discussed the relationship in Calkins, Illinois Brick and its Legislative
Aftermath, 47 ANTrrRusT L.J. 967, 983 (1978). See also, eg., HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 98TH
CONG., 2D SESS., STUDY OF THE ANTITRUST TREBLE DAMAGE REMEDY 27-33 (Comm. Print 1984)
(prepared by G. Garvey) [hereinafter GARVEY STUDY]; 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW
331b2 (1978).
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antitrust law, however, the availability of treble damages has had a pronounced
and more consistently limiting effect.
The final part of the article represents a slight digression from the article's
principal theme. It reports and discusses information from the Georgetown data
set concerning the use of motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment
in various kinds of antitrust cases. The Georgetown data and a review of recent
authorities indicate that pretrial motions by antitrust defendants frequently are
successful and play an important role in antitrust litigation. Even before the
recent trio of Supreme Court cases supporting the regular use of summary judg-
ment4 (which were decided after this article was drafted but are discussed
herein), the suggestion in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System 5 that "sum-
mary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation"6 was
not the law.
Aspects of this final part of the article support the principal theme. One of the
ways in which courts appear to have compensated for treble damages is by being
more willing to dispose of cases prior to trial. Summary disposition may be more
common in antitrust cases than it would be were there no treble damages, and
thus these motions, too, represent a means of equilibration.
II. EXAMPLES OF EQUILIBRATING TENDENCIES OUTSIDE OF ANTITRUST
The equilibrating tendency of the legal system can be seen in numerous set-
tings, including criminal law, civil litigation under the RICO statute, and tort
law.
A. CRIMINAL LAW: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM'S
RESPONSE TO SEVERE SANCTIONS
Between the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries English law prescribed the
death penalty for over 200 crimes, many of which were minor offenses by mod-
em standards. Such minor crimes included the theft of five shillings from a
shop, stealing goods worth one pound, stealing turnips, and associating with
gypsies. Because of its extreme and disproportionate severity, the criminal law
was known as the "Bloody Code."'7
In response, juries, judges, prosecutors, and even complainants prevented ap-
plication of the death penalty in numerous cases in which it was legally required.
Jurors frequently refused to convict those accused of minor crimes for which the
penalty was death. Jurors either granted an outright acquittal or found the ac-
cused guilty only of a lesser crime than the facts indicated. Evidence of this
latter behavior, known as "pious perjury," can be found as early as the beginning
of the eighteenth century.8
4. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505
(1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986). These cases are
discussed infra notes 362-401, 427-66 and accompanying text.
5. 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
6. Id. at 473.
7. A. KOESTLER, REFLECTIONS ON HANGING 7 (1957) (quoted in E. BERGLER & J. MEERLOO, JUS-
TICE AND INJUSTICE 116 (1963)).
8. 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH CRIMINAL LAW AND Is ADMINISTRATION FROM
1750 at 94 (1948). In the years 1731-1732,
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Jurors frequently committed pious perjury. Sir Thomas Fowell Buxton, a
nineteenth century reformer, studied the records of judicial proceedings at the
Old Bailey and found that deliberate undervaluation "was largely responsible for
the virtual suspension of many capital statutes."9 One remarkable instance in-
volved a man who was indicted "for stealing 133/4 yards of lace, value 6
[pounds]" and found guilty of stealing 39s worth (one shilling less than the capi-
tal amount). Later he was indicted "for stealing 41/2 yards of lace" and again
found guilty of stealing 39 shillings worth. Finally, he was indicted for stealing
131/2 yards lace. This last theft was from a shop, for which the capital amount
was only five shillings. This time the jury set the value at under five shillings.10
After citing several similar cases, Sir Buxton asked, "Is there any man who
doubts the reason of these strange and sudden fluctuations in the value of the
property?""1 He went on to say:
These are some few of the cases of this nature which I have selected;
and I hold in my hand twelve hundred of a similar description .... I, in
the little leisure that I enjoy, have only been able to select so limited a
number; but, if any gentleman wishes to enlarge his collection, he will
find no difficulty in making that twelve hundred, twelve thousand.
Now, observe: each of these cases involves the perjury of twelve men.
I have confined myself to one species of crime out of a multitude-to
one species of evasion out of a multitude-and to one court, the Old
Bailey, without touching upon the remainder of England .... And,
thus restricted, I prove my point.12
In his landmark book, Theft, Law and Society, Jerome Hall cites early Ameri-
can cases with a similar pattern of jury behavior. In the 1815 case State v. Ben-
nett,13 the court expressed its resignation to the practice: "However absurd it
may appear" to allow juries "sworn to determine a case according to evidence"
to find goods to be worth less than the capital amount even "when all the wit-
nesses swear they are of much greater value," the practice has "been indulged in,
until it has become the law of the land. The principle has been too long estab-
lished, to be now called into question .... -14
of the thirty-three persons indicted at the Old Bailey for stealing privately in shops to the value
of five shillings, only one was convicted; twelve were acquitted while another twenty were found
guilty but the value of the stolen property was found to be below the five shillings. Again, of
fifty-two persons tried... for stealing to the value of forty shillings in dwelling houses, only six
were convicted, twenty-three were acquitted and twenty-three convicted of larceny but not on
the capital charge, the jury having found the stolen property to be below the value of forty
shillings.
Id. at 329; see also J. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SOciETY 127-30 (2d ed. 1952).
9. 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 8, at 95; see also J. HALL, supra note 8, at 128-30 n.45.
10. J. HALL, supra note 8, at 129 n.45; 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 8, at 95.
11. J. HALL, supra note 8, at 129 n.45. Hall also cites many other legal scholars as acknowledging this
behavior. Id. at 127-28 nn.42-44.
12. Id. at 130 n.45.
13. 5 S.C.L. (3 Brev.) 246 (Constitutional Court) (1815) (cited in J. HALL, supra note 8, at 128 n.44).
14. Id. Other American examples of "jury nullification" by convicting only for a lesser offense are set
forth in H. KALVEN, JR. & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 306-12 (1966); see also McGuatha v.
California, 402 U.S. 183, 199 (1971) (cases where juries "simply refused to convict of the capital offense"
where death penalty was "clearly inappropriate"). For defenses of "jury nullification," see M. KADISH &
S. KADISH, DISCRETION TO DIsOBEY (1973) (jury serves important "recourse role") (reviewed and criti-
cized by Christie, Lawful Departures from Legal Rules "Jury Nullification" and Legitimated Disobed-
[Vol. 74:10651068
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Juries were not the only actors circumventing legislatively imposed death pen-
alties. Judges also avoided the application of severe sanctions. Radzinowicz cites
a blatant example of such a merciful act by a nineteenth century English judge as
follows:
'Trying a prisoner at the Old Bailey on a charge of stealing in a dwell-
ing-house to the value of forty shillings... a capital offence', Lord
Mansfield 'advised the jury to find a gold trinket, the subject of the
indictment, to be of less value. The prosecutor exclaimed, with indig-
nation, "Under forty shillings, my Lord! Why the fashion, alone, cost
me more than double the sum". Lord Mansfield calmly observed,
"God, forbid, gentlemen, we should hang a man for fashion's sake!" '15
In addition to instructing jurors on the value of stolen goods, judges strictly
construed statutes to sidestep the death penalty. As Livingston Hall put it,
[a] statute imposing a penalty which the court regards as dispropor-
tionately heavy for the acts committed can hardly escape a strict con-
struction. It was with such statutes, taking away benefit of clergy, that
the doctrine arose, and the history of the past four hundred years has
amply proved that under such circumstances courts, juries, and even
prosecutors will cooperate to defeat a clearly avowed "legislative will"
by any available means.' 6
In King v. Cook 17 a person was charged with the capital felony of stealing a
cow. The court held that
since the stolen animal was only two and a half years old and had never
had a calf, it was not a cow but a heifer. And because the relevant Acts
mentioned both cow and heifer, it was held further that "the one must
have been used in contradiction to the other; and therefore that the
evidence did not support the indictment, and the prisoner was entitled
to his acquittal."' 18
Judges also used procedural technicalities to avoid inappropriate application
of the death penalty. Radzinowicz reports the existence of "abundant evidence
of this tendency."' 9 One example from the Annual Register for 1800 is
illustrative:
John Taylor had been arraigned and tried on the charge of uttering a
forged note, in the name of Bartholomew Browne... of which the jury
ence, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1289 (1974)); Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CAL. L.
REv. 168 (1972) (nullification makes law responsive to public). For more general discussions of juries
departing from legal rules, see Levine, The Legislative Role of Juries, 1984 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 605
(conviction rates for violating selective service laws higher during wartime and correlated with public
approval of war); Meyers, Rule Departures and Making Law: Juries and Their Verdicts, 13 LAw & Soc'Y
REv. 781 (1979) (study of one county showed only limited departures from rules).
15. 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 8, at 94 n.49 (quoting J. CAMPBELL, THE LivEs OF THE CHIEF
JUSTICES OF ENGLAND (3d ed. 1874)); see also T. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE 148-49,
278-87 (1985).
16. Hall, Strict or Liberal Construction of Penal Statutes, 48 HARV. L. REv. 748, 763 (1935).
17. 1 Leach 105 (1774) (quoted in 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 8, at 87).
18. Id.
19. 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 8, at 100; see also T. GREEN, supra note 15, at 280; R. WINDEYER,
LEGAL HISTORY 227 (1957).
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found him guilty; but just as Baron Hotham was about to put on his
black cap, and to pass sentence of death on the prisoner, one of the
barristers, not retained on the trial, happening to turn over the forged
note, saw it signed Bartw. Browne; throwing his eyes immediately on
the indictment, perceived it written therein Bartholomew Browne. He
immediately pointed out the circumstance to Mr. Garrow, counsellor
for the prisoner, who rose up and stated the variance as fatal to the
indictment; in which the judge -concurred, and discharged the
prisoner.20
Such cases were typical. A wrong name for either the criminal or the victim, or
other technical errors, could defeat an indictment.21
Even the prosecutors would participate. Radzinowicz quotes a case where the
court told the prosecutor that if goods obviously worth a great deal more than
the capital amount were set at a lower amount he could "save the prisoner's
life." The prosecutor said, "God forbid I should take her life! I will value them"
below the capital amount.22 If mitigation was the reaction of eighteenth and
early nineteenth century jurors, judges, and prosecutors to the severity of crimi-
nal sanctions, abandonment of the death penalty for most crimes was the legisla-
ture's counterreaction. The legislature gradually adopted the view that severe
sanctions prevented successful law enforcement, and by the middle of the nine-
teenth century most crimes were no longer capital. 23 The death penalty "re-
mained only in cases of treason, murder, and piracy with violence."'24
An increase in indictments and conviction rates followed abolition of capital
sanctions for most crimes.25 As penalties began to reflect the severity of crimes,
juries more regularly convicted defendants of committing the crimes of which
they were accused. According to Hay, the rate increased from fifty to eighty
percent, and the "incidence of commitals not resulting in trials" went from
twenty to ten percent.26 According to Radzinowicz, "[a]lmost immediately af-
ter" repeal of the statute authorizing the death penalty for stealing from the
person in the amount of twelve pence, "both prosecutions and convictions...
began rapidly to increase."'27
20. 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 8, at 100 (emphasis added) (quoting 42 ANNUAL REGISTER,
CHRONICLE 6-7 (Mar. 30, 1800)).
21. 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 8, at 101 n.71 (quoting MacKinnon, The Law and Lawyers, in 2 A.
TURBERVILLE, JOHNSON'S ENGLAND 308 (1933)).
22. 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 8, at 95 (quoting Sir Fowell Buxton's 1821 speech against the death
penalty for forgery, in PARLIAMENTARY DEBATE (1821) N.S. vol. 5, col. 944).
23. See L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 8, at 330 (discussing pamphlet based on a speech given by
Romilly in which he outlined the difficulties in imposing the death penalty for minor crimes); see also Id.
at 324 nn.6-8 (discussing pamphlet's publications).
24. R. WINDEYER, supra note 19, at 279.
25. Hay, The Criminal Prosecution in England and Its Historians, 47 MOD. L. REV. 1, 5 (1984); see also
I L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 8, at 502-03 (increase in prosecutions and convictions due partly to
change in law and partly to other factors).
26. Hay, supra note 25, at 5.
27. 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 8, at 501. One might suggest that repeal of the death penalty for
many offenses simply increased the amount of crime, and that this increase accounts for the greater
number of prosecutions and convictions. The decline in acquittal rates and in convictions for lesser of.
fenses than those charged, however, tends to support the view that repeal did lead to greater law enforce-
ment. Id. at 502-03.
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The increase in indictments and conviction rates was due, at least in part,28 to
the reduced need for pious perjury by jurors. A more liberal construction of
statutes and a lessened insistence upon procedural exactitude also contributed to
the change. After the death penalty was no longer applicable to most minor
offenses,
[o]nly in exceptional cases involving ambiguous and equivocal statutes
was the predominantly merciful interpretation so prevalent in the
eighteenth century still adhered to. In all others a strict interpretation
was followed, which neither narrowed nor broadened the scope of the
statutes .... [T]he adopted interpretation, while remaining essentially
strict, became less rigidly formal.29
Based on this historical record, it seems clear that the legal system responded
to a severe penal code by mitigating its sanctions. The mitigation was achieved
by stretching the rules to favor defendants, and by the willing perjury of partici-
pants in the legal system. The legislature responded by lessening the law's sever-
ity, thus leading to a reduction in the various quasi-legal methods used to
achieve a more humane result. The system was then able to operate without the
mitigating constraints, and convictions increased.
B. RICO
The struggle of the courts to adjust liability to remedy, and the restrictions on
their institutional freedom to do so, are illustrated by the continuing uncertainty
about the appropriate scope of civil liability under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO).30 RICO was enacted in 1970 as title IX of
the Organized Crime Control Act.31 It was designed principally "to seek the
eradication of organized crime" in legitimate business activities.32 In addition to
the criminal penalties33 and civil remedies34 the government can seek, RICO
authorizes any person injured "by reason of" a violation of the Act's substantive
provisions to recover treble damages and attorney's fees.35
The civil provisions of the RICO statute largely were ignored during the first
decade after the statute's enactment. 36 Since 1980, however, as the plaintiffs' bar
28. Cf Hay, supra note 25, at 9, 10 (larger police force also factor in increased prosecutorial activity).
29. 1 L. RADZINOWICZ, supra note 8, at 103.
30. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1982).
31. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970).
32. Id., 84 Stat. at 923 ("[Organized crime's] money and power are increasingly used to infiltrate and
corrupt legitimate business [and] ... seriously burden interstate and foreign commerce .... It is the
purpose of this act to seek the eradication of organized crime in the United States .... ").
33. 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1982). Criminal sanctions include fines of up to $25,000, imprisonment for up to
20 years, and forfeiture of interests acquired or maintained in violation of § 1962. See Weiner, Crime
Must Not Pay: RICO Criminal Forfeiture in Perspective, 1 N. ILL. L. RFv. 225 (1981).
34. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1964(a), (b), (d) (1982). Civil remedies include divestiture of the violator's business
interests, injunctions against future investments by violators in similar businesses, and dissolution of the
enterprise. For analyses of these civil remedies, see Curnow & Matloff, The Case for Divestiture to Private
Plaintiffs under 18 U.S. C. Section 1964 (a), 21 CAL. W.L. REv. 302 (1985); Comment, RICO and Equita-
ble Remedies Not Available for Private Litigants, 21 CAL. W.L. REv. 385 (1985).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c) (1982). RICO provides that "[a]ny person injured in his business or property
by reason of a violation of section 1962... may sue therefore in any appropriate United States District
Court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost of the suit, including a reasonable
attorney's fee." Id.
36. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3277 n.1 (1985) (only nine private RICO
1986]
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has become more familiar with RICO's treble damage remedy, civil RICO
claims have proliferated. This proliferation has inspired courts to search with
considerable imagination for ways to limit the reach of civil RICO.37 The
courts' attempts to limit RICO are partly due to a perception that RICO's penal-
ties are excessive. They also reflect a belief that the proliferation of lawsuits,
induced by the lure of treble damages, threatens to create a broad federal remedy
for common law wrongs, which may be contrary to Congress' intent.
The effort to limit RICO has been encumbered by the breadth of the statutory
language. Treble damages are authorized for "[a]ny person injured in his busi-
ness or property by reason of a violation of" a provision making unlawful the
use or investment of income "derived, directly or indirectly, from a pattern of
racketeering activity" in the operation of an enterprise engaged in commerce. 38
"Racketeering activity" is defined to include violations of the federal mail fraud
statutes and of the antifraud provisions of the federal bankruptcy and securities
laws. 39 A "pattern" of such activity is defined to require "at least two" such acts
decisions were published throughout the 1970's); see also REPORT OF THE AD Hoc CIVIL RICO TASK
FORCE OF THE A.B.A. SECTION OF CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW 53a, 55 (1985) [here-
inafter A.B.A. REPORT].
37. See, eg., Warner Communications, Inc. v. Murdoch, 581 F. Supp. 1482, 1497 (D. Del. 1984) (ex-
pressing alarm about awarding "heavily punitive treble damages" for a "garden variety claim"). For
critical reviews of these judicial efforts, see Note, The Conflict overRICO's Private Treble Damages Action,
70 CORNELL L. REV. 902 (1985); Note, Civil RICO: The Temptation and Impropriety of Judicial Restric-
tion, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1101 (1982).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1982) provides:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived, directly or indi-
rectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity or through collection of an unlawful debt in which
such person has participated as a principal within the meaning of section 2, title 18, United
States Code, to use or invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of
such income in acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise
which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce. A purchase
of securities on the open market for purposes of investment, and without the intention of con-
trolling or participating in the control of the issuer, or of assisting another to do so, shall not be
unlawful under this subsection if the securities of the issuer held by the purchaser, the members
of his immediate family, and his or their accomplices in any pattern or racketeering activity or
the collection of an unlawful debt after such purchase do not amount in the aggregate to one
percent of the outstanding securities of any one class, and do not confer, either in law or in fact,
the power to elect one or more directors of the issuer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person through a pattern of racketeering activity or through
collection of an unlawful debt to acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or
control of any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or
foreign commerce.
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engage in,
or the activities of which affect interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, di-
rectly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity or collection of unlawful debt.
(d) It shall be unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections
(a), (1), or (c) of this section.
39. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1982) provides:
"racketeering activity" means (A) any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping, gambling,
arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, or dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is
chargeable under State law and punishable by imprisonment for more than one year; (B) any act
which is indictable under any of the following provisions of title 18, United States Code: Section
201 (relating to bribery), section 224 (relating to sports bribery) sections 471, 472, and 473
(relating to counterfeiting), section 659 (relating to theft from interstate shipment) if the act
indictable under section 659 is felonious, section 664 (relating to embezzlement from pension
and welfare funds), sections 891-894 (relating to extortionate credit transactions), section 1084
(relating to the transmission of gambling information), section 1341 (relating to mail fraud),
1072 [Vol. 74:1065
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within a decade.40 As if to emphasize the expansiveness of the authorization,
Congress wrote that "[tihe provisions of this title shall be liberally construed to
effectuate its remedial purpose."41
Conspicuously absent from the statutory requirements was any reference to
organized crime.42 Nonetheless, several lower courts read a need to show a con-
nection to organized crime into the statute.43 This effort was founded in part on
traditional statutory interpretation. 44 It also reflected a concern about remedy.
As the trial court wrote in Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc.,45 "there is nothing in
the legislative history to suggest that Congress intended to create a private right
of action for treble damages for violations of substantive statutes by ordinary
business or parties."' 46 This reasoning, or at least the organized crime require-
ment it was to support, uniformly has been rejected at the appellate level as
inconsistent with the statutory language and purpose.47
Other courts attempted to limit the reach of civil RICO by circumscribing the
compensable injuries. These courts emphasized the similarity between RICO's
language and that of section 4 of the Clayton Act, the statute on which RICO
section 1343 (relating to wire fraud), section 1503 (relating to obstruction of justice), section
1510 (relating to obstruction of criminal investigation), section 1511 (relating to the obstruction
of State or local law enforcement), section 1951 (relating to interference with commerce, rob-
bery, or extortion), section 1952 (relating to racketeering), section 1953 (relating to interstate
transportation of wagering paraphernalia), section 1954 (relating to unlawful welfare fund pay-
ments), section 1955 (relating to the prohibition of illegal gambling businesses), sections 2314
and 2315 (relating to interstate transportation of stolen property), sections 2341-2346 (relating
to trafficking in contraband cigarettes), section 2421-24 (relating to white slave traffic), (C) any
act which is indictable under title 29, United States Code, section 186 (dealing with restrictions
on payments and loans to labor organizations) or section 501(c) (relating to embezzlement from
union funds), or (D) any offense involving fraud connected with a case under title 11, fraud in
the sale of securities, or the felonious manufacture, importation, receiving, concealment, buying,
selling, or other wise dealing in narcotic or other dangerous drugs, punishable under any law of
the United States.
40. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1982) provides that a "'pattern of racketeering activity' requires at least two
acts of racketeering activity, one of which occurred after the effective date of this chapter [Oct. 15, 1970]
and the last of which occurred within ten years (excluding any period of imprisonment) after the commis-
sion of a prior act of racketeering activity."
41. Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 84 Stat. 941 (1970).
42. Congress could not decide how to define such a requirement, and it was also worried about the
constitutional implications of such a definition. See A.B.A. REPORT, supra note 36, at ch. 7.
43. E.g., Noonan v. Granville-Smith, 537 F. Supp. 23, 29 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (RICO inapplicable in se-
curities fraud action because organized crime not involved); Adair v. Hunt Int'l Resources Corp., 526 F.
Supp. 736, 746-48 (N.D. Il. 1981) (Organized Crime Control Act inapplicable in land fraud case where
developers not involved with organized crime).
44. See Barr v. WUI/TAS, Inc., 66 F.R.D. 109, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (legislative history indicates
Congress focused on problem of organized crime).
45. 553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y.), affd on other grounds, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1025 (1984).
46. 553 F. Supp. at 1361; see also Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Avondale Shipyards, Inc., 527 F. Supp. 256,
260 (E.D. La. 1981) ("The civil remedies provisions of RICO were not designed to convert every fraud or
misrepresentation action involving corporations who use the mails or telephones.., into treble damages
RICO actions.").
47. See, eg., Moss, 719 F.2d at 21 (neither statutory language nor legislative history of RICO require
proof or allegation of organized crime connection); Bunker Ramo Corp. v. United Business Forms, Inc.,
713 F.2d 1272, 1287, n.6 (7th Cir. 1983) ("well-established that RICO does not require proof that the
defendant or the enterprise are connected with organized crime"); Schacht v. Brown, 711 F.2d 1343, 1356
(7th Cir.) (Congress intended to cut "deliberately broad swath ... to reach the evil it sought"), cerL
denied, 464 U.S. 1002 (1983); Bennett v. Berg, 685 F.2d 1053, 1063 (8th Cir. 1982) (RICO suits not
limited to contexts in which organized crime tie is alleged), affid in part and rev'd in part, 710 F.2d 1361
(8th Cir.) (en bane), cerL denied, 464 U.S. 1008 (1983).
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was based.48 The more extreme of these attempts at circumscription imposed a
requirement that "competitive injury" be shown. In fashioning this require-
ment, the court in Bankers Trust Co. v. Feldesman,49 expressed its doubt that
"Congress intended to sweep.., ordinary injuries.., within the dragnet of the
treble damage remedy .... For example, it would seem illogical that a plaintiff
suing under the federal securities laws could recover only one-third of the dam-
ages recoverable by a person suing under RICO for the identical injury."'50 This
approach has also been rejected as inconsistent with the language and history of
the statute.5 1
A larger number of courts borrowed the analytical approach of Brunswick v.
Pueblo Bowl-C-Mat, Inc.,52 and allowed civil RICO recoveries only for "racke-
teering injury."'53 This effort was rebuffed by a 5-4 Supreme Court decision,
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,54 as unworkable and inconsistent with the statu-
tory language. The dissenters and those courts that had adopted this limitation
viewed it as necessary to prevent the federalization of broad areas of common
law wrongs as litigants, "lured by the prospect of treble damages and attorney's
fees," freely invoke RICO and coerce settlements by defendants "facing a tre-
mendous financial exposure in addition to the threat of being labelled a
'racketeer.' "55
A few courts have even attempted to limit the scope of civil RICO by restrict-
ing the class of defendants against whom a civil RICO action can be brought.
Reacting to what it perceived to be "extraordinary, if not outrageous"5 6 uses of
RICO's treble damages remedy "against respected and legitimate"57 businesses,
the Second Circuit in Sedima required a prior criminal conviction as a predicate
to civil liability under the statute.5 8 Not requiring a prior criminal conviction,
the Second Circuit reasoned, "would provide civil remedies for offenses criminal
in nature, stigmatize defendants with the appellation 'racketeer,' [and] authorize
the award of damages which are clearly punitive, including attorney's
fees . . . ,,19 The Supreme Court rejected this limitation also in its Sedima
opinion.
48. E.g., Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 494-96 (2d Cir. 1984), rev'd, 105 S. Ct. 3275
(1985).
49. 566 F. Supp. 1235 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), a.ffld on other grounds, 741 F.2d 511 (2d Cir. 1984), vacated
sub nom. Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 105 S. Ct. 3550 (1985) (mem.), vacated on remand, 779 F.2d 36
(2d Cir. 1985) (mem.).
50. 566 F. Supp. at 1241 (footnote omitted); see also North Barrington Dev., Inc. v. Fanslow, 547 F.
Supp. 207, 211 (N.D. Ill. 1980) ("Mhe purpose of the Act was to give law enforcement another tool with
which to combat infiltration of legitimate businesses by racketeering influences and not to award treble
damages for a breach of contract or common law fraud .....
51. Sedima, 105 S. Ct. at 3287.
52. 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977). There, the Court held that plaintiffs suing for violations of § 7 of the
Clayton Act must prove more than that they suffered injury as a result of the defendant's unlawful entry
into the market; they must "prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful." Id.
53. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 741 F.2d 482, 493 n.34 (2d Cir. 1984) (citing cases), rev'd, 105
S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
54. 105 S. Ct. 3275 (1985).
55. Id. at 3294 (Marshall, I., dissenting).
56. 741 F.2d at 487.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 496.
59. Id. at 500 n.49.
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The RICO experience illustrates the lengths to which courts will go to prevent
the imposition of sanctions they consider inappropriately severe. It also illus-
trates the limitations on a court's freedom to make adjustments. Appellate
courts, most notably the Supreme Court in Sedima, have frustrated attempts to
adjust RICO liability. Where statutory language and legislative intent are suffi-
ciently clear, certain adjustments may be prevented.
The RICO equilibrating process continues, however. The Supreme Court in
Sedima apparently invited Congress to narrow liability under civil RICO.60 In
addition, while blocking certain interpretive approaches designed to respond to
the perceived pattern of misuse of the treble damage remedy, the Court sug-
gested an alternative approach to limit liability. A gratuitous footnote explored
the legislative history and suggested that the statutory requirement of a "pat-
tern" of racketeering activity, which requires at least two such acts within a
decade, should not be satisfied by "two isolated acts."'6 1 This requirement had
not previously been viewed as a significant limitation;62 indeed, the Court
blamed the unexpectedly frequent use of civil RICO in part on "the failure of
Congress and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of 'pattern.' "63 Thus
either through legislation, which is pending, or through judicial decisions, ad-
justments are likely to continue.64
C. TORT LAW: ADJUSTMENTS TO THE SHIFT TO COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
AND ADOPTION OF MARKET SHARE LIABILITY
The common law tort system offers two examples of the legal system's equili-
brating tendencies. The first concerns contributory and comparative negligence.
The second concerns punitive damages, which are in great measure the common
law equivalent of treble damages.
The tort system's equilibrating tendencies are vividly illustrated by the adjust-
ments to the perception that the contributory negligence doctrine was unfairly
severe and by the still-continuing readjustments to the shift from contributory to
comparative negligence. 65 While not an example of a reaction to a penalty as
such, the change illustrates how the modification of what is perceived to be a
60. 105 S. Ct. at 3287.
61. Id. at 3285 n.14; see Paul S. Mullin & Assocs. v. Bassett, 632 F. Supp. 532, 540-41 (D. Del. 1986)
(some separation of predicate acts required, reviewing cases); Modem Settings, Inc. v. Prudential-Bache
Sec., Inc., 629 F. Supp. 860, 864 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (since Sedima, courts "have stringently interpreted the
'pattern' requirement"). But cf R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v. Hyatt, 774 F.2d 1340, 1354 (5th Cir. 1985)
(two acts of mail fraud could form a "pattern" even post-Sedima).
62. See ABA REPORT, supra note 36, at ch. 8.
63. 105 S. Ct. at 3287.
64. See H.R. 2943, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., 131 CONG. Rac. H5442 (1985); Graham, RICO Reform: Two
Approaches Vie on the Hill, Legal Times, June 2, 1986, at 1, col. 3 (prospects uncertain); see also Carter v.
Berger, 777 F.2d 1173 (7th Cir. 1985) (post-Sedima decision holding that only directly injured parties
may bring RICO actions); Bennett v. United States Trust Co., 770 F.2d 308, 315 (2d Cir. 1985) ("enter-
prise" and "person" must be separate, reviewing cases); RICO Case Standing Order (N.D. Ohio Mar. 7,
1986) (Krenzler, J.) (requiring remarkably detailed 20 item "RICO case statements" demonstrating plain-
tiff's compliance with pleading rules); Civil Rico Litigation after Sedima, A.L.I.-A.B.A. VIDEO LAW RE-
VIEW STUDY MATERIALS (1985).
65. For more extensive discussions of the shift to comparative negligence, see C. HEFr & C.J. HEFr,
COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE MANUAL (1984); W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS § 67
(5th ed. 1984); H. WOODS, THE NEGLIGENCE CASE: COMPARATIVE FAULT (1978); Wade, Comparative
Negligence-Its Development in the United States and Its Present Status in Louisiana, 40 LA. L. REV. 299
(1980).
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harsh, pro-defendant rule can lead to a series of perhaps unforeseen or unap-
preciated adjustments.
The common law doctrine of contributory negligence acted as a complete bar
to recovery. As the court remarked in Butterfield v. Forrester, a case where the
plaintiff rode "violently" into an obstruction placed in the road by defendant,
"the accident appeared to happen entirely from [plaintiff's] own fault" because
use of due care would have avoided it.66 This causation analysis was unpersua-
sive-for instance, both tortfeasors would be liable to an injured bystander 67 -
but the doctrine remained. The legal system responded predictably to the per-
ceived harshness of this rule.68 As they had in criminal cases, juries apparently
ignored instructions concerning contributory negligence.69 The courts crafted
exceptions to the doctrine, ruling that a plaintiff could recover despite his negli-
gence where the defendant committed an intentional tort; was "willful," "wan-
ton," or "reckless"; or had failed to use a "last clear chance" to avoid the
accident.70 Later, courts supplemented negligence with strict liability, and ruled
that contributory negligence (as opposed to a voluntary assumption of risk)
would not bar recovery.71
The same pressures that created exceptions to contributory negligence ulti-
mately led to its repudiation.72 The change started at the end of the 1960's and
continued through the 1970's and 1980's. Almost every state now has adopted
some form of comparative negligence, either by statute or by court decision. 73
Commentators did not initially appreciate the consequences of the shift to
comparative negligence. In 1941 Dean Prosser wrote that comparative negli-
gence statutes "offer a fairly simple problem where only two parties are in-
volved." 74 In 1953 he wrote that the "chief problem" in moving to comparative
negligence "is one of some protection for the defendants, and some restraint
upon the irresponsible jury, which will keep it within bounds and insure that the
apportionment will in fact be made."' 75 Leading articles on the subject gave
66. 11 East 60, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (1809).
67. The example is Prosser's. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 394 (1941).
68. See Turk, Comparative Negligence on the March, 28 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 189, 199-203 (1950)
(describing doctrine as "harsh," "startling," and "crude").
69. See Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 51 MICH. L. Rnv. 465, 469 (1953) ("Every trial lawyer is well
aware that juries often do in fact allow recovery in cases of contributory negligence, and that the compro-
mise in the jury room does result in some diminution of the damages because of the plaintiff's fault.")
(footnote omitted).
70. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 65, at 462-68. The most commonly proffered justification
for this last exception was that it was the defendants' failure to use that chance that actually had caused
the accident, but this has long been acknowledged as unpersuasive. See W. PROSSER, supra note 67, at
410 ("The real explanation would seem to be a dislike for the defense of contributory negligence which has
made the courts rebel at its application in many situations .... ).
71. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 524 comment a (1977) (Since the strict liability of one who
carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is not founded on his negligence, the ordinary contributory
negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense to an action based on strict liability.); id. § 402A comment n
(1965) ("Since the liability with which this Section deals [strict products liability] is not based upon negli-
gence of the seller, but is strict liability, the rule applied to strict cases (see § 524) applies.").
72. See generally Fleming, Foreword: Comparative Negligence at Last-by Judicial Choice, 64 CALIF.
L. REv. 239 (1976); Woods, The Trend Toward Comparative Fault, TRIAL, Nov. 1984, at 16. For a
defense of contributory negligence see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 156-57 (3d ed. 1986).
73. V. SCHWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE 15 (1974 & Supp. 1981); H. WOODS, supra note 65, 1
1.11 (1978 & Supp. 1985).
74. W. PROSSER, supra note 67, at 407.
75. Prosser, supra note 69, at 508.
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short shrift to the possibility of compensating changes.76
Compensating adjustments, however, were inevitable. As Victor Schwartz
recognized, "an enormous number of 'adjustments' must be made in the tort law
once a form of comparative negligence has been adopted." 77 The sharp lessening
of the "penalty" for plaintiff negligence removed the compulsion to avoid finding
the plaintiff negligent.
This is not the place to chronicle the adjustment in the system, but it can be
briefly summarized. Although the purported logic of the "last clear chance"
doctrine-that defendant's fault really "caused" the accident 78 -would seem to
be unaffected by the change to comparative negligence, the doctrine has been
largely abolished.79 On the other hand, comparative negligence continues to be
inapplicable to intentional torts.80 Although the courts are split concerning the
application of comparative negligence to various degrees of negligence short of
intentional torts, the more recent decisions tend to apply the doctrine.81
Perhaps the most interesting adjustment has been in strict liability law. Under
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a defendant's liability is not premised on neg-
ligence.82 Facile logic might therefore suggest that the plaintiff's own negligence
should not be "compared," since there is no defendant's negligence for compari-
son.83 Moreover, some courts apparently feel constrained by statutory language
making comparative negligence available only where contributory negligence
could be asserted as a defense.84 Nonetheless, slowly a majority of states have
made the adjustment and are allowing courts and juries to consider the plaintiff's
negligence.85 The change from contributory to comparative negligence simply
76. See Mole & Wilson, A Study of Comparative Negligence, 42 CORNELL L.Q. 333, 604, 650 (1932)
(discussion of "major change" that would result limited to burdens of proof); Turk, supra note 68, at 341-
42 (referring to the "frictionless application" of comparative negligence, with "[n]o special difficulties" or
"hidden pitfalls").
77. V. SCHWARTZ, supra note 73, at 37.
78. See supra note 70.
79. G. CHRISTIE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF TORTS 452 (1983); H. WOODS, supra note
65, § 8:2, at 172-73. But see Fountain v. Thompson, 252 Ga. 256, 312 S.E.2d 788 (1984).
80. H. WOODS, supra note 65, § 7.1; see Landes & Posner, An Economic Theory of Intentional Torts, I
INT'L REV. OF L. & ECON. 127 (1981) (intentional torts so lacking in justification that they cannot be
overdeterred).
81. See Annot., 10 A.L.R. 4TH 946 (1981 & Supp. 1985).
82. See supra note 71.
83. See Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 763, 575 P.2d 1162, 1185, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380,
403 (1978) (Mosk, J., dissenting).
84. E.g., Bailey v. V & 0 Press Co., 770 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1985) (applying Ohio law); Young's Mach.
Co. v. Long, 100 Nev. 692, 693, 692 P.2d 24, 25 (1984) (declining to apply comparative negligence to
products liability actions where the comparative negligence statute applies to actions "in which contribu-
tory negligence may be asserted as a defense"); Stearns v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 770 F.2d 599 (6th
Cir. 1985) (Ohio comparative negligence statute not applicable to strict liability action because the statute,
on its face, was limited to negligence actions). But see Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negli-
gence, 42 TENN. L. REv. 171, 179-80 (1974) (arguing that courts should apply comparative negligence in
strict liability cases unless statute explicitly limits its application to negligence claims). Because of this
factor, the change is being made most promptly and consistently in states that judicially adopted compar-
ative negligence or that statutorily applied comparative negligence to strict liability actions.
85. E.g., Smith v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 600 F. Supp. 1561 (D. Vt. 1985) (evidence of passen-
gers' failure to use seat belt admissible in strict liability action against the manufacturer); Lippard v.
Houdaille Indus., Inc., 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 10,821, at 29,285 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App. Dec. 3, 1985)
(reviewing cases applying comparative fault doctrine to actions based on strict tort liability); see Annot., 9
A.L.R.4TH 633 (1981 & Supp. 1985); Comment, Comparative Negligence and Strict Products Liability:
Where Do We Stand? Where Do We Go?, 29 VILL. L. REV. 695, 698-99 (1984). But cf. Simpson v.
General Motors Corp., 108 Ill.2d 146, 483 N.E.2d 1 (1985) (comparative negligence, as distinguished from
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was too great not to change the meaning of strict liability. Other responses to
the move to comparative negligence continue to evolve.86
In contrast to the nominal absoluteness of the old contributory negligence rule
(and, indeed, antitrust treble damages), the decision of a common law court to
impose punitive tort damages is discretionary.87 The capacity to tailor the pen-
alty to the offense is built into the tort system. Only a showing of outrageous
conduct, and not simple negligence, will justify punitive damages.88
Unusual changes may call for unusual accommodations, however. Of particu-
lar interest is the recent response of the courts to the expansion of liability
through "market share" and related theories. In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories8 9
the California Supreme Court responded to the plight of a class of DES-injured
plaintiffs unable to identify the manufacturers of the drugs that injured them by
creating a new "market share" theory of causation. 90 Under this theory, de-
scribed by the dissent as "a new high water mark in tort law," 91 once a plaintiff
named as defendants "the manufacturers of a substantial share of the DES
which her mother might have taken,"'92 she satisfied her burden of demonstrat-
ing causation. The burden of disproving causation would then be on the named
defendants. This unprecedented step was justified, the court said, because the
cost of injury should be borne by negligent defendants rather than innocent
plaintiffs, and defendants are "better able to bear the cost of injury." In addi-
tion, imposing liability "will provide an incentive to product safety."'93 More
recently, the highest courts of Michigan, Washington, and Wisconsin, while re-
jecting "market share" theories as such, have issued decisions apparently al-
lowing DES-injured plaintiffs to overcome the impossibility of proving
manufacturer-specific causation. 94
product misuse and assumption of risk, cannot be considered in apportioning liability in strict liability
action). For a spirited critique, see Lambert, Tom on Torts, EtAlia, 28 ATLA L. REP. No. 1, at 4, 9-10
(Feb. 1985). The change has occurred principally in products liability suits (as opposed to suits challeng-
ing abnormally dangerous activities), since products liability suits are much more common.
86. See Vannoy v. Uniroyal Tire Co., 2 Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) 110,889, at 29,636-38 (Idaho Nov. 22,
1985) (fault of nonparties considered in strict liability cases); Annot., 16 A.L.R.4TH 700 (1982 & Supp.
1985) (assumption of risk); H. WOODS, supra note 65, chs. 9-13 (wrongful death, statutory violations,
nuisance, person under disability, and multiple parties).
87. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982) ("Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by
reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws ... shall recover threefold the damages by him sus-
tained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee") with W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra
note 65, § 2, at 14 (punitive damages not matter of right; judge and jury always have discretion to decide if
award warranted).
88. See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 65, § 2, at 9-10. For discussion of the role of punitive
damages in the tort system, see R. EPSTEIN, MODERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 172-90 (1980); Ellis,
Fairness & Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1982); Mallor & Roberts,
Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 639 (1980); Owen, Problems in
Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers of Defective Products, 49 U. CmI. L. REv. 1 (1982);
Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MIcH. L. REV. 1258 (1976).
89. 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr. 132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
90. See generally Note, Market Share Liability: An Answer to DES Causation Problem, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 669 (1981).
91. 26 Cal. 3d at 614, 607 P.2d at 938, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 146 (Richardson, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the effect of the theory was "to guarantee that plaintiffs will prevail on the causation issue").
92. 26 Cal. 3d at 612, 607 P.2d at 937, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 145.
93. 26 Cal. 3d at 611, 607 P.2d at 936, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 144.
94. Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 418 Mich. 311, 343 N.W.2d 164, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 123 (1984); Martin
v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 689 P.2d 368 (1984); Collins v. Eli Lilly & Co., 116 Wis. 2d
166, 342 N.W.2d 37, cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 107 (1984). But see Mulcahy v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d
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These expansions of liability are being qualified by limitations on penalties,
however. Although the Sindell court permitted the plaintiff to recover under a
market share theory, a lower California appellate court subsequently held that
the market share theory would not support an award of punitive damages. 95
Similarly, in its decision expanding liability the Wisconsin Supreme Court ruled
that punitive damages would not be permitted. 96
D. CONCLUSION
The above discussions of criminal law, the law under the RICO statute, and
tort law suggest that the legal system tends toward equilibrium positions. Sanc-
tions and standards of liability are interrelated. Adjustments to the imposition
and removal of unreasonably severe sanctions demonstrate this relationship. 97
Where a rule mandates a sanction that actors in the legal system perceive as
unduly harsh, those actors will attempt to mitigate that sanction. The dispro-
portionate severity of the criminal law's "Bloody Code" caused judges, jurors,
and even prosecutors to circumvent it. Some apparently guilty defendants were
released, while others were convicted of lesser offenses bearing more realistic
punishments. When private RICO suits became popular many judges responded
to the perceived inappropriate severity of RICO's "racketeering" stigmatization
and treble damage penalties by limiting the reach of civil RICO. Appellate
courts, constrained by the clarity of legislative intent, have rejected the lower
67, 70-76 (Iowa 1986) (rejecting various theories of recovery in DES case, and reviewing cases). In Col-
lins, the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to adopt the market share theory of liability set out in Sindell.
The court's reluctance stemmed from the difficulty of defining and proving market share. 116 Wis. 2d at
189, 342 N.W.2d at 48. However, it concluded the defendant should pay for the injury if the plaintiff
could prove the defendant produced or marketed the precise kind of drug consumed by her mother. The
plaintiff may move against one manufacturer or more, provided she can prove this. 116 Wis. 2d at 193-94,
342 N.W.2d at 50. InAbel, the Michigan Supreme Court described its theory of liability as a "new DES-
unique version of alternative liability." First, the plaintiff must show that all defendants acted tortiously.
Second, she must prove that her injuries were caused by the conduct of one of the defendants. Finally, she
must prove that her inability to identify the specific manufacturer is not her fault. 418 Mich. at 331-32,
343 N.W.2d at 173. The court limited the application of this theory to negligence cases, reserving consid-
eration of the issue with regard to warranty or strict liability claims. 418 Mich. at 332, 343 N.W.2d at
173. In Martin, the Washington Supreme Court rejected the approaches of Sindell, Collins, and Abel, but
crafted a new "market-share alternate liability." Under this theory, the plaintiff may proceed against one
or more DES manufacturers by alleging (and later proving) that she was injured by DES and that the
defendant(s) negligently produced or marketed DES of a type that was taken by the plaintiff's mother.
102 Wash. 2d at 604, 689 P.2d at 382. Each defendant will be responsible only for a share of injuries equal
to its share of the relevant temporal and geographic market, but defendants will be presumed to have
equal market shares-and bear the burden of proving they did not market in the relevant area or during
the relevant time, or that their market shares are less than the presumed amount. 102 Wash. 2d at 605-06,
689 P.2d at 383.
95. Magallanes v. Superior Court, 167 Cal. App. 3d 878, 883-90, 213 Cal. Rptr. 547, 550-54 (1985)
(citing "basic fairness," "threat of overkill," and "individualized" nature of the punishment). Contra
Morris v. Parke Davis & Co., 573 F. Supp. 1324, 1325-30 (C.D. Cal. 1983) (punitive damages consistent
with Sindell and "indispensable deterrent" to conduct endangering public health). Punitive damages were
requested in Sindell, but that opinion does not address the propriety of awarding them.
96. Collins, 116 Wis. 2d at 202, 342 N.W.2d at 54 (punitive damages an "individualized punishment");
cf. Martin v. Abbott Laboratories, 102 Wash. 2d 581, 604, 689 P.2d 368, 382 (1984) (not discussing
punitive damages but justifying result solely in terms of cost spreading).
97. For speculation about the equilibrating effect of authorizing treble damages penalties for insider
trading, Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified at 15
U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78c, 78o, 78t, 78u, 78ff (Supp. 111984), see Note, Treble Damages, Deterrence, and Their
Relation to Substantive Law: Ramifications of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, 20 VAL. U.L.
REV. 575 (1986).
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courts' initial efforts to limit civil RICO, but other efforts continue. Finally, to
avoid the perceived harshness of barring all recovery for a contributorily negli-
gent plaintiff, juries and judges regularly circumvented or limited the common
law doctrine of contributory negligence. Judges approved jury findings appar-
ently contrary to the facts, and crafted numerous exceptions to the doctrine.
These examples demonstrate that where mandatory penalties seem inappropri-
ate, the legal system will endeavor, subject to institutional constraints, to avoid
their imposition.
The legal system also readjusts to the elimination of the inappropriate sanc-
tion. In criminal law, an increase in convictions followed the reduction in the
"Bloody Code's" penalties. In tort law, the substitution of comparative for con-
tributory negligence has led to the abolition of some of the previously crafted
exceptions to contributory negligence. When a finding of liability results in an
appropriate sanction, the legal system is more likely to find liability. The "mar-
ket share" causation experiences similarly support this conclusion, as some
courts have been willing to expand liability standards but only for a limited
sanction.
The legal system's tendency toward equilibrium-its tendency to adjust liabil-
ity standards in response to the changes in the perceived severity of sanctions-
does not mean that changes will inevitably be nullified by compensating adjust-
ments. Obviously, effective changes in sanction levels occur over time. This re-
flects the role of institutional constraints on the legal system, as illustrated by the
RICO experience. It also reflects changes in beliefs about what constitutes an
inappropriate sanction. The equilibrating tendency of the legal system produces
short-run equilibrium. In the long run the views of the legal system's actors can
change, and with that change may come a changed equilibrium position.
III. EQUILIBRATING TENDENCIES IN ANTITRUST LAW
Suits challenging violations of the federal antitrust laws may be filed by several
categories of plaintiffs: the U.S. Department of Justice, the Federal Trade Com-
mission, state attorneys general, and private parties and other purchasers of
goods and services (including, in their capacity as purchasers, the federal govern-
ment, state governments, and even foreign governments). The U.S. Justice De-
partment may seek criminal penalties and actual damages; foreign governments
may seek actual damages; state governments may seek treble damages for inju-
ries suffered by the state government (or, in a parens patriae action, by natural
persons residing in the state); private parties may seek treble damages; and each
of these classes of plaintiffs, and the Federal Trade Commission, also may seek
civil injunctions. This basic structure of enforcement, two federal enforcement
agencies supplemented by treble damages actions, has remained constant. 98
98. There have been minor changes in the past decade. The level of criminal penalties was increased in
- 1974, parenspatriae damages actions were authorized in 1976, and foreign governments were limited to
actual damages in 1982. Violation of the Sherman Act currently is a felony for which a corporation may
be fined up to $1 million, and an individual may be fined up to $100,000 and be imprisoned for up to three
years. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982). Before 1974, a violation was a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of up to
$50,000 and imprisonment of up to one year. See Antitrust Procedures and Penalties Act of 1974, Pub. L.
No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706. The tax treatment of treble damages penalties has also changed. The tax code
was amended in 1969 to provide that when a taxpayer has been convicted of a criminal antitrust violation
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What has changed has been the volume of treble damages actions. Such suits
were relatively unimportant until about 1950, but they have become increasingly
common and currently represent the overwhelming majority of antitrust suits. 99
Since the end of the 1950's, commentators have speculated about whether the
treble damages remedy may disadvantage antitrust plaintiffs by making it more
difficult for them to prevail.100 More recently, Professors Areeda and Turner
have been identified with the view that the treble damages remedy has limited
the reach of antitrust law. 101 In particular, they suggest that the spectre of large
damage awards may have dissuaded courts from extending monopolization law
to relatively unblameworthy situations.
When a statute has both criminal and civil remedies, it might seem somewhat
anomalous to ask whether the civil remedy has inhibited an expansive interpreta-
tion of the statute. Early Supreme Court cases featured verbal sparring about
the interpretation of language that served a dual civil-criminal function.102 That
or has entered a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charged criminal violation, no deduction will be
allowed for two-thirds of any judgment or settlement in a related private treble damages action. Pub. L.
No. 91-172, § 902, 803 Stat. 487, 710 (1970) (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 162(g) (1982)); see A.B.A. ANTI-
TRUST SECTION, ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS chs. 5-7 (2d ed. 1984 & Supp. 1986) [hereinafter
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS].
99. See Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 373 (1970).
100. See Bicks, The Department of Justice and Private Treble Actions, 4 ANTITRUST BULL. 5, 13 (1959)
("It may well be that the low percentage of private plaintiff's verdicts is due, at least in part, to Courts'
and jurors' inclinations to award no recovery at all when faced with the sometimes harsh alternative of
penalizing unwitting violators with treble damages."); Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doc-
trines of Damages in Private Antitrust Suits, 52 Mica. L. REv. 363, 363-64 (1954) ("It also seems that the
mandatory trebling of any recovery has generated a natural reluctance in the courts to impose prodigious
damages upon violators of the act .... [T]his provision may have hindered, rather than aided, accom-
plishment of the statutory purpose.").
The effect of a change in an antitrust penalty was explored in an interesting paper by Ted Synder. E.
Snyder, "Defensive Effort" and Efficient Enforcement: An Application to Antitrust (June 1984) (unpub-
lished manuscript) (copy on file at the Georgetown Law Journal). He examined the experience of the
Justice Department's Antitrust Division before and after the 1974 amendment of the Sherman Act that
made violations felonies (instead of misdemeanors) and increased financial penalties and length of possible
prison terms. Snyder found that the increase in penalties "significantly reduced the government's chances
of success" in litigated cases. Id. at 3. Since this could have resulted from factors other than a change in
the effective standard of proof (such as reduced violations or increased vigor of defense), it does not prove
the thesis, but it tends to support it.
101. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, 331b2, at 150 ("Mhe availability of damages, and
especially of treble damages, can limit the development of antitrust law. Not only may the courts hesitate
to punish settled expectations, they may justifiably hesitate to apply the antitrust laws to such situations as
blameless monopolies or oligopolies, even though antitrust policy might support equitable remedies alone
in those situations.") (footnote omitted); see GARVEY STUDY, supra note 3, at 33 (relying on Areeda &
Turner); Breit & Elzinga, Private Antitrust Enforcement: The New Learning, 28 J.L. & ECON. 405, 439
(1985) (same). Areeda and Turner also lament that "the lure of the treble damage bonanza, especially for
lawyers in class actions, tends to trivialize antitrust litigation. Ordinary tort and contract claims are
transformed into antitrust complaints." 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, 331b2, at 150
(footnote omitted).
Although the discussion below focuses on enunciated standards of liability, trebling's effect also may
have been felt in the unexplained application of those standards by judges or juries. The discussion of
criminal law illustrated the way judges and juries may strive to achieve rough justice regardless of legal
standards. The same sort of sometimes unexplained adjustments could flow from trebling. (Whether
juries adjust for trebling depends in part on their awareness of it. This writer has not yet succeeded in
measuring the effect of differing rules for disclosure to jurors.)
102. See Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 358 (1904):
It is said that this statute contains criminal provisions and must therefore be strictly construed.
The rule upon that subject is a very ancient and salutary one. It means only that we must not
bring cases within the provisions of such a statute that are not clearly embraced by it, nor by
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sparring soon ended, however. As the Supreme Court recognized in United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 103 "the [Sherman] Act has not been inter-
preted as if it were primarily a criminal statute."'1 4
In Gypsum, the Court explicity adopted different standards for criminal and
civil antitrust liability. Chief Justice Burger reasoned as follows:
With certain exceptions for conduct regarded as per se illegal ... the
behavior proscribed by the [Sherman] Act is often difficult to distin-
guish from the gray zone of socially acceptable and economically justi-
fiable business conduct .... The imposition of criminal liability on a
corporate official, or for that matter on a corporation directly, for en-
gaging in such conduct which only after the fact is determined to vio-
late the statute because of anticompetitive effects, without inquiring
into the intent with which it was undertaken, holds out the distinct
possibility of overdeterrence; salutary and procompetitive conduct ly-
ing close to the border line of impermissible conduct might be shunned
by businessmen who chose to be excessively cautious in the face of un-
certainty regarding possible exposure to criminal punishment for even
a good-faith error of judgment.10 5
Professor Areeda relies on Gypsum to argue that "punitive treble damages are
sufficiently analogous to criminal sanctions to call for the same limitations," but
acknowledges that this view has not been generally adopted by the courts. 10 6
Areeda and Turner and other commentators thus suggest the converse: that fear
of overdeterrence has limited the reach of the antitrust laws, making lawful con-
duct that otherwise would be unlawful and causing plaintiffs to lose suits they
otherwise would win. Antitrust law also could have been limited, at least re-
cently, as a reaction to the sheer volume of litigation. Without the lure of treble
damages, numerous lawsuits would not have been filed, or would have been filed
narrow, technical, or forced construction of words, exclude cases from it that are obviously
within its provisions.
Justice Holmes, in dissent, remarked:
The statute of which we have to find the meaning is a criminal statute .... It is vain to insist
that this is not a criminal proceeding. The words cannot be read one way in a suit which is to
end in fine and imprisonment and another way in one which seeks an injunction. The construc-
tion which is adopted in this case must be adopted in one of the other sort .... So I say we must
read the words before us as if the question were whether two small exporting grocers should go
to jail.
Id. at 401-02; see also United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, 353 (1897) (White, J.,
dissenting):
The well-settled rule is that where technical words are used in an act, and their meaning has
previously been conclusively settled, by long usage and judicial construction, the use of the
words without an indication of an intention to give them a new significance is an adoption of the
generally accepted meaning affixed to the words at the time the act was passed. Particularly is
this rule imperative where the statute in which the words are used creates a crime, as does the
statute under consideration ....
103. 438 U.S. 422 (1978).
104. Id. at 439.
105. Id. at 440-41 (footnote omitted); cf Steadman v. SEC, 450 U.S. 91, 106 (1981) (Powell, J., dissent-
ing) (arguing unsuccessfully for a greater than preponderance of the evidence standard in SEC proceed-
ings to bar association with investment advisors, in light of "the sensitivity that traditionally has marked
our review of the Government's imposition upon citizens of severe penalties and permanent stigma.").
106. P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 59-60 (3d ed. 1981).
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in different forums or for different causes of action. Moreover, because the com-
plexity and burden of litigation presumably increase as a function of the
stakes, 10 7 these treble damages actions may have exacerbated courts' impatience
with antitrust suits. Courts may thus have limited antitrust law for several treble
damages-related reasons.
The logic of this suggestion is seductive but open to question on several
grounds. First, as mentioned in the RICO context, courts may feel obligated to
remain faithful to legislative wishes. Gypsum's line between civil and criminal
enforcement is relatively sharp, so the adoption of separate liability standards
followed easily. The difference between treble and single damages is less pro-
nounced. Perhaps that difference is not sufficiently great to make outcomes
under a treble damages regime much different from what they would have been
with only single damages. Second, much Supreme Court antitrust jurisprudence
involved government suits, and the threat of treble damages may have been of
less concern during the period when fewer private suits were filed.108 Third, and
most important, the incentive to file lawsuits provided by trebling has also given
plaintiffs an incentive to seek to expand the coverage of the antitrust laws. 10 9
Only with trebling would some suits be filed, or at least fied as federal antitrust
claims. Trebling can make worthwhile the pursuit of novel theories. Thus pri-
vate enforcement through treble damages may have broadened rather than lim-
ited the antitrust laws.
In fact, trebling probably has both limited and expanded coverage, at different
times and for different parts of the law. This is suggested by a review of major
substantive and procedural antitrust standards-a review which, in order to
cover most standards, necessarily will treat many only in an abbreviated fashion.
A. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
Before reviewing particular substantive antitrust standards, this article will
compare standards under the antitrust laws to standards under the Federal
Trade Commission Act, 110 the closest approximation to a controlled experiment
comparing antitrust law with and without treble damages. Section 5 of the FTC
107. Cf Trubek, Sarat, Felstiner, Kritzer & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L.
REV. 72, 101-09 (1983) (noting that factors besides stakes also play a role; factors include events in the
case, nature of participants, participant goals, and case processing and management).
108. See M. HANDLER, H. BLAKE, R. PITOFSKY & H. GOLDSCHMID, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
TRADE REGULATION 128 (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter CASES AND MATERIALS ON TRADE REGULATION].
109. Cf I. STELZER, PROCEDURES FOR PRIVATE ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES
28-29 (1983) (multiple damages and use of contingent fee arrangements in Europe "would have the effect
of extending the scope and reach of competition policy in Europe, and soon prompt a clarification of that
policy") (footnote omitted). But cf. DuVal, The Class Action as an Antitrust Enforcement Device: The
Chicago Experience (II), 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1273, 1275-77 (study of Chicago antitrust class
actions showed that "the availability of large fees has not broadened the scope of antitrust enforcement
measured in terms of the kinds of legal theories advanced").
110. The Federal Trade Commission Act is not defined as an antitrust law. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1982); see
Rader v. Balfour, 440 F.2d 469, 471 (7th Cir.) ("conduct which is declared unlawful by § 45 ... need not
be a violation of an antitrust law"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 983 (1971); New Jersey Wood Finishing Co. v.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 332 F.2d 346, 350 (3d Cir. 1964) (FTC Act not an antitrust law), afi'd on
other grounds, 381 U.S. 311 (1965). Comparison also could be made to the antitrust laws of foreign
countries or certain states, see W. LIFLAND, STATE ANTITRUST LAW § 8.03[2 (1984) (minority of states
authorize less than treble damages), but extraneous differences seem even greater than those between the
FTC Act and the antitrust laws. See generally id. chs. 2-7 (review of substantive standards); ANTITRUST
LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 98, at 573-98 (discussion of foreign antitrust laws). One also could
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Act declares unlawful "unfair methods of competition," and conduct may be
condemned under section 5 without fear of treble damages recovery since there
is no private right of action."' Under this statute the Commission may chal-
lenge conduct prohibited by the antitrust laws, but it also may attack unfair and
anticompetitive practices not technically violating those laws." 2 Section 5 is an
imperfect proxy for nontreble damages antitrust law, however, for four reasons:
(1) section 5's language and legislative history color judicial interpretation of it;
(2) the FTC's zealousness in enforcing section 5 and its interest in expanding the
reach of that authority varies from time to time, and the institutional incentives
affecting FTC enforcement policy differ significantly from those affecting private
enforcement; (3) the latitude given the FTC in interpreting section 5 may depend
substantially on the stature of that agency at any given time; and (4) rather than
eliminating treble damages (and allowing recovery of actual damages), section 5
simply offers no private right of action. Nonetheless, comparison of FTC and
antitrust law jurisprudence is useful to an understanding of the impact of treble
damages.113
1. Comparison of Federal Trade Commission and Antitrust Law
Three things are uncertain: first, the extent to which section 5 standards differ
from antitrust law; second, the extent to which this difference, if any, is attribu-
table to the absence of private rights of action; and third, whether any such
attributable difference would continue were there a private right to seek single
damages.
The extent of the difference between section 5 and the antitrust laws used to be
clear. Section 5 could be used to prohibit countless activities immune from anti-
trust challenge, or so language in Supreme Court decisions suggested.
Section 5 enforcement was first expanded to reach conduct that could lead to a
violation of either the Sherman or Clayton Acts were it left unchecked." 4 In
compare antitrust standards before and after the tax treatment of treble damages was changed, as dis-
cussed supra note 98.
111. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982); see ANTrr~UsT LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 98, at 340-41.
112. See FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 106 S. Ct. 2009, 2016 (1986) (dictum) (standards of unfair-
ness encompass not only practices that violate antitrust laws but also practices FTC determines against
public policy); FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972) (FTC empowered to proscribe
unfair or deceptive practices); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683, 694 (1948) ("The Sherman Act and the
Trade Commission Act provide the government with cumulative remedies against activity detrimental to
competition"); FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953) (FTC Act
designed to "supplement and bolster" antitrust laws). The Commission also may directly enforce the
Clayton and Robinson-Patman Acts. Since most FTC investigations question conduct suspect under the
antitrust laws, FTC investigations will frequently be followed by private actions. Conduct may thus be
challenged in separate proceedings both under the FTC Act and under the Sherman Act. Compare Boise
Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980) (FTC Act) with In re Plywood Antitrust Litig., 655
F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1981) (antitrust litigation), cert. dismissed, 462 U.S. 1125 (1983).
113. The discussion that follows briefly reworks ground already plowed by others generally more inter-
ested in FTC jurisprudence (that is, can or should the FTC Act cover more than the antitrust laws) than
in the effect of treble damages in limiting antitrust jurisprudence. See, e.g., ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOP-
MENrs, supra note 98, at 279-83; Hobbs, The Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Trade Commis-
sion Act, in ANTiTRUST ADVISOR 346-53 (3d ed. 1985). For a discussion more similar in focus to the
current one, see E. Synder, supra note 101, ch. VI.
114. See Fashion Originators' Guild v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 466 (1941) (FTC Act intended to reach
illegal acts in their "incipiency"); FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643, 647 (1931) (same); FTC v. Gratz,
253 U.S. 421, 435 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (FTC should intervene before antitrust violation
occurs).
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FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service Co., 115 the Court wrote that the FTC
Act was designed to fill the gaps in the Sherman and Clayton Acts and "to stop
in their incipiency acts and practices which, when full blown, would violate
those Acts." ' 1 6 The reach of section 5 was then extended to prohibit conduct
that violated the "spirit" of the antitrust laws. In Atlantic Refining Co. v.
FTC,117 the Commission condemned as a section 5 violation an agreement be-
tween Atlantic Refining and Goodyear under which Goodyear paid a commis-
sion in return for Atlantic's promotion of Goodyear products to Atlantic's
wholesale and retail service stations. The Supreme Court affirmed, even though
the agreement was not a tying arrangement and thus did not violate the antitrust
laws, because it nonetheless had the "central competitive characteristic" of a
tying agreement, "the utilization of economic power in one market to curtail
competition in another." 118 This use of section 5 to reach the "spirit" of the
antitrust laws was further refined in FTC v. Brown Shoe Co. 119 In Brown Shoe,
the Court upheld the Commission's banning of Brown's franchise program120
even though the Commission had not shown an effect on competition as required
by section 3 of the Clayton Act. It was enough that the program reduced buyer
freedom and thus was in conflict with the "central policy" of the antitrust
laws. 121
The most capacious interpretation of section 5 is FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson
Co. 122 In Sperry & Hutchinson the Supreme Court armed the Commission with
the power to, as one commentator stated, "formulate and enforce competition
policy on its own initiative."' 123 The Court declared that section 5 empowered
the Commission to reach conduct that threatens competition even though it does
not "infringe either the letter or the spirit of the antitrust laws.' 1 24
The breadth of this mandate has been called into question as a result of several
recent decisions. In E.L du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC,125 the Second Cir-
cuit restrained the Commission in its attempts to expand the scope of section
115. 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
116. Id. at 394-95.
117. 381 U.S. 357 (1965).
118. Id. at 369; see also FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 223, 230 (1968) (FTC can act where commerce
"unfairly burdened"); Shell Oil Co. v. FTC, 360 F.2d 470, 479 (5th Cir. 1966) (FTC Act § 5 intended to
defeat practices not specifically proscribed by antitrust laws), cert denied, 385 U.S. 1002 (1967).
119. 384 U.S. 316 (1966).
120. Brown Shoe developed a franchise agreement whereby independent dealers who increased their
purchase of Brown's shoes were provided special benefits. Id. at 318-19.
121. Id. at 321. The Court in Brown Shoe went even further than the Second Circuit had gone a few
years earlier in Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 1962). In Grand Union, the Court of
Appeals agreed with the Commission's decision that Grand Union's inducement of promotional al-
lowances had violated the spirit of § 2(d) of the Robinson-Patman Act. Id. at 99.
122. 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
123. See Averitt, The Meaning of "Unfair Methods of Competition" in § 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, 21 B.C.L. REv. 227, 275 (1980).
124. 405 U.S. at 239. In this often quoted passage the Court stated:
[L]egislative and judicial authorities alike convince us that the Federal Trade Commission does
not arrogate excessive power to itself if, in measuring a practice against the elusive, but congres-
sionally mandated standard of fairness, it, like a court of equity, considers public values beyond
simply those enshrined in the letter or encompassed in the spirit of the antitrust laws.
Id. at 244.
125. 729 F.2d 128 (2d Cir. 1984) vacating In re Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983).
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5.126 The Commission had held that while it was difficult to establish when
consciously parallel activities violate section 1 of the Sherman Act, it was a
"more manageable task" to proscribe such practices under section 5.127 The
Court of Appeals, however, held that the Commission did not have the power to
prohibit conduct without some indication of oppressiveness, that is, an anticom-
petitive intent or an absence of an independent legitimate business purpose for
the conduct.1 28
In Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC,129 the Second Circuit reversed the
Commission's order requiring the Reuben H. Donnelley Co., a monopolist air-
line guide publisher, to change its publication practices. 130  The Commission
held that Donnelley's failure to list certain connecting flights was arbitrary,
caused competitive injury, and violated section 5.131 The Second Circuit re-
versed the Commission, stating that Donnelley had the right to decide with
whom it would deal. The court was unwilling to allow the Commission to
"delve into... 'social, political, or personal reasons' for a monopolist's refusal to
deal," and "to substitute its own business judgment for that of the monopolist in
any decision that arguably affects competition."' 1 32
Thus, even though a section 5 action may be appropriate where a Sherman or
Clayton Act violation is not, the Second Circuit requires the Commission to use
the same analytical process that is used in applying the Sherman and Clayton
Acts. 133 Recent FTC decisions follow this teaching and show a new hesitancy to
extend section 5 beyond the antitrust laws. 134
On balance, then, are FTC standards more encompassing than antitrust stan-
dards? The answer is a cautious "yes." The Supreme Court has not endorsed the
more rigorous scrutiny now being given, at least in the Second Circuit, to FTC
orders. United Air Lines, Inc. v. CAB,1 35 a Seventh Circuit decision upholding a
126. Id. The FrC held that four domestic producers of lead-based antiknock compounds had engaged
in unfair methods of competition in violation of § 5. In re Ethyl Corp., 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983). The
business practices, which were independently and unilaterally adopted, were: (1) a uniform delivered pric-
ing scheme, (2) giving advance notice of price increases, and (3) the use of a "most favored nation clause."
Most favored nation treatment "promises that the buyer will receive the lowest price at which the same
product is sold to any other customer." Id. at 428. The Commission declared that though the adoption of
these practices was noncollusive, taken together they lessened competition in violation of § 5. Id. at 639-
44.
127. Id. at 652.
128. 729 F.2d at 139.
129. 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981).
130. 630 F.2d at 928. The Reuben H. Donnelley Corp. published the "bible" of the airline guide
industry. This guide listed flight schedules for Civil Aeronautics Board certified carriers only and did not
include connecting schedules of noncertifled carriers. The Commission charged that Donnelley had vio-
lated § 5 of the FrC Act because of these publishing policies, which resulted in a restraint of trade. Id. at
922-23.
131. In re Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 95 F.T.C. 1 (1980).
132. 630 F.2d at 927 (quoting United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919)); see also Silcox,
Unfair Methods of Competition: The Courts Revive Proof of Injury to Competition in Antitrust Cases under
§ 5 of the FTC Act, 29 ANTITRUST BULL. 423, 455 (1984).
133. The Ninth Circuit has taken a similar approach. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d. 573
(9th Cir. 1980).
134. See In re General Motors Corp., 103 F.T.C. 641, 701 (1984) (apply "'spirit' theory" with "great
caution" to price discrimination cases); In re General Foods Corp., 103 F.T.C. 204, 365-66 (1984) (requir-
ing same "dangerous probability of success" for attempted monopolization cases brought under § 5 as
under Sherman Act § 2, Commission said it should treat extension of § 5 "cautiously").
135. 766 F.2d 1107 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.).
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Civil Aeronautics Board finding that the biased computerized reservations sys-
tems provided by airlines constituted unfair methods of competition, indicates
the continued vitality of the traditional view. 136 The court reasoned that this
form of conduct by a monopolist probably would be illegal ("whether rightly or
wrongly") under traditional monopoly law, and thus could be prohibited by the
CAB prior to an airline's achieving monopoly power. United Air Lines was a
traditional "incipiency" opinion, and nothing prevents another court from writ-
ing a similar one in another FTC case.
Moreover, for purposes of this article's focus it matters less whether today the
FTC enjoys different standards than whether it has enjoyed them from time to
time. In fact, section 5 has been somewhat less constraining than the antitrust
laws. While the litigated orders demonstrate this additional freedom, it is illus-
trated most sharply by the FTC's initiatives. Examples include the FTC's Lock-
heed consent order banning certain foreign payments, 137 its "shared monopoly"
cereal lawsuit, 138 and its suit against the big oil companies. 139 More recently,
Commissioner Terry Calvani has succumbed to the siren call of section 5 and is
suggesting its use against lawyers who assist firms engaged in otherwise unilat-
eral predatory conduct. 140 Section 5 thus seems to include within its reach viola-
tions of the antitrust laws, and a little more.
To what extent does that "little more" stem from the absence of a private right
of action? Certainly this feature did not play a prominent role in the develop-
ment of the expansive view of FTC jurisprudence. One searches Supreme Court
cases in vain for a thoughtful discussion of why certain conduct should be pro-
hibited only when private parties may not sue. Rather, the focus was on the
peculiar legislative history of the FTC Act. The Act was a reaction to the "rule
of reason" standard established by the Court in Standard Oil Co. v. United
States.14 1 Congress enacted the FTC Act because it feared that the rule of rea-
son was too narrow to control the trusts. 142 As Senator Cummings said, "the
words 'unfair competition' can grow and broaden and mold themselves to meet
circumstances as they arise." 143 It was to this tradition and to the words them-
selves that the Court pointed in writing expansively about section 5.144
Only recently have commentators and the Commission itself regularly focused
on the absence of a private right of action. Areeda and Turner point to this as
the only colorable justification for divergent standards (and would prefer that the
distinction between evaluating conduct for damages and for injunctive relief be
136. The decision was based on § 411 of the Federal Aviation Act, "essentially a copy of section 5" of
the FTC Act. Id. at 1112. See 49 U.S.C. § 1381 (1982).
137. Lockheed Corp., 92 F.T.C. 968 (1978).
138. Kellogg Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) % 19,898 (FTC complaint filed
1972), dismissed, 99 F.T.C. 8 (1982).
139. Exxon Corp., [19731976 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) % 20,388 (complaint announced
July 17, 1973), dismissed, 98 F.T.C. 453 (1981).
140. T. Calvani, Remarks before the ABA Antitrust Section Annual Meeting (July 9, 1985), reprinted
in 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) t 50,475 (1985); see also T. Calvani & R. Tritell, Invocation of United States
Import Relief Laws as an Antitrust Violation, Remarks before the Fordham Corporate Law Institute
(Oct. 3, 1985) (§ 5 covers unilateral import relief abuse).
141. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
142. See ABA ANTrrRusT SECTION, MONOGRAPH No. 5, VOL. 1, THE FTC AS AN ANTITRUST EN-
FORCEMENT AGENCY 4 (1981).
143. 51 CONG. REc. 12,871 (1914).
144. E.g., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239-44 (1972).
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imported into the antitrust laws).145 Other commentators calling for activist
FTC approaches rely in part on this unique feature. 146 In In re Ethyl Corp.,147
the Commission expressly relied on this distinction, advocating its approach as
having "the advantage of not extending liability to private causes of action, re-
sulting in treble damage liability, or creating a prima facie case in a private treble
damages action." 148
The question of the proper weight to give words remains. Does the early ab-
sence of such language mean the point was unimportant? Was such language
used in Ethyl to justify a decision that would have been made regardless? I think
the absence of a private right of action made a difference. Consider the Official
Airlines Guides case. It seems unlikely that such a limitless concept (a duty not
to be arbitrary) would have been espoused in a Sherman Act case. 149 The United
Airlines decision would have been far more difficult were treble damages at stake.
Moreover, the risk of creating excessive recoveries has dissuaded the Depart-
ment of Justice's Antitrust Division from filing certain lawsuits. 150 On balance,
the FTC's freedom from private follow-on litigation has made a modest differ-
ence, for better or worse.
Would an effect also have been felt from the presence of only a single damages
private right of action, as opposed to a right to treble damages? Given the mod-
est difference between FTC and antitrust standards, and that only a portion of
that difference can be attributed to the absence of a private right of action, it
seems unlikely that such a difference in remedy would have caused much vari-
ance in substantive standards.
Comparison between FTC law and antitrust law thus provides only very mod-
est support for the argument that the availability of treble damages has limited
the reach of the antitrust laws. However, because of section 5's peculiar lan-
guage, history, and enforcement mechanism, that comparison does not disprove
the argument either.
2. Review of Antitrust Standards Arguably Affected by the Treble
Damage Remedy
Which substantive antitrust law standards would be different were there no
treble damages bonanzas? Court opinions and commentators suggest the follow-
ing candidates.
Monopolization. Professors Areeda and Turner argue that the treble
damages remedy has made courts reluctant to expand the reach of monopoliza-
145. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, 1307, at 26; see also 6 P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW
1436 (1986) (certain "facilitating practices" should be subject to injunction).
146. See Averitt, supra note 123, at 251 n. 112; Reich, The Future of Unfair Methods of Competition, 50
ANTrTRUST L.J. 801 (1982).
147. 101 F.T.C. 425 (1983), rev'd sub nom. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128 (2d
Cir. 1984); see supra notes 125-28 and accompanying text.
148. 101 F.T.C. at 652.
149. Cf Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
at 14 n.15, 16-17 n.19, FTC v. Official Airline Guides, Inc. (twice noting that finding a violation of § 5
would not expose respondent to a damage claim), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917 (1981).
150. Interview with Thomas E. Kauper, former assistant attorney general for the Antitrust Division.
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tion law.15 1 The suggestion has merit. It seems hard to imagine that the
Supreme Court would have used the sweeping language of Alcoa,152 Griffith, ' 53
Lorain Journal,154 and Grinnel1155 had damages rather than injunctive relief
been sought. 156 To critics, 157 the recent narrowing of the monopolization offense
is typified by two private suits, Berkey Photo15 8 and Telex. 159 In addition, a
federal court first accepted the Areeda-Turner invitation to tailor liability to re-
lief in a monopolization case, by granting judgment n.o.v. for a defendant on all
damage claims but reserving judgment on injunctive relief.160 Finally, the prin-
cipal virtue of the cost-based approach to predatory pricing claims is clarity, and
those courts adopting this approach have done so in response to a perception
that private litigation threatened to lessen competition.1 61 Thus, there is consid-
erable support for the Areeda-Turner suggestion.
It would be a mistake, however, to overemphasize the role of treble damages
in limiting monopolization law. One early expansive monopolization case, East-
man Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co.,162 involved a private action
where the plaintiff recovered treble damages. 163  In United Shoe Machinery
Corp.,164 another expansive monopolization opinion, Judge Wyzanski expressed
his awareness of the treble damages remedy. 165 United Shoe involved an action
151. 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, 331b2, at 150; see also Flynn, Monopolization under
the Sherman Act: The Third Wave and Beyond, 26 ANTITRUST BULL. 1, 100 (1981) ("judicial concern for
defendants subject to substantial treble damage liability... may be an unspoken but potent factor steer-
ing" court analysis in all but clearly unfair conduct cases).
152. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945) (certified to the Second
Circuit in absence of quorum of six Supreme Court Justices qualified to hear case), followed, American
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 811-14 (1946).
153. United States v. Griffith, 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
154. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
155. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
156. For other cases where injunctive relief was sought, see Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410
U.S. 366 (1973), aff'd, 417 U.S. 901 (1974); International Boxing Club, Inc. v. United States, 358 U.S. 242
(1959); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), affl'd per curiam,
347 U.S. 521 (1954).
157. See Flynn, supra note 151; Sullivan, Monopolization: Corporate Strategy, the IBM Cases, and the
Transformation of the Law, 60 TEx. L. REv. 587, 604 (1982).
158. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1093 (1980).
159. Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 927 (10th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S.
802 (1975).
160. SCM v. Xerox Corp., 463 F. Supp. 983, 998 (D. Conn. 1978) ("the need to harmonize the pur-
poses of the patent and antitrust laws may well require recognition that some patent-related conduct
creates antitrust liability only for prospective equitable relief, but not for treble damage remedies, at least
in some circumstances"), afl'd on other grounds, 645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981), cerL denied, 455 U.S. 1016
(1982). For criticisms of the suggestion that liability should depend on remedy, see Berkey Photo, Inc. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 457 F. Supp. 404, 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (no sharp dichotomy between suits in equity
and damage claims on which to tailor liability to relief), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.
1979), cerL denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); Spivak, Monopolization under Sherman Act, Section 2, 50 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 285 (1981). But see Berkey Photo, 603 F.2d at 298 n.57 ("The situation might be different in a
Government equity action.").
161. See infra part IV.c.6. See generally Austin, Negative Effects of Treble Damage Actions: Reflec-
tions on the New Antitrust Strategy, 1978 DUKE L.J. 1353; Baumol & Ordover, Use ofAntitrust to Subvert
Competition, 28 J. LAW & ECON. 247, 254 (1985) (discussing vagueness of antitrust criteria).
162. 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
163. The FTC lost a similar suit only three years earlier in FTC v. Raymond Bros.-Clark Co., 263 U.S.
565 (1924).
164. United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam,
347 U.S. 521 (1954).
165. 110 F. Supp. at 345 n.2 (Supreme Court and Congress "are the only tribunals competent to con-
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brought by the government; the case was followed by a private suit.166 Perhaps
the most controversial case limiting monopolization law, United States v. Empire
Gas Corp.,167 was a government case seeking equitable relief. Conversely, the
most controversial case expanding monopolization law, Lessig v. Tidewater Oil
Co., 168 was a private treble damages action. Moreover, it was the FTC's 1980
decision in du Pont 169 that most clearly demonstrated that Alcoa's expansive
approach has been narrowed. Cost-based pricing rules are now enshrined at the
FTC,170 and the Commission's attempt to use section 5 to expand monopoliza-
tion law was rebuffed by the Second Circuit.1 71 Finally, Aspen Skiing 172 reminds
us that wronged private parties continue to seek, and occasionally find, treble
damages relief.
How, then, would monopolization law differ were there no treble damages?
Not as much as some have suggested. Single damages still would be available, so
this would not be a world with Areeda-Turner's and the SCM district court's
damageless violations.173 Actual damages in a monopolization case can be sub-
stantial. Moreover, equitable relief can be far harsher and more economically
harmful than damage awards. For example, the FTC has proposed imposing
such drastic remedies as the mandatory licensing of a treasured trademark and
the divestiture of brand names. 174 Finally, Official Airline Guides175 demon-
strates the reluctance of modern courts to sanction economic engineering in the
name of antitrust. 176 "No fault" monopolization seems unlikely even were there
no treble damages. The availability of treble damages seems to have affected
monopolization law primarily by stimulating the filing of such a large number of
suits that observers began to believe that nonmeritorious suits were being filed in
part for strategic, anticompetitive purposes. Courts responded by beginning to
terminate such cases in an early stage of litigation.177 In the process, monopoli-
zation law may have become slightly less amorphous and protean, but it is still
sider whether . . . it is appropriate to read a statute having criminal and treble damage provisions as
applying to the mere exercise of effective control of the market").
166. Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 245 F. Supp. 258 (M.D. Pa. 1965), vacated in part on
other grounds, 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
167, 537 F.2d 296 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977); see NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE
REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL 146-47 (1979) (criticizing decision).
168. 327 F.2d 459 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964).
169. In re E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 96 F.T.C. 650 (1980).
170. See, e.g., In re International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 104 F.T.C. 280 (1984) (analytical approach based
on cost-based rules and elements of intent, conduct and probability of success); General Foods Corp., 103
F.T.C. 204 (1984) (same).
171. Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980) (monopolist airline schedule
publisher did not have duty under FTC Act not to discriminate between competing carriers), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 917 (1981); see supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text.
172. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 105 S. Ct. 2847 (1985).
173. See supra notes 145, 160.
174. See In re Borden, Inc., 92 F.T.C. 669, 831 (1978) (continued use of trademark enjoined where
necessary to dissipate illegally acquired and used monopoly power), affd, 674 F.2d 498 (6th Cir. 1982),
vacated and remanded for entry of consent order, 461 U.S. 940 (1983); In re Kellogg Co., [1970-1973
Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 19,898 (FTC complaint filed 1972), dismissed, 99 F.T.C. 8
(1982).
175. Official Airline Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 917
(1981).
176. But see United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), afld sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
177. See infra part IV.c.
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capable of being adapted to cover conduct that cries out for redress. 178
Horizontal Restraints. The classic expansive Supreme Court language
condemning agreements whose purpose or effect is to affect price is found in
criminal antitrust cases. 179 It seems unlikely, therefore, that trebling inhibited
the development of antitrust law's treatment of horizontal restraints. In addi-
tion, the Supreme Court's recent qualifications of the per se ban against price
fixing occurred in civil actions not involving treble damages claims.1 80 This may
suggest that the existence of the treble damages remedy played little part in the
Court's decision to qualify the per se rule. This cannot be proven, of course. In
recent years the Court has become very aware of treble damages, 181 and the fear
of overdeterrence or windfall losses may silently underlie some decisions. None-
theless, the current reconsideration probably would have occurred even in a sin-
gle-damages world. If anything, trebling may have expanded price-fixing law by
providing an incentive for the entrenchment of the ban against maximum
prices.1 82 Nor does the treble damages remedy appear to have limited the reach
of the prohibition of horizontal market division or customer allocation.
Although the essential Supreme Court cases, Sealy 183 and Topco, 184 are govern-
ment injunctive cases, Topco was decided the same year as Hawaii v. Standard
Oil Co.,185 where the Court demonstrated concern about excessive use of treble
damages. Given the contemporaneous focus on that issue, it seems unlikely that
a treble damages suit would have been decided differently.
Four other horizontal restraint categories appear to be more likely candidates
for demonstrating the impact of the treble damages remedy. First, the Supreme
178. Cf Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 105 S. Ct. 2847, 2861 (1985) (inference
that monopolist deliberately discouraged customers from doing business with rival enough to support
claim under Sherman Act § 2); United States v. American Airlines, Inc., 743 F.2d 1114, 1118 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 420 (1985) (determining whether offense of attempted monopolization oc-
curred based on case-by-case review of proximity and magnitude of harm and degree of apprehension).
179. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 n.59 (1940) (conspiracy to fix prices
violates Act "though no overt act is shown, though it is not established that the conspirators had the
means available for accomplishment of the objective, and though the conspiracy embraced but a part of
the interstate or foreign commerce in the commodity"); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S.
392, 396 (1927) (Although only unreasonable restraints are prohibited by the Sherman Act, "it does not
follow that agreements to fix or maintain prices are reasonable restraints and therefore permitted by the
statute, merely because the prices themselves are reasonable."); Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 378
(1913) ("the Sherman Act ... does not make the doing of any act other than the act of conspiring a
condition of liability").
180. See National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Board of Regents, 468 U.S. 85 (1984) (injunctive relief
sought); Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, 441 U.S. 1 (1979) (injunctive relief and declaratory judgment
sought). But cf. Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982) (per se rule applied in
injunctive action).
181. See, eg., Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 737 (1977) (court concerned about new
dimensions of complexity which would be added to treble damages suits if "pass-on" theories under § 4 of
Sherman Act allowed).
182. See Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968) (complainant injured by liquor sellers' con-
spiracy fixing maximum resale prices awarded treble damages); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram
& Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211 (1951) (fixing maximum as well as minimum resale prices by agreement or
combination is per se § 1 Sherman Act violation). But cf Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y,
457 U.S. 332 (1982) (per se rule reaffirmed in injunctive suit).
183. United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
184. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
185. 405 U.S. 251, 263-64 (1972) (to allow states to recover treble damages for injury to general econ-
omy would risk duplicative recoveries).
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Court's recent partial rejection of the intraenterprise conspiracy doctrine' 86
likely resulted in part from the Court's dismay at the excessive use, or attempted
use, of treble damages. 187 Chief Justice Burger explained that the Court's deci-
sion "will simply eliminate treble damages from private state tort suits masquer-
ading as antitrust actions." 188 Crediting or blaming treble damages for this
result is unfair, however, since it was in part in private treble damages cases that
the doctrine was established. 189 If treble damages deserve partial responsibility
for the doctrine's death, it also deserves partial responsibility for its birth and
life.
The Pick-Barth doctrine' 90 is the second category of horizontal restraints
where treble damages probably played an important role. As the Fifth Circuit
stated in the leading case rejecting the doctrine, "only if the defendant can gain
an increment of monopoly through his unfair competition would the additional
sanctions of the Sherman Act, including treble damages and criminal sanctions,
be appropriately used to deter him. Single damages or equivalent injunctive re-
lief is thought sufficient to compensate a firm for unfair competition."'191 How-
ever, were it not for the lure of treble damages, these cases might not have been
brought under the antitrust laws in the first place, for all of the Pick-Barth cases
are private actions. Again, treble damages may deserve credit for both expan-
sion and retreat.
The third part of horizontal restraint law likely to have been affected by treble
damages is the confused area of group boycotts. The lower courts apparently
reacted to the incessant stream of cases involving alleged boycotts by applying
the per se rule only to certain types of concerted refusals to deal. 192 The
Supreme Court has tentatively endorsed these limitations on the per se rule. 193
186. Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984). The intraenterprise conspir-
acy doctrine provided that liability under § I of the Sherman Act is "not foreclosed merely because a
parent and its subsidiaries are subject to common ownership." Id. at 759.
187. For a review of the scores of intra-enterprise cases prior to Copperweld see ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 98, at 11-14.
188. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 777.
189. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968) (summary
judgment for defendant in treble damages case reversed; common ownership does not prevent Sherman
Act from applying to separate corporations, and other conspiracies found); Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 213 (1951) (treble damages awarded complainant injured by liquor
sellers' conspiracy fixing maximum resale prices; common ownership and control does not prevent appli-
cation of antitrust laws). But cf Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951)
(dictum) (in government injunction action, Court said fact of common ownership does not protect against
antitrust laws, citing Kiefer-Stewart); United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947) (in
government injunction action challenging series of acquisitions of taxicab companies and conspiracies
among the acquired companies, Court said that "in this case, the common ownership and control of the
various corporate appellees are impotent to liberate the alleged combination and conspiracy from the
impact of the Act"). Because the language in other cases is dicta or forms only alternative holdings,
Copperweld cites Kiefer-Stewart at "the one case giving support to the intra-enterprise conspiracy doc-
trine." 467 U.S. at 763.
190. See Albert Pick-Barth Co. v. Mitchell Woodbury Corp., 57 F.2d 96, 102 (Ist Cir.), cert. denied,
286 U.S. 552 (1932) ("If a conspiracy is proven, the purpose or intent of which is by unfair means to
eliminate a competitor in interstate trade and thereby suppress competition, such a conspiracy... is a
violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act."). See generally ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra
note 98, at 53-54.
191. Northwest Power Prods., Inc. v. Omark Indus., Inc., 576 F.2d 83, 89 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1116 (1979).
192. For a review of these cases, see ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 98, at 43-49.
193. See Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and Printing Co., 105 S. Ct. 2613,
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Moreover, Fashion Originators' Guild,1 94 one of the early Supreme Court cases
with expansive language, featured a challenge under the FTC Act. Since other
important expansive Supreme Court boycott cases, Klor's,195 Radiant Burn-
ers,196 and Silver,197 featured suits for treble damages, again it seems doubtful
that trebling chilled the initial expansion of the law. Instead, it may have served
as a tonic. Perhaps the recent retrenchment would have been prevented or
delayed had trebling not stimulated so many suits, but again the remedy's net
effect is uncertain.
Finally, the treble damages remedy may have had a significant effect on the
development of conscious parallelism and data dissemination law. The delivered
pricing cases were first brought under the FTC Act, 198 and most of the other
important expansive Supreme Court cases featured government injunctive
suits. 199 The cold water of Theatre Enterprises2°° and Matsushita,201 private
treble damages cases, is in sharp contrast. Although courts have rebuffed the
FTC's efforts to exploit section 5 to expand this part of the law, 20 2 the FTC's
continued exploration of the bounds of illegality in this area203 suggests that
2621 (1985) (rule of reason applied instead of per se rule where challenged activity not likely to have
predominantly anticompetitive effect); see also FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 106 S. Ct. 2009, 2018
(1986) ("theper se approach has generally been limited to cases in which firms with market power boycott
suppliers or customers in order to discourage them from doing business with a competitor").
194. Fashion Originators' Guild of Am., Inc. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457 (1941).
195. Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
196. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961) (per curiam).
197. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
198. FTC v. National Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419 (1957); FTC v. Cement Inst., 333 U.S. 683 (1948);
Triangle Conduit & Cable C. v. FTC, 168 F.2d 175 (7th Cir. 1948), affid by an equally divided court sub
nom. Clayton Mark & C. v. FTC, 336 U.S. 956 (1949).
199. See United States v. Container Corp. of Am., 393 U.S. 333, 334 (1969) (conspiracy found where
exchange of price information even though no agreement to adhere to price schedule); Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939) ("It was enough that, knowing that concerted action was
contemplated and invited, the distributors gave their adherence to the scheme and participated in it.");
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948) (applied expansive principle that to
find conspiracy it is not necessary to have express agreement; enough that concert of action is contem-
plated and defendants' actions conform to arrangement); United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 333
U.S. 364, 394 (1948) (applied expansive principle that when group of competitors enters into series of
separate but similar agreements with competitors or others, strong inference arises that such agreements
are result of concerted action); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265, 275 (1942) (participants in
conspiracy expanded to include those who did not intend to participate in concert of action; "must be held
to have intended the necessary and direct consequences of their acts"). But see American Tobacco C. v.
United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946) (classic definition of conspiracy as "a unity of purpose or a
common design and understanding, or a meeting of minds in an unlawful arrangement" written in crimi-
nal case); cf Ambook Enters. v. Time Inc., 612 F.2d 604, 613-18 (2d Cir. 1979) (private treble damages
conscious parallelism suit should continue), cert. dismissed, 448 U.S. 914 (1980); Bogosian v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 561 F.2d 434, 446 (3d Cir. 1977) (reversing dismissal of private treble damages suit), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1086 (1978).
200. Theatre Enters., Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
201. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1357 (1986) (ruling that
summary judgment had been improperly granted, the Court said "antitrust law limits the range of permis-
sible inferences from ambiguous evidence in a § 1 case"). For a discussion of the case, see infra part
IV.B.4.
202. See E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 139 (2d Cir. 1984) (relying in part on
Theatre Enterprises); Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573 (9th Cir. 1980) (industrywide adoption of
delivered pricing system using West Coast freight not per se violation of FTC Act).
203. Compare American Soc'y of Internal Medicine, 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 22,242 (FTC advisory
opinion April 19,1985) ("relative value guides" would be illegal under rule of reason) with United States v.
American Soc'y of Anesthesiologists, Inc., 473 F. Supp. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("relative value guides"
upheld against per se rule attack).
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antitrust law may have been limited by the worry about treble damages. It
seems likely that the availability of treble damages has limited the expansion of
the law concerning horizontal coordination short of actual agreements on price
and output.
Vertical Restraints. The treble damages remedy currently seems to be
limiting the breadth of antitrust law's condemnation of certain vertical re-
straints. The Supreme Court's recent attempt in Monsanto204 to draw some
sharp lines between the types of conduct subject to the rule of reason and those
subject to the per se rule appears to be a response to the treble damage remedy:
[I]t is of considerable importance that independent action by the manu-
facturer, and concerted action on nonprice restrictions, be distin-
guished from price-fixing agreements, since under present law the latter
are subject to per se treatment and treble damages .... If an inference
of [a price-fixing] agreement may be drawn from highly ambiguous evi-
dence, there is a considerable danger that the doctrines enunciated in
Sylvania and Colgate will be seriously eroded .... In sum, "[t]o permit
the inference of concerted action on the basis of receiving complaints
alone and thus to expose the defendant to treble damage liability would
both inhibit management's exercise of independent business judgment
and emasculate the terms of the statute."
Thus, something more than evidence of complaints [about price-cut-
ting distributors] is needed. There must be evidence that tends to ex-
clude the possibility that the manufacturer and nonterminated
distributors were acting independently. 20 5
Earlier developments in the vertical restraint area similarly indicate the limit-
ing effect of the treble damages remedy. The doctrine of "patent misuse" illus-
trates this point. A finding of "misuse" resulted in unenforceability of a patent
but not in exposure to treble damages, and a number of largely vertical practices
were condemned as "misuse. '20 6 The current Justice Department, appalled by
the reach of this rogue doctrine, unrestrained by trebling's sobering companion-
ship, has sought to limit patent misuse to cases where antitrust violations are
also found. 20 7 Indeed, most of the expansive Supreme Court language in the
vertical restraint area appears in cases which, like United States v. Arnold
Schwinn & Co.,208 did not involve treble damages. 20 9 The Supreme Court re-
204. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
205. Id. at 763-64 (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 n.2 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981)) (footnote omitted).
206. See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 695 (D.S.C. 1977) (licensing pro-
gram constituted patent misuse but not vertical restraint), aft'd in part, rev'd in part, 594 F.2d 979 (4th
Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1015 (1980); ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 98, at 489;
Hoerner, Patent Misuse, 53 ANTrrRUST L.J. 641 (1984).
207. See S. 1841, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. tit. IV (1983) (would amend 35 U.S.C. § 271 so that listed
activities not classified as patent misuse unless also antitrust violations); see also Delman, Property Rights
Theory and Patent-Antitrust: The Role of Compulsory Licensing, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 977, 1005-13 (1977)
(criticizing misuse doctrine).
208. 388 U.S. 365 (1977).
209. E.g., United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362
U.S. 29 (1960); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt Co. v. United
States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947); Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons, Co., 220 U.S. 373, 382 (1911)
1094 [Vol. 74:1065
EQUILIBRATING TENDENCIES
versed its expansive approach in a private treble damages case, Continental TV,
Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,21O and followed scores of lower court decisions that
had crafted exceptions to Schwinn in an effort to deny treble damages awards. 211
Again, the possible limiting effect of treble damages should not be overstated.
Absent treble damages, it is less likely that private litigants would seek antitrust
remedies in cases like Albrecht v. Herald Co. 212 and Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v.
United States Steel Corp.,213 two of the more extreme applications of vertical
restraint law. The treble damages remedy, moreover, must share responsibility
for current Supreme Court views with the dramatic changes in accepted eco-
nomic learning that occurred in the decade prior to GTE Sylvania.214 But treb-
ling probably has contributed to the current limiting of vertical restraint law.
Jurisdictional Reach of the Antitrust Laws. A number of courts have
ruled that the extraterritorial reach of the antitrust laws should be decided in
particular cases at least in part through considerations of international com-
ity.215 Some courts regard these considerations as proper elements of the deter-
mination of subject matter jurisdiction; others regard review of these
considerations as appropriate only in deciding whether to decline jurisdiction as
a matter of discretion. Whatever the context, several of the factors to be weighed
in evaluating comity considerations are likely to be affected by the size of the
antitrust sanction, including the "[d]egree of conflict with foreign law or policy"
and the "[p]ossible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction
and grants relief."'216 Since foreign abhorrence of treble damages is legendary, 217
any balancing process weighing such factors could conceivably come out differ-
(Dr. Miles involved an (unsuccessful) attempt to enforce a contract with an anticompetitive restraint,
rather than an attempt to recover treble damages for injuries caused by the restraint.). But see Fortner
Enters., Inc. v. U.S. Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495 (1969) (use of credit as tying product provides basis for
finding of vertical restraint in treble damages suit); Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (fixing
maximum price is per se violation of antitrust law in treble damages suit); Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 377
U.S. 13 (1964) (use of consignment agreement to engage in resale price maintenance violates antitrust laws
in treble damages suit).
210. 433 U.S. 36 (1977). GTE Sylvania overruled the per se rule of Schwinn and held that a rule of
reason standard must be used to review all nonprice vertical restraints. Ia. at 58-59; see also Packard
Motor Car Co. v. Webster Motor Car Co., 243 F.2d 418 (D.C. Cir.) (limiting restricted distribution law in
treble damages case), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 822 (1957). But cf United States v. Jerrold Elecs. Corp., 187
F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960) (imiting tying law in government injunctive case), affldper curiam, 365 U.S.
567 (1961).
211. See A.B.A. Antitrust Section, Monograph No. 2, Vertical Restrictions Limiting Intrabrand Com-
petition (1977) (listing pre-GTE Sylvania cases).
212. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
213. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
214. See GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. at 48 n.13 (listing articles critical of Schwinn); see also Williamson,
Commentary, in R. Tollison, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF ANTITRUST: PRINCIPAL PAPER BY WIL-
LIAM BAXTER ch. 5 (1980) (noting recent importance of economics while tracing trends in antitrust analy-
sis). The difficulty of segregating the responsibility of economic learning for changes in antitrust also
plagues the evaluation of trebling's effect on other standards.
215. E.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 280 (D.D.C. 1984);
ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 98, at 529-31 (citing cases). See generally 1 J. ATWOOD &
K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BusINEss ABROAD § 6.21 (2d ed. 1981). But cf Laker
Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 948-53 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (criticizing other
courts' comity "balancing tests").
216. Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1297-98 (3d Cir. 1979); see also
Laker Airways, 604 F. Supp. at 292-93 (discussing factors in Mannington Mills).
217. See 404 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) 562 (1980) (comments of Lord Mackay) (British companies
should be protected from the "penal element" and "unjustified enrichment" of treble damages); see also 1
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ently today than if only single damages were available.218 However, given both
the paucity of cases engaging in such a balancing process, and doubts about the
frequency with which that process has affected outcomes even when used, it
seems unlikely that many cases would be decided differently were there no treble
damages.
The effect of trebling on the domestic jurisdictional reach of the antitrust laws
is also ambiguous. In a series of private treble damages cases decided primarily
during the past decade, the Supreme Court substantially relaxed the domestic
jurisdictional limits, leading commentators to wonder whether the requirement
of interstate effects continues to serve as a meaningful restriction.219 It seems
doubtful that government lawyers or private plaintiffs entitled only to single
damages would have pushed the outer bounds of antitrust coverage so far.
The relaxation of the commerce requirement caused the courts to be "deluged
with complaints" alleging that denial of medical staff privileges restrained
trade.220 This wave may have crested, as some courts are becoming more reluc-
tant to find jurisdictional requirements satisfied. 221 Although this may simply be
a retreat from an overexuberant reading of the Supreme Court cases, it may be
reinforced by concern about the availability of treble damages. For instance, the
Seventh Circuit recently adverted to an antitrust damages request of $13.5 mil-
lion, before trebling, when it required the pleading of specific facts from which
the requisite effect on commerce could be inferred. 222 Moreover, although many
J. ATWOOD & K. BREWSTER, supra note 215, § 4.18 (2d ed. 1981 & Supp. 1985) (reviewing foreign
statutes aimed in part at neutralizing treble damages authority).
218. Accord GARVEY STUDY, supra note 3, at 41.
219. McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 235 (1980) (injunctive relief also sought); Hospital Bldg.
Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1980) (injunction and more than $2 million sought); Goldfarb
v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 778 (1975) (injunctive relief and damages sought); Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 190 (1974) (same); see P. AREEDA, supra note 106, at 133 (concluding
that McLain requires interstate connections but suggests ease with which they are established); CASES
AND MATERIALS ON TRADE DEREGULATION, supra note 108, at 160 (asking "[a]fterMcLain, how much
room is left for a jurisdictional defense given the Court's willingness to focus on the 'brokerage activity' as
opposed to the 'effect on interstate commerce caused by the alleged conspiracy'?"); Comment, Expanding
FederalAntitrust Jurisdiction: A Close Look at McLain v. Real Estate Board, Inc., 19 HOUSTON L. REV.
143 (1981) (Supreme Court should reconsider effect of McLain test and provide guidelines for narrowing
scope of Sherman Act jurisdiction). See generally ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 98, at
24-28.
220. Marrese v. Interqual, Inc., 748 F.2d 373, 381 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 3501 (1985).
221. See, eg., Stone v. William Beaumont Hosp., 5 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 1 66,932, at 61,798-800
(6th Cir. Jan. 30, 1986) (denial of physician staff privileges had only de minimis impact on interstate
commerce); Seglin v. Esau, 769 F.2d 1274 (7th Cir. 1985) (physician denied hospital admittance privileges
filed antitrust action but complaint dismissed because physician failed to adequately allege challenged
activites in interstate commerce); Hayden v. Bracy, 744 F.2d 1338, 1342-43 (8th Cir. 1984) (physician
who claimed that other physicians at hospital combined to assert monopoly power in taking disciplinary
action against him did not prove that alleged activity occurred in interstate commerce); Furlong v. Long
Island College Hosp., 710 F.2d 922, 927 (2d Cir. 1983) (physician denied hospital staff privileges failed to
state claim because allegation that loss of revenue from out of state insurers insufficient to establish con-
nection to interstate commerce). But see El Shahawy v. Harrison, 778 F.2d 636, 641 (1Ith Cir. 1985)
(finding jurisdiction where alleged that "defendent's business activities have a substantial impact on inter-
state commerce").
222. Seglin v. Esau, 769 F.2d at 1280 n.6 ("it is 'hard to ignore the suspicion that the facts of this case
have been forced into an antitrust mold to achieve federal jurisdiction' ") (quoting Havoco of Am., Ltd. v.
Shell Oil Co., 626 F.2d 549, 559 (7th Cir. 1982)); see also Doe v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 788 F.2d 411, 417
n.10 (7th Cir. 1986) (affirming in relevant part sua sponte dismissal of physician's challenge to suspension
of staff privileges, court noted such claims "may border on the frivolous"). For a commentator's lament
that lower courts deciding medical staff exclusion cases are failing to follow Supreme Court teachings and
are applying overly restrictive interstate commerce standards, see Note, Sherman Act "Jurisdiction" in
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of these private suits seek injunctive relief, there may have been less of an un-
seemly "deluge" had treble damages not enticed plaintiffs.
Even if the possible current retrenchment finds support in concern about treb-
ling, that would not demonstrate that trebling has limited the domestic jurisdic-
tional reach of the antitrust laws. If the Supreme Court cases relaxing
jurisdictional requirements (or other cases achieving the same doctrinal result)
would not have been brought or pursued vigorously without the lure of treble
damages, that remedy may have served to broaden the domestic jurisdictional
coverage of the antitrust laws. The net effect is difficult to gauge.
Antitrust Exemptions. Trebling has at least increased the number of anti-
trust exemptions and has probably broadened them. If nothing else, horror sto-
ries about gargantuan penalties imposed on constituents attract notice on
Capitol Hi, 2 2 3 and the greater the damages threatened, the more cost-effective
the hiring of high-priced lobbyists becomes. Without treble damages, there
might well be no Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984,224 National Cooper-
ative Research Act of 1984,225 Shipping Act of 1984,226 Export Trading Com-
pany Act of 1982,227 or, perhaps, Soft Drink Interbrand Competition Act,228 to
mention only recently enacted exemptions.
Congressional concern about treble damages also may have buttressed judicial
concern and have led to broader interpretations of antitrust exemptions than
would otherwise have been adopted. This suggestion is best supported in con-
nection with the state action exemption.229 The dissenting justices in Cantor v.
Hospital Staff Exclusion Cases, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 121 (1983). For an argument that frivolous staff
exclusion cases can be decided easily on the merits without resort to jurisdictional barriers, see Havig-
hurst, Doctors and Hospitalk An Antitrust Perspective on Traditional Relationships, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1071,
1142-44 (1984).
223. Cf H.R. REP. No. 965, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (antitrust damages exposure "may be of a
different and potentially more harmful type than other legal risks confronting local governments"), re-
printed in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 4602, 4611-12.
224. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 34-36 (West Supp. 1986) (damages may not be recovered from local governments);
see supra note 223. See generally ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 98, at 612 (supplement
reviews statute).
225. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 4301-4305 (West Supp. 1986) ("joint research and development ventures" subject
only to rule of reason review, and when antitrust agencies notified in advance plaintiffs limited to actual
damages); see S. REP. No. 427, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (additional views of Sens. Hatch, Laxalt, Simp-
son, East, and Denton) (treble damages creates "bias in favor of litigation" that "has no place in the
present context"), reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 3105, 3121.
226. 46 U.S.C.A. §§ 1701-1706, 1715 (West Supp. 1986) (broadening shipping's antitrust immunity
and eliminating certain private rights of action); see H.R. REP. No. 53, pt. 1, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 45-46
(1983) (letter to Walter B. Jones, Chairman of House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
from Drew Lewis, Secretary of Transporation, arguing that ocean carrier agreements "should be clearly
immune from the antitrust laws, without any danger of application of antitrust penalties" (Feb. 5, 1982)),
reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 167, 210-11.
227. 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4021 (1982) (Certification of Review for export trading activities would limit
injured parties to single damages and create presumption of legality); see H.R. REP. No. 637, pt. 1, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (certification designed to reduce "'chilling' effect of antitrust laws"), reprinted in 1982
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2431, 2437. See generally ANzrrRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note
98, at 572-73 (reviewing certificate program).
228. 15 U.S.C. §§ 3501-3521 (1982) (special standard for vertical restraints by soft drink licensors); see
H.R. REP. No. 1118, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (bill "responds to... concerns of prolonged antitrust damage
liability"), reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE CONG. & A.D. NEWS 2373, 2376.
229. See S.P. Posner, The Proper Relationship Between State Regulation and the Federal Antitrust Laws,
49 N.Y.U. L. REv. 693, 728-29 (1974) (suggesting need to limit awards of treble damages against states);
Note, Antitrust Treble Damage as Applied to Local Government Entities: Does the Punishment Fit the
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Detroit Edison Co. 230 and City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.2 3 1
expressed dismay at the liability threatening municipalities. The Court in Lafay-
ette reserved judgment on the questions of remedy.232 While recent broad read-
ings of the state action exemption233 were not necessarily responsive to fears
about remedy, some of those readings surprised commentators looking only at
the logic of the Court's previous interpretations. 234 The perceived treble dam-
ages problem undoubtedly played a role. More recently, this perceived problem
may have influenced the Court's decision to preserve the immunity from ship-
pers' private treble damages actions for rates duly submitted to the Interstate
Commerce Commission and lawful under the Interstate Commerce Act.235 It
also may have played, or will play, a role in broadening other exemptions. 236
Defendant?, 1980 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 411, 420 ("severity of treble damages may act as a disincentive for courts
to impose antitrust liability on municipalities"). These two writers, and Areeda & Turner, called for
judicial limiting of damage recoveries from public actors. See 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, %
217a3. As with other parts of antitrust law-such as jurisdictional reach-it is conceivable that trebling's
stimulus for novel private suits may have offset any chilling effect on courts considering whether to ex-
pand the part of the economy subject to antitrust. Most of the leading Supreme Court cases limiting the
state action exemption, however, probably would have been filed even if there were no treble damages.
See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982) (injunction sought); Califor-
nia Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (same); City of Lafayette v.
Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (antitrust counterclaim). But see Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976) (treble damages class action). It thus seems likely that the net effect of
trebling has been to expand the exemption.
230. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 615 (1976) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
231. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 440 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissent-
ing) (warning of "staggering costs" that "would assure bankruptcy for almost any municipality"); id. at
443 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) ("the prospect of insolvency for petitioner cities would so threaten the
welfare of their inhabitants").
232. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 401-02.
233. Southern Motor Carriers Rate Conference v. United States, 105 S. Ct. 1721 (1985); Town of
Hallie v. City of Eau Claire, 105 S. Ct. 1713 (1985); Hoover v. Ronwin, 466 U.S. 558 (1984).
234. See J. Briggs & S. Calkins, Antitrust Update 1984-1985: Remarks to the Conference Board's An-
nual Antitrust Program 28-29 (Mar. 7, 1985) (incorrectly predicting the plaintiff would win in Southern
Motor Carriers) (unpublished monograph on file at Georgetown Law Journal); Campbell, Supreme Court
Update-State Action Immunity from Antitrust Law, 53 ANTiTRusT L.J. 429, 432 (1984) (incorrectly
predicting the plaintiff would win in Town of Hallie).
235. Square D Co. v. Niagara Frontier Tariff Bureau, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 1922 (1986). In Square D the
Court declined to overrule Keogh v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry., 260 U.S. 156 (1922), thus rejecting
invitations from the Solicitor General, 106 S. Ct. at 1927, and Judge Friendly, writing for the court of
appeals below, 760 F.2d 1347, 1349 (2d Cir. 1985) ("much of the reasoning of Keogh seems outdated," but
"if there is to be an overruling, that task is for the Supreme Court"). Keogh had immunized rates in
properly filed tariffs from treble damages suits by shippers, but not from government suits for injunctions,
forfeiture, or criminal sanctions. 260 U.S. at 161-62; see also Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439,
453 (1945) (government could sue). SquareD's upholding oftheKeogh immunity was nominally based on
principles of stare decisis, 106 S. Ct. at 1930-31, but the Court took pains to emphasize the limited extent
of that immunity. The Court pointed to the "critical distinction" between complete immunity and "a far
more limited non-availability of the private treble-damages remedy." Id. at 1929-30 n.28. "Keogh simply
held that an award of treble damages is not an available remedy for a private shipper claiming that the
rate submitted to, and approved by, the ICC was the product of an antitrust violation." Id. at 1929. This
emphasis on treble damages in a decision preserving an immunity of questionable merit suggests the result
might have been different had only single damages been available. See generally Velvel, 'Keogh' Re-
mains-but So Do Doctrine's Limits, Legal Times, July 14, 1986, at 26 (Square D Court doubted wisdom
of immunity).
236. Cf. Consolidated Express, Inc. v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 602 F.2d 494 (3d Cir. 1979) (nonstat-
utory labor exemption would limit plaintiff to injunctive relief where employer-union agreement was ille-
gal if the defendant could not have foreseen that the agreement would violate the labor laws, the illegal
agreement was closely related to the objectives of collective bargaining, and the object of the agreement
was not more restrictive than reasonably necessary), vacated sub nom. International Longshoremen's
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B. PROCEDURAL AND REMEDIAL LAW, OTHER THAN SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND MOTIONS TO DISMISS
Several nonsubstantive parts of antitrust law may have developed differently
were there no trebling.
1. In Pari Delicto
Although Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.237 rejected the
in pari delicto defense in private antitrust actions, five Justices endorsed this de-
fense where a plaintiff equally and voluntarily participates in the challenged con-
duct.238 Trebling influenced the five justices to recommend preserving this part
of the defense. To Justice Harlan it seemed "bizarre... to pay violators three
times their losses in doing what public policy seeks to deter them from doing." 239
Justice Marshall could not "agree that the public interest requires that a plaintiff
who has actively sought to bring about illegal restraints on competition for his
own benefit be permitted to demand redress-in the form of treble damages-
from a partner who is no more responsible for the existence of the illegality than
the plaintiff.' '24° Moreover, as recognized by one court, the interest in prevent-
ing windfall gains "justifies application of the complete involvement defense to
an action for treble damages," but not to an action seeking injunctive and declar-
atory relief.241 Thus, it appears that the treble damages remedy has played a role
in the development of this doctrine and may play a role in the future.
2. Class Actions
In the absence of treble damages, fewer class action damages requests would
"shock the conscience" and be rejected for sheer oppressiveness. 242 Although
Ass'n v. Consolidated Express, Inc., 448 U.S. 902 (1980), modified, 641 F.2d 90 (3d Cir.), mandamus
denied, 451 U.S. 905 (1981).
237. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
238. 392 U.S. at 146 (White, J., concurring); id. at 147-48 (Fortas, J., concurring in the result); id. at
149 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result); id. at 154 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
239. Id. at 154 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
240. Id. at 151 (Marshall, J., concurring in the result). Since the Supreme Court just last term incorpo-
rated the Perma Life rejection of the in pad delicto defense, including the exception for equal culpability,
into securities law, Eichler v. Berner, 105 S. Ct. 2622 (1985), one could argue that trebling was irrelevant
to the equal-culpability exceptions. On the other hand, the Court's familiarity with the exception may
explain its adoption into securities law.
241. THI-Hawaii, mc. v. First Commerce Fin. Corp., 627 F.2d 991, 996 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Gen-
eral Leaseways v. National Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744 F.2d 588, 597 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J.) (in pad
delicto defense rejected in injunctive action, but there would be a "very serious" problem were the plaintiff
"seeking damages measured by the loss of cartel profits"); cf Florists' Nationwide Telephone Delivery
Network v. Florists' Tel. Delivery Ass'n, 371 F.2d 263, 271 (7th Cir.) (same "independent equitable
consideration" might require different outcomes for damages and injunctive relief aspects of treble dam-
ages case defended on grounds of "unclean hands"), cert denied, 387 U.S. 909 (1967).
242. As the Ninth Circuit said in Kline v. Coldwell, Banker & Co., 508 F.2d 226 (9th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975), "the amount of a recovery in a lawsuit is not ordinarily of concern where a
wrong has been inflicted and an injury suffered. But when 2000 are joined in an action in which each is
jointly and severally liable, the liability is increased in geometric progression. Such an award would shock
the conscience." 508 F.2d at 234. See Arth Main St. Drugs v. Beer Distribs., Inc., 26 Fed. R. Serv. 2d
(Callaghan) 87, 90 (N.D. Ind. 1978) (trebled recovery "might well bankrupt many of the present and
potential defendants"); Hooley v. Red Carpet Corp. of Am., 1975 Trade Cas. (CCH) 60,2895, at 66,112
(D. Or. April 1, 1975) (certification denied where size of potential liability might "result in some or all of
the defendants opting for a settlement with some or all of the plaintiffs whether they were guilty of the
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without trebling the legal standards would not necessarily be different, those
standards, as applied, would likely lead to some different outcomes. It follows,
therefore, that class actions would be more easily certified were there no trebling.
3. Proof of Damages
Ever since Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc.,243 antitrust courts have ac-
commodated imperfections in plaintiffs' proof of damages. With good reason,
Richard Posner has labeled Bigelow as the stimulus for the surge of private anti-
trust actions. 244 In recent years, however, courts have qualified Bigelow by in-
sisting that plaintiffs show a "fair degree of certainty" as to the fact of injury,245
as opposed to the amount. Some courts have limited Bigelow even more directly
by requiring a careful "segregation" between injuries caused by lawful conduct
and those resulting from unlawful conduct or, in some cases, even among inju-
ries caused by different illegal activities.246 In MCI Communications Corp. v.
American Telephone and Telegraph Co.,247 for instance, the Seventh Circuit ex-
plained that careful segregation was required to avoid forcing a defendant "to
pay treble damages for conduct that was determined to be entirely lawful. ' 248 In
general, courts have apparently begun to scrutinize damages claims more rigor-
ously.249 While proof is still in short supply, it seems that trebling has contrib-
uted to the modifications of the Bigelow standards.
plaintiffs' allegations or not"). But see Chevalier v. Baird Say. Ass'n, 72 F.R.D. 140, 150 (E.D. Pa. 1976)
(possible "staggering liability" did not affect superiority of class action).
243. 327 U.S. 251, 264 (1946) (evidence sufficient to enable jury to "make a just and reasonable esti-
mate of the damage"); see also Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555, 563
(1931) ("while the damages may not be determined by mere speculation or guess, it will be enough if the
evidence show the extent of the damages as a matter of just and reasonable inference, although the result
be only approximate").
244. Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & EcON. 365, 373-74 (1970).
245. See ANTTRuST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 98, at 407-08 n.193.
246. See MCI Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1160-69 (7th Cir.)
(jury may not make reasonable and principled estimate of damages when plaintiff improperly attributes all
losses to defendant's illegal acts despite presence of significant other factors), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 891
(1983); Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 297 (2d Cir. 1979) ("a purchaser may
recover only for the price increment that 'flows from' the distortion of the market caused by the monopo-
list's anticompetitive conduct"), cert denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980); ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v.
IBM Corp., 458 F. Supp. 423, 434 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (since plaintiff not able to isolate impact of each of
defendant's acts, no basis for jury to determine "what effect on damages would be if one or more of
defendant's challenged acts found lawful"), afl'd, 636 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972
(1981). For discussion of these issues, see J. Shenefield, Shifting Requirements for Proof of Damages and
Standards for Injunctive Relief Remarks Before the 18th Annual New England Antitrust Conference in
Boston, Mass. (Nov. 2-3, 1984); Comment, Segregation of Antitrust Damages: An Excessive Burden on
Private Plaintiffs, 72 CALIF. L. REV. 403 (1984).
247. 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
248. 708 F.2d at 1163.
249. See, eg., MCI Communications, 708 F.2d at 1160-69 (separate trial on damages ordered where
first jury had no way to adjust award to reflect dismissal of several claims for failure to prove unlawful
competition); Southern Pac. Communications Co. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 556 F. Supp. 825, 1073-75
(D.D.C. 1982) (judgment for defendants where evidence insufficient to provide reasonable basis for deter-
mining amount of damages), affld, 740 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1721 (1985);
Ways & Means, Inc. v. IVAC Corp., 506 F. Supp. 697 (N.D. Cal. 1979) (ruling plaintiffs' damage study
inadmissible and granting summary judgment for defendant in part because'of inadequacy of proof of
damages); Breit & Elzinga, supra note 101, at 420-22 (courts recently have required "more rigorous esti-
mates of damages").
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4. Standing
Plaintiffs would find standing rules more hospitable in a single-damages world.
It is here that we see most unequivocally a limiting consequence of the treble
damages remedy.2 50 The role of the treble damages remedy in limiting standing
is clear not just from references to it in decisions limiting standing-although
such decisions have attached significance to trebling with unusual consistency
over time-but from comparison of antitrust standing principles with related
legal concepts and from the focus on trebling in current antitrust standing prin-
ciples themselves. Although "narrow" standing rules currently may be gaining
support from the focus on consumer welfare as the principal or sole antitrust
concern,2 51 such rules also owe their existence in part to trebling.
Treble damages have long been featured in standing decisions. The first "di-
rect injury" case, Ames v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.,252 warned that
"[a] construction of the act which makes the defendant liable to sextuple dam-
ages is certainly to be avoided. '2 53 Perhaps the leading "target area" opinion,
Calderone Enterprise Corp. v. United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.,254 cautioned
that "if the flood-gates were opened to permit treble damage suits by every credi-
tor, stockholder, employee, subcontractor, or supplier of goods and services that
might be affected, the lure of a treble recovery, implemented by the availability
of the class suit.., would result in an over-kill." 255 Numerous other decisions
reflect similar worries about treble damages. The concern is variously cast in
terms of "potentially ruinous liabilities, ' 256 unfair "windfalls," 25 7 and an inun-
dation of plaintiffs lured by treble damages.258 In a moment of judicial candor,
250. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrrRUST 773-74 (1977); Breit & Elzinga, supra
note 101, at 413-22; GARVEY STUDY, supra note 3, at 29-30; Handler, The Shft from Substantive to
Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L.
REv. 1, 31 (1971). See generally Blecher, The New Antitrust, 54 ANrrRUST L.J. 43 (1985) (recognition of
private right to seek divestiture in Cia. Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404 (1st
Cir. 1985), is in response to perceived federal nonenforcement of antimerger laws). For purposes of this
subsection, "standing" includes the related concepts of "antitrust injury," see Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977), "fact of damage," see ANTrIRusT LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra
note 98, at 387-92, and the Illinois Brick limitation, see Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
251. See Breit & Elzinga, supra note 101, at 414-15; Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Viola-
tions, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1445 (1985); Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An Approach to
Antitrust Injury, 47 Cmi. L. REv. 467, 471 (1980).
252. 166 F. 820 (C.C.D. Mass. 1909).
253. Id. at 824.
254. 454 F.2d 1292 (2d Cir. 1971) (Mansfield, J.), cerL denied, 406 U.S. 930 (1972).
255. Id. at 1295; see Billy Baxter, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 431 F.2d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 1970) (plaintiff's
burden to show damages directly caused by, or business within "target area" of, defendant's illegal act),
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 923 (1971); Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir.
1951) (first target area case explaining that damages should be "withheld from those who seek the wind-
fall of treble damages because of incidental harm").
256. See, eg., Mid-West Paper Prods. Co. v. Continental Group, Inc., 596 F.2d 573, 586-87 (3d Cir.
1979) (because of "potentially ruinous liabilities," courts should be reluctant to permit treble damage
action to have punitive impact that "may unduly cripple a defendant and lead to an overall deleterious
effect upon competition"); Jeffrey v. Southwestern Bell, 518 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1975) (referring to
"potentially disastrous recoveries").
257. Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951). Reference also is
made to "speculative damages," eg., Pitchford v. PEPI Inc., 531 F.2d 92, 107-08 (3d Cir.), cerL denied,
426 U.S. 935 (1976), which presumably would be less unacceptable were they one-third as large.
258. See In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514, 519-20 (7th Cir. 1982) (stressing impor-
tance of "avoidance of excessive treble damages litigation"), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1016 (1983). See gener-
ally Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J. 809 (1977).
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Judge Guy, now of the Sixth Circuit but then on the District Court in Detroit,
explained that "one might reach a different conclusion in matters of this nature
depending upon where one starts.' 259 In denying standing, Judge Guy said that
his decision was
predicated on that line of authority that holds in general that the Anti-
Trust Laws are being over-used today, and that they are used in many
instances in which traditional common law or other statutory forms of
action would suffice, and that the principal reason they are being used
in that regard is because of the triple-damage remedies that they afford.
They afford plaintiffs not only an additional bite at an apple, but a
much larger bite at an apple. And they provide considerable leverage
because of that factor.260
By its terms, the Supreme Court's current approach to standing makes treb-
ling important. 261 For example, the Court requires consideration of the "risk of
duplicate recoveries, '262 which is exacerbated with trebled damages; avoidance
of unnecessary complexity of litigation,263 a problem that is eased when the
stakes are less high; and the speculativeness of the claimed damages, 264 which is
also of less concern when multiple damages are not available. Treble damages
also played a central role in two other decisions that limited standing, Illinois
Brick 265 and Hawaii v. Standard Oil.266 These decisions turned on the dual risks
of duplicate recoveries and of burdening the legal system with complex litiga-
tion.267 Both of these risks would be reduced if there were no trebling. The
259. J.F. Reed Co. v. K Mart Corp., 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,499, at 72,770 (E.D. Mich. 1981),
supplemented, 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 64,500 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
260. 1982-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 64,499 at 72,768. Ironically, the precise (if ignoble) reason why Con-
gress added § 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Act, the statutory provision at issue, probably was to protect
persons such as the plaintiff in J.F Reed, a manufacturer's sales representative who was terminated at the
insistence of a large buyer demanding a discount. Cf Edward Joseph Hruby, 61 F.T.C. 1437, 1447-48
(1962). See generally General Motors Corp., 3 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCII) 22,165 (FTC June 21, 1984).
261. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 542-44
(1983). For the reception given the case and the Court's rather different standing decision the preceding
year in Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982), see Amey, Inc. v. Gulf Abstract & Title, Inc., 758
F.2d 1486 (11th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1513 (1986); Note, A Farewell to Arms: The Imple-
mentation of a Policy-Based Standing Analysis in Antitrust Treble Damages Actions, 72 CALIF. L. REV.
437 (1984); Note, More Trouble with Treble: The Effects of McCready and Associated General Contrac-
tors on the Antitrust Standing Opinions of the Federal Courts of Appeals, 10 J. CORP. L. 463 (1985); Note,
Private Antitrust Standing: A Survey andAnalysis of the LawAfter Associated General, 61 WASH. U.L.Q.
1069 (1984).
262. 459 U.S. at 544.
263. Id. at 543-44.
264. Id. at 542. Other factors include the causal connection between the violation and the harm, the
nature of the alleged injury, the directness of the injury, and the existence of victims with superior poten-
tial standing claims, the weighing of all of which probably would be different were damages single. For a
review of (and alternative ways of counting) the Associated General Contractors factors, see Southaven
Land Co. v. Malone & Hyde, Inc., 715 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir. 1983); Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co., 713 F.2d 958 (3d Cir. 1983), cert denied, 465 U.S. 1024 (1984).
265. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977).
266. 405 U.S. 251 (1972). Conceivably, trebling played a role in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-
Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977), but that decision makes little of the issue and the reasoning of the opinion,
at least read narrowly, would be equally applicable to single damages.
267. See, e.g., Calkins, supra note 3; Recent Developments in Antitrust Standing, Class Action Law
Explored at ALI-ABA Seminar, Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 852, at A-4, A-5 (Feb. 23, 1978)
(Illinois Brick based "on the belief that 'trial courts cannot cope with the kinds of problems raised by
difficult cases' ").
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holdings of both Illinois Brick and Hawaii v. Standard Oil are limited to cases
where damages are sought.268
Cases adopting expansive views of standing when only injunctive relief is
sought further suggest the importance of trebling. Recent decisions have held
that competitors may seek to enjoin mergers for which they could not recover
damages269 and that associations may seek injunctive relief for members who
would have to sue individually for damages.270 Since belief in equilibrating ten-
dencies leads one to expect broader standing for injunctive relief than even for
single damages, the marked difference in the approach to standing for injunctive
relief and for treble damages does not prove that standards in a single-damage
world would be more relaxed than at present, but the difference is suggestive.
The final reason to believe that trebling constricts standing is the strictness of
antitrust standing standards.271 In Associated General Contractors, the Court
explained that standing is rooted in common law causation, 272 but the difference
between standing in an antitrust case and a tort case is breathtaking. In antitrust
suits, licensors, franchisors, and lessors who are foreseeably injured by illegal
conduct are regularly denied standing;273 in tort law, "there are quite remarka-
ble events which have been taken in stride by various courts as within the bound-
aries of the jury's permission to find foreseeability" (and thus causation). 274 In
torts, the courts cheerfully find that numerous defendants have "proximately
caused" an accident and that numerous plaintiffs should be allowed to recover
for a single wrong.275 In antitrust cases courts search for "the appropriate anti-
trust enforcer," a member of the "select class of plaintiffs that can impose the
deterrent sting of treble damages at the smallest cost of enforcement. '276 Fi-
nally, and very important, in torts "proximate cause... is ordinarily a question
of fact for the jury, to be solved by the exercise of good common sense in the
consideration of the evidence in each particular case."' 277 In antitrust, standing
is decided as a matter of law, on a principled basis, by the court.278 It is incon-
268. See ANTTrRUsT LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 98, at 404.
269. See Monfort, Inc. v. Cargill, Inc., 761 F.2d 570, 573 (10th Cir. 1985) (competitor had standing in
§ 16 injunction case, despite lack of proof of actual injury), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 784 (1986); White
Consol. Indus. v. Whirlpool Corp., 612 F. Supp. 1009, 1032 (N.D. Ohio) (standing established by "suffi-
cient showing of potential or threatened antitrust injury"), vacated on other grounds, 619 F. Supp. 1022
(N.D. Ohio 1985), affid, 781 F.2d 1224 (6th Cir. 1986); Christian Schmidt Brewing Co. v. G. Heileman
Brewing Co., 600 F. Supp. 1326, 1331 & n.5 (E.D. Mich.) (standing established where "substantial likeli-
hood that plaintiff's competitive position would be harmed"), afl'd, 753 F.2d 1354, 1358 (6th Cir.), cer.
dismissed, 105 S. Ct. 1115 (1985).
270. Mission Hills Condominium Ass'n M-1 v. Corley, 570 F. Supp. 453 (N.D. Ill. 1983); see 2 P.
AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, 335e.
271. The Supreme Court acknowledged the strictness of antitrust standing in a recent RICO decision.
See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 105 S. Ct. 3275, 3286-87 (1985).
272. 459 U.S. at 531-35.
273. See ANTITRUST LAW DEVELOPMENTS, supra note 98, at 397; 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra
note 3, I 341.
274. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 65, at 300. See generally Wright, Causation in Tort Law,
73 CALIF. L. REV. 1735, 1744 (1985) (causation is viewed as having little substantive content).
275. W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 65, at 266-68.
276. In re Industrial Gas Antitrust Litig., 681 F.2d 514, 520 (7th Cir. 1982) (Bauer, J.) (emphasis
added).
277. Healy v. Hoy, 115 Minn. 321, 323, 132 N.W. 208, 209 (1911), quoted in W. PROSSER & W.
KEETON, supra note 65, at 321.
278. E.g., Nishimura v. Dolan, 599 F. Supp. 484, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsu-
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ceivable that the award of treble damages was not a key factor in the evolution of
these dissimilar approaches.
IV. MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTIONS TO DISMISS
The treble damages remedy appears to have caused courts to view motions for
summary judgment and motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim more fa-
vorably. This remedy's effect can be seen in judicial language, legal standards,
and comparative results.
The Georgetown Project data base provides a unique opportunity to explore
the use of these pretrial motions in antitrust cases. The following discussion will
not only examine the impact of trebling on the use of these motions, but also
explore more generally the use of these motions. The data indicates that even
before Matsushita,279 pretrial motions for summary judgment and motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim were highly successful and played an impor-
tant role in antitrust litigation-contrary to the suggestion of Poller v. Columbia
Broadcasting System, 280 the "lessons" of which continued to be recited regu-
larly.28 1 A consistent, if sometimes unspoken, recent theme is that disposal of
antitrust cases prior to trial is encouraged.
The discussion will proceed as follows. First, to put the data in context, I will
review the learning on summary judgment and motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim (hereinafter "motion to dismiss"). This survey will focus both on
understandings as of the completion of this study's empirical work and, for com-
pleteness and to avoid being misleading, on the impact on those understandings
of the trio of 1986 Supreme Court summary judgment cases. Second, findings
from the data will be presented or, where the information is recorded on accom-
panying tables, highlighted. Finally, I will appraise these findings.
A. CONVENTIONAL WISDOM ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS
1. In General
The motion to dismiss 282 is scorned by the leading civil procedure authorities.
The following discussion from Wright and Miller is typical:
The motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim is viewed with disfa-
vor and is rarely granted. Rule 8 indicates that a complaint need only
set out a generalized statement of facts from which defendant will be
able to frame a responsive pleading. Few complaints fail to meet this
liberal standard and become subject to dismissal.283
shita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1158 n.70 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (Becker, J.), affld in part, rev'd in
part, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
279. Matsushita Elee. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1357 (1986)
280. 368 U.S. 464 (1962).
281. See infra part IV.B.
282. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6).
283. 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 598 (1969) (footnotes omit-
ted); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2555 (1986) (with shift to notice pleading, sum-
mary judgment has served former function of motions to dismiss); 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE 12.07[2.-5] (1985) ("generally disfavored"); 27 FEDERAL PROCEDURE, L. ED.
§ 62:465, at 575 (1984) ("looked on with disfavor by the courts, and... granted sparingly and with care")
(footnotes omitted). The same lack of affection is shown for the motion for judgment on the pleadings,
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Charles Wright cites a 1962 sampling for the Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules that "suggests that [rule 12(b)] motions are made in only about 5% of all
cases, and that in fewer than 2% of all cases do such motions lead to a final
termination of the action."'2 84 The leading Supreme Court discussion of the
standard for dismissing complaints continues to be Conley v. Gibson,285 in which
the Court, speaking through Justice Black, held that "a complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him
to relief."'2 8
6
However, whatever past experience indicates, it may not accurately forecast
the future. Concern about litigation excesses has been widely noted.28 7 The ef-
fects of this concern are reflected in the recent amendments to the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, particularly rule 11,288 and in the emergence of rule 68 as a
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(c), which may be filed once pleading has been completed, but otherwise is indistin-
guishable from motions to dismiss. See, J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE
294-95 (1985) (issues in motion to dismiss and motion for judgment on the pleadings identical).
284. C. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 432 (4th ed. 1983); see also A. MILLER, THE AU-
GUST 1983 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: PROMOTING EFFECTIVE
CASE MANAGEMENT AND LAWYER RESPONSIBILITY 8 (1984) (motion to dismiss "is a wonderful tool on
paper, but have you ever looked at the batting average of rule 12(b)(6) motions? I think it was last
effectively used during the McKinley administration"). In addition to motions to dismiss for failure to
state a claim, rule 12(b) authorizes motions to dismiss for "(1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter,
(2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency of
service of process," and "(7) failure to join a party under Rule 19 [joinder of persons needed for just
adjudication]." FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b).
Motions to dismiss may be more commonly used in class actions. Of the 120 class actions for damages
filed in the federal district court for the District of Columbia from July 1, 1966, to December 31, 1972,
that had not been consolidated or transferred, 81 had reached some kind of disposition by the end of 1972.
Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim were granted in 16 (13.3% of total, 19.8% of 81), and
motions to dismiss on other grounds (lack of jurisdiction, voluntary dismissal, improper party, want of
prosecution, etc.) were granted in 17 cases (14.2% of total, 21.0% of 81). STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON
COMMERCE, 93D CONG., 2D SESs., CLASS ACTION STUDY 8-9 (Comm. Print 1974) [hereinafter CLASS
ACTION STUDY].
285. 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
286. Id. at 45-46; see, e.g., Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984) ("A court may dismiss a
complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved
consistent with the allegations."); Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974) ("The issue is not whether
a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the
claims. Indeed it may appear on the face of the pleadings that a recovery is very remote and unlikely but
that is not the test.").
287. See generally Newman, Rethinking Fairness: Perspectives on the Litigation Process, 94 YALE L.J.
1643 (1985). But cf Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (and
Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 UCLA L. REv. 4 (1983);
NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, STATE COURT CASELOAD STATISTICS: ANNUAL REPORT
1984, at 173 (1986) (study found "no evidence to support the often cited existence of a national 'litigation
explosion' in the state trial courts").
288. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note. Rule 11 was amended in 1983 because it had
"not been effective in deterring abuses," and amendment was needed to "reduce the reluctance of courts
to impose sanctions." Id. The signature of an attorney on a complaint now constitutes a certification that
he has read the complaint and "that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief formed after
reasonable inquiry it is well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument for
the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law." FED. R. CIv. P. 11. According to the advisory
committee's note, this language "stresses the need for some prefiling inquiry into both the facts and the
law to satisfy the affirmative duty imposed by the rule. The standard is one of reasonableness under the
circumstances." FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note. Where a paper is signed in violation of
this requirement, the court "shall impose... an appropriate sanction, which may include.., a reasonable
attorney's fee," upon the lawyer who signed the paper, the client, or both. FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
Courts in antitrust and other cases have responded to the amendment by imposing sanctions with some
regularity. See, eg., Westmoreland v. CBS, 770 F.2d 1168 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (when party in libel suit
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more potent force.289 Inevitably, the concern over litigation excesses is changing
thinking about motions to dismiss.290
2. In Antitrust Cases
At one time antitrust complaints were held to a more stringent standard than
sought to hold nonparty witness in contempt for refusing to permit deposition to be videotaped, rule 11
required sanctions); Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 762 F.2d 243, 254 (2d Cir. 1985) (sanc-
tions required where competent attorney would have concluded that antitrust claim "was destined to
fail"); Monument Builders, Inc. v. American Cemetery Ass'n, 629 F. Supp. 1002, 1012-13 (D. Kan. 1986)
(requiring plaintiff and attorneys to pay attorneys' fees incurred in having antitrust claim dismissed); see
also A. MILLER, supra note 284, at 17 (remarks by reporter to the advisory committee that although
"shall often means may; not here-shall means shall" in rule 11); Schwarzer, Sanctions under the New
Federal Rule 11-A Closer Look, 104 F.R.D. 181 (1985) (reviewing standards); Strasser, Sanctions: A
Sword Is Sharpened, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 11, 1985, at 1, col. 2 (examples ofincreasing use); cf Zaldivar v. City
of Los Angeles, 780 F.2d 823, 831 (9th Cir. 1986) (reversing award of sanctions for filing civil rights
complaint, court said sanctions should be assessed where a complaint "is frivolous, legally unreasonable,
or without factual foundation, even though the paper was not filed in subjective bad faith"); Seglin v.
Esau, 769 F.2d 1274, 1280-81 n.6 (7th Cir. 1985) ("the bar is now put on notice that in the future this
court will not tolerate such groundless pleading").
The 1983 amendment of rule I1 was part of a program of changes designed to reduce the burden of
litigation. Included in the program were amendments to rule 7 (to make clear that rule 11 applies to
pleadings), rule 16 (among other things, to authorize sanctions against parties and attorneys interfering
with judicial management of litigation), and rule 26 (to encourage judges to limit unnecessary discovery,
and to require certification, subject to possible sanction, of the propriety of discovery requests and re-
sponses. See Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 97 F.R.D. 165 (1983); A. MILLER,
supra note 284 (reviewing and critiquing amendments). See generally Burbank, Sanctions in the Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure" Some Questions about Power, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV.
997 (1983) (questioning the power to issue such rules). Three years earlier Congress amended 28 U.S.C.
§ 1927 to add attorneys' fees to the costs a lawyer may be ordered to satisfy personally when caused by
dilatory litigation practices. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 1234, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1980). More re-
cently, the Federal Judicial Center contributed the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (2d ed. 1985) to
the effort to reduce the burden of litigation. See Panel Discussion, Charting a New Course for Complex
Cases: The New MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, SECOND, 54 ANTITRUST L.J. 417 (1985) (review-
ing MANUAL).
289. Rule 68 provides that if a timely pretrial offer of settlement is not accepted and "the judgment
finally obtained by the offeree is not more favorable than the offer the offeree must pay the costs incurred
after the making of the offer." FED. R. Civ. P. 68; see Marek v. Chesny, 105 S. Ct. 3012 (1985) (defining
"costs" to include attorney's fees whenever the underlying statute does); see also Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States, Preliminary Draft of Proposed
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1984), reprinted in 102 F.R.D. 407, 423 (1984)
(proposed amendment to rule 68 "designed to encourage early settlements, avoid protracted litigation,
and thus reduce the current enormous delay and expense that marks dispute resolution in federal courts").
See generally Burbank, Proposals to Amend Rule 68-Time to Abandon Ship, 19 U. MICH. J.L. REP. 425
(1986) (questioning wisdom of further amendment).
290. For a recent impressionistic suggestion that courts have started requiring a "new fact pleading,"
particularly in securities fraud, civil rights, and conspiracy cases where litigation volumes have been high,
see Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 COLUM. L. REV.
433, 436 (1986) (partially criticizing this trend and recommending expanded use of summary judgment
instead). In a particularly reflective discussion, Judge Newman of the Second Circuit suggests that if
judges thought about fairness to the legal system as well as to the parties in a particular action-as they
should-then
I doubt that we should retain our current rule that a pleading should remain in court if any
conceivable set of facts might support its allegations. We need not return to the days of Chitty's
pleadings, but we could insist that complaints contain assertions of the essential facts. When the
claim survives dismissal, I doubt that discovery should be routinely permitted .... Once discov-
ery is complete, I doubt that we should confine the use of summary judgments as rigidly as we
now do.
Newman, supra note 287, at 1650-51.
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other complaints,2 91 and motions to dismiss antitrust complaints enjoyed a
warm reception by the courts. In part this was a response to the perceived
greater complexity and burden of antitrust cases, 292 which, as discussed above, is
indirectly related to trebling. The warm reception was also a direct response to
trebling.293 As a 1939 student note explained:
Whether triple damages are punitive in nature has been disputed, but
pleading requirements at any rate have assumed the same protective
character that is typical of criminal prosecutions. Not only must the
complaint allege violation, injury and proximate cause, but it must do
so with enough specification to warn the defendant of the particular
offense and convince the court that a cause of action has been stated,
since the remedy is drastic and must be strictly construed. The degree
of particularity is intermediate between the requirements of a criminal
indictment and equitable bill.294
As all antitrust litigators know, this rigorous approach to antitrust complaints
gradually died out, or at least courts asserted it did.295 The same pleading stan-
dards are said to apply in antitrust as in other cases. 296 Indeed, support can be
found for the proposition that more relaxed standards apply to pleadings in anti-
trust cases, because of the difficulty of proof.297 As the Supreme Court said in
Rex Hospital,298 "in antitrust cases, where 'the proof is largely in the hands of
the alleged conspirators,' dismissals prior to giving the plaintiff ample opportu-
nity for discovery should be granted very sparingly. ' 299 This is a "concedely
rigorous standard. ' '30°
There has been little empirical work exploring the effect of the relaxed plead-
291. See McElroy, Federal Pretrial Procedure in an Antitrust Suit, 31 Sw. L.J. 649, 679 (1977) (old
view required actual detail in pleadings).
292. See New Dyckman Theatre Corp. v. Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp., 16 F.R.D. 203, 205-06
(S.D.N.Y. 1954) (burden of triple damages antitrust actions has been matter of great concern to courts;
insufficiently specific complaints may create "bottomless sea of interrogatories, depositions, and pre-trial
proceedings" on irrelevant issues); see also Dawson, The Place of the Pleading in a Proper Definition of the
Issues in the "Big Case," 23 F.R.D. 430 (1958).
293. 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 283, 8.17[3].
294. Note, Fifty Years of Sherman Act Enforcement, 49 YALE L.J. 284, 297 (1939) (citations and foot-
notes omitted). The writer added that "requirements of pleading and proof are occasionally eclipsed by
the hazards of normal trial procedure, which may withhold a victory almost won [citing 11 plaintiff trial
victories that were reversed]. Under the circumstances it is not at all surprising that prospective litigants
hesitate to take the risk." Id. at 298 & n.93.
295. See Note, Adequacy of Notice Pleading Reasserted in Second Circuit Private Antitrust Suits, 58
COLUM. L. REv. 408, 410 (1958) (warning that a "probable result [will be] an increase in the number of
strike suits and private fishing expeditions undertaken with a bare suspicion of antitrust violations");
Note, Antitrust Enforcement by Private Parties: Analysis of Developments in the Treble Damage Suit, 61
YALE L.J. 1010, 1033-34 (1952).
296. See McElroy, supra note 291, at 679; New Home Appliance Center v. Thompson, 250 F.2d 881,
883 (10th Cir. 1957) (liberal pleading standards as applicable to antitrust cases as any other case; under
these standards complaint need not plead detailed facts or state particular theories for recovery). See
generally Clark, Comment on Judge Dawson's Paper on the Place of the Pleading in a Proper Definition of
the Issues in the "Big Case", 23 F.R.D. 435 (1958); Clark, Special Pleading in the "Big Case", 21 F.R.D.
45 (1957).
297. See 2A J. MOORE & J. LUCAS, supra note 283, 8.17[3].
298. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738 (1976).
299. Id. at 746 (quoting Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 473 (1962)); see Radovich
v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445, 453 (1957) ("test as to sufficiency. .. is whether 'the claim is
wholly frivolous' ") (quoting Hart v. B.F. Keith Vaudeville Exchange, 262 U.S. 271, 274 (1923)).
300. Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738, 746 (1976).
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ing standard. In 1961, Fred Freund relied on a handful of cases to conclude that
"it is a signal feat for a party permanently to enjoy the fruits of a dismissal for
failure to state a claim. 301 This continues to be the accepted wisdom. 302 In-
deed, one noted plaintiffs' antitrust lawyer has claimed that, at least until the
Supreme Court's decisions in McCready and Associated General Contractors,
"lawyers who counsel potential plaintiffs tell them, 'Don't worry. I can draft a
complaint that will get you into court and will allow you to engage in sufficient
discovery so we can determine whether the defendant has done anything
wrong.' "'303
Benjamin DuVal's investigation of Chicago class actions conflicts with this
generally accepted wisdom. DuVal reviewed all antitrust treble damages actions
filed in the Northern District of Illinois from July 1, 1966, through June 30,
1973, that were not subsequently transferred out of the district. DuVal found
that 10.8% of all terminated nonclass action suits and 17.3% of all terminated
class action suits were "involuntarily dismissed.' ' 3°4 DuVal cautioned that his
numbers were small. He also speculated that the greater success of defendants in
class suits may be attributable to the tenuous nature of many class actions where
lawyers are lured by the prospect of rich rewards or hope to coerce settlement of
nonmeritorious suits, or to judges' interest in dismissing class suits to avoid re-
quiring the giving of notice.305
Four recent Supreme Court opinions suggest that the Court may ease the stan-
dard for granting motions to dismiss in antitrust suits. In a footnote, wholly
unnecessary to the result, Justice Stevens for the Court in Associated General
Contractors said that the lawfulness of defendant's conduct might have been "ev-
ident" had the trial court required plaintiff to describe the antitrust violation
"with particularity. '30 6 He added that "[c]ertainly in a case of this magnitude, a
district court must retain the power to insist upon some specificity in pleading
before allowing a potentially massive factual controversy to proceed. ' 30 7 In Rei-
ter v. Sonotone Corp.,308 the Court noted that its decision that consumers may
recover for overcharges "need not result in administrative chaos, class-action
harassment, or 'windfall' settlements if the district courts exercise sound discre-
tion and use the tools available. ' 30 9 The Court admonished district courts to
301. Freund, The Pleading and Pre-Trial of an Antitrust Claim, 18 A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEC. REP. 15,
18 (1961).
302. See P. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 96 (3d ed. 1981) ("courts seem to allow... unsupported
complaints to stand long enough to permit the plaintiff access to discovery").
303. Susman, Standing in Private Antitrust Cases: Where is the Supreme Court Going?, 52 ANTITRUST
L.J. 465, 466 (1983). Susman added, "No longer is it possible to give that assurance to a potential plain-
tiff." Id
304. DuVal, The Class Action as an Antitrust Enforcement Device: The Chicago Experience (1I), 1976
AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 1273, 1306-07, 1342. Just under half of the "involuntarily dismissed" cases were
dismissed for failure to state a claim. These figures combine DuVal's numbers for "clustered" and "un-
clustered" cases. Looking only at "unclustered" cases, 10% of nonclass cases were involuntarily
dismissed.
305. Id. at 1307. A Senate Commerce Committee study of class actions also found a higher than
average number of dismissals for failure to state a claim. See CLASS AcTION STUDY, supra note 284.
306. Associated Gen. Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 528
n.17 (1983).
307. lrd
308. 442 U.S. 330 (1979).
309. Id at 345.
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"be especially alert to identify frivolous claims brought to extort nuisance settle-
ments .... 310 Finally, in Monsanto3l" and Matsushita312 the Court expressed
concern about allowing juries to award treble damages based on ambiguous evi-
dence of conspiracies. These cases are invitations for lower courts to require
more specificity in antitrust complaints-specificity that might be unnecessary
were the stakes less high and the controversy less complex.
As shown below, this invitation apparently is being accepted and, indeed, was
being accepted even before it was issued.313 For example, in Havoco of America,
Ltd. v. Shell Oil Co.,314 Judge Pell, affirming the dismissal of an antitrust com-
plaint, observed that "if the allegations of the complaint fail to establish the req-
uisite elements of the cause of action, our requiring costly and time consuming
discovery and trial work would represent an abdication of our judicial responsi-
bility." 315 Similarly, in Sutliff, Inc. v. Donovan Cos.,316 Judge Posner cited Asso-
ciated General Contractors and wrote that "the heavy costs of modem federal
litigation, especially antitrust litigation, and the mounting caseload pressures on
the federal courts, counsel against launching the parties into pretrial discovery if
there is no reasonable prospect that the plaintiff can make out a cause of action
from the events narrated in the complaint.
'3 17
B. CONVENTIONAL WISDOM AND NEW TEACHING ON SUMMARY JUDGMENT
1. Conventional Wisdom in General
Rule 56, which provides for summary judgment, is deceptively simple. Any
party may move for partial or complete summary judgment, and
[t]he judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, dep-
ositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on fie, together
with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.318
A motion may be granted in part or in full. 319 By a 1963 amendment, when a
motion is
made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, but his re-
310. Id.
311. Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 763-74 (1984) (affirming plaintiff jury verdict
but finding court of appeals applied incorrect standard). Monsanto is discussed supra text accompanying
notes 204-05 and infra notes 456, 458 and accompanying text.
312. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1357 (1986) (reversing denial
of summary judgment). Matsushita is discussed infra part IV.a.4.
313. Current cases provide little support for Wright and Miller's assertion that "[t]he current trend is
toward greater liberality in pleading antitrust claims." 5 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 283,
§ 1228, at 40 (Supp. 1986).
314. 626 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1980).
315. Id. at 553 (citation omitted).
316. 727 F.2d 648 (7th Cir. 1984).
317. Id. at 654; see also Seglin v. Esau, 769 F.2d 1274, 1283 (7th Cir. 1985) (affirming dismissal; "plain-
tiffs are required to be more specific as to the facts of the interstate commerce nexus before we will compel
defendants to engage in protracted, expensive antitrust discovery").
318. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) (emphasis added).
319. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(d) (judgment may issue for less than entire relief requested).
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sponse, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set
forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he
does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be en-
tered against him.320
When the affidavit(s) of the nonmoving party show why he cannot present essen-
tial facts by affidavit, "the court may refuse the application for judgment or may
order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or depositions to be taken
or discovery to be had ....
Buried within the unpretentious words of the first part of the rule quoted
above lie some of the most troublesome issues in the law:
(1) What is a question of "fact," as opposed to a question of "law"? It is
routinely said that a court hearing a motion for summary judgment should not
resolve disputed fact issues, but may (and perhaps should) resolve disputed is-
sues of law.3 22 But which issues involve fact, which involve law? Particularly
troubling are "mixed questions of fact and law," or, as they are also described,
questions requiring the application of legal standards to facts. The customary
illustration is taken from negligence law. How fast a defendant traveled is a
question of fact; whether traveling at that speed is negligent is a mixed question
of fact and law.323 Although most commentators agree that both determining
speed and deciding whether that speed is negligent should be considered fact
questions (and thus answered by the jury in a jury case),3 24 there is less agree-
ment on other issues of mixed fact and law.325
320. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e). This provision was added in 1963 to overcome a line of cases denying
summary judgment whenever a "well-pleaded" complaint set forth a cause of action. The advisory com-
mittee said denial of summary judgment in this situation was inappropriate because "[t]he very mission of
the summary judgment procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether
there is a genuine need for trial." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(e) advisory committee's note. However, the advi-
sory committee cautioned that the amendment was not "designed to affect the ordinary standards applica-
ble to the summary judgment motion .... Where the evidentiary matter in support of the motion does
not establish the absence of genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied even if no opposing eviden-
tiary matter is presented." 1d.; see also Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
1961-1963 (II), 77 HARV. L. Rnv. 801, 825-28 (1964) (views of reporter to advisory committee).
321. FED. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
322. E.g., 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2725, at
84-85, 104 (2d ed. 1983) (under the rule, "the judge cannot summarily try the facts," but summary judg-
ment should not be denied just because difficult questions of law exist; delay only postpones facing prob-
lem and increases costs).
323. See generally W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, supra note 65, § 37 ("the existence of negligence in a
particular case is sometimes said to be a mixed question of law and fact").
324. E.g., id.; see Weiner, The Civil Jury Trial and the Law-Fact Distinction, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 1867,
1876-77 (1966) (jury rather than judge normally decides whether undisputed historical facts will be char-
acterized as negligence).
325. Cf Asbill & Snell, Summary Judgment under the Federal Rules-When an Issue of Fact is
Presented, 51 MICH. L. Rav. 1143, 1144 (1953) (to decide whether genuine issue of material fact exists
judge balances potential positive effects of full evidentiary trial against cost of lengthy trial and possibility
of use of threat of trial to coerce settlement); Schwarzer, Summary Judgment under the Federal Rules:
Defining Genuine Issues of MaterialFact, 99 F.R.D. 465, 471 (1984) (test should be "whether the disputed
issue, as a matter of precedent or policy, should be decided by the jury or by the court"); Weiner, supra
note 324, at 1918-19 (same). Separating issues of fact from issues of law is further complicated by the
constitutional right to a jury trial. See generally Jorde, The Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial of
Antitrust Issues, 69 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 7-22 (1981) (discussion of seventh amendment jury trial require-
ment). The same distinction, between issues of law and fact, torments analysis of Rule 52(a), which
provides that appellate courts shall not set aside "[flindings of fact ... unless clearly erroneous." See
Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 288-90 & n.19 (1982) (referring to "vexing nature of the distinc-
tion between questions of fact and questions of law," the Court declined to address "the much-mooted
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(2) What facts are material? Facts are material if they make a difference. 326 If
the law is not clear, however, it takes great courage to say that any fact could not
make a difference.
(3) What is a "genuine issue" of material fact, or, perhaps more important,
how convincingly must a movant prove the absence of a "genuine issue"? Sev-
eral courts have further complicated the question by embellishing the words of
the rule by stating, for instance, that summary judgment must be denied if the
"slightest doubt" over the facts at issue remains. 327 Such glossing of the rule has
fallen from favor. 328 The seriously difficult problem is how to resolve cases
where nonmovants have not shown a genuine issue as of the date of decision, but
might be able to create one through discovery or at trial. In the civil rights case
Adickes v. S.H. Kress and Co.,329 the Court suggested that the movant had to
show the impossibility of evidence creating a genuine issue of fact.330 This ap-
proach, however, has not been widely accepted.3 31 Difficulty nonetheless arises
whenever plaintiffs plan to develop evidence not yet available to them.332
These troublesome issues are more challenging in some kinds of cases than in
others. Thus much effort has been expended discussing what are the most ap-
propriate (or likely, which may not be the same thing) situations for summary
judgment. Summary judgment is said to be most likely to be used in four types
of cases: (1) small cases, where little is at stake;333 (2) cases involving simple
facts;334 (3) cases turning on documents, rather than on witnesses; 335 and (4)
issue of the applicability of the Rule 52(a) standard to mixed questions of law and fact," although it noted
that some Supreme Court decisions support independent review by appellate courts of such questions, and
there is "substantial authority" in the circuits "on both sides of this question"). See generally Calleros,
Title VII and Rule 52(a): Standards of Appellate Review in Disparate Treatment Cases--Limiting the
Reach of Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 58 TUL. L. REv. 403, 425 (1983) (advocating an approach based on
policy considerations); Note, The Law/Fact Distinction and Unsettled State Law in the Federal Courts, 64
TEX. L. REv. 157, 170-86 (1985) (criticizing Supreme Court's handling of the question and advocating a
"functional approach").
326. E.g., Note, Summary Judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56-A Need for a Clarify-
ing Amendment, 48 IowA L. REv. 453, 454 (1963); see also Schwarzer, supra note 325, at 480 (material
facts those that will affect outcome and not those that may affect outcome); see also infra note 394.
327. E.g., 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 322, § 2725, at 97-98.
328. E.g., Louis, Summary Judgment and the Actual Malice Controversy in Constitutional Defamation
Cases, 57 S. CAL. L. REv. 707, 712 (1984) (most courts now "take a neutral position neither favoring or
disfavoring the grant of the motion"); Rogers, Summary Judgments in Antitrust Conspiracy Litigation, 10
Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 667, 686 (1979) (lower courts not following "requirement that all inferences of conspir-
acy be conclusively disproved for summary judgment to issue").
329. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
330. Id. at 157-61.
331. See Currie, Thoughts on Directed Verdicts and Summary Judgments, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 72, 76-
78 (1977) (Adickes suggestion "strained"); Sonenshein, State of Mind and Credibility in the Summary
Judgment Context: A Better Approach, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 774, 782 n.33 (1983) (Adickes "seemed to
muddle the understanding of the nature of the movant's initial burden").
332. See generally Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745,
762-64 (1974) (discussing flexible approach allowing opposing parties who have reasonable chance of
success to get to trial).
333. Cohen, Summary Judgment in the Supreme Court of New York- A Factual Study of Rule 113, 32
COLUM. L. REv. 830, 854 (1932); Sandier & Corderman, Winning a Summary Judgment, LITIGATION,
Spring, 1984, at 15; cf. Note, Factors Affecting the Grant or Denial of Summary Judgment, 48 COLUM. L.
REv. 780, 784 (1948) (one study showed summary judgment likely granted when amount contested is
smaller; absent further study, such proposition is conjecture).
334. See Kennedy, The Federal Summary Judgment Rule--Some Recent Developments, 13 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 5, 11 (1947) (summary judgment will be denied where facts are complicated); Note, supra note
333, at 784 (complex cases generally require full trial).
335. See Cohen, supra note 333, at 854 ("summary judgment is most readily applied to actions in
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bench trials, where the traditional and constitutionally required deference to a
jury is not a factor.3 36
On the other hand, summary judgment is said to be unlikely to be used in the
converse situations, and in five additional types of cases, where: (1) credibility is
critical;337 (2) the nonmovant has unequal access to facts, or for some other
reason requires discovery;3 38 (3) the legal issues are complicated; 339 (4) court
dockets are not crowded, so trial time need not be conserved; 340 and (5) the
court is in the Second Circuit.34 1 Litigators are warned that unsuccessful mo-
tions cause delay, expose facts and strategy to the opposition, and may create
bad law;342 judges are warned that summary judgment orders suffer an uncom-
monly high rate of reversal, 34 3 although some dissent from the latter proposition
has been voiced. 344
As for actual frequency of use, many commentators suggest that the summary
judgment motions "are put to little use except in cases that depend on documen-
tary evidence or on [a] determination of a question of law in a case involving
which the evidence is almost entirely documentary and less effective in actions in which the documentary
evidence is rare").
336. J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE & A. MILLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 440 (1985) ("extreme deference of
judges to jury trial"); see Gellhorn & Robinson, Summary Judgment in Administrative Adjudication, 84
HARV. L. REv. 612, 613-14 (1971) (in cases not subject to jury trial, summary judgment rhay be granted
where there is no dispute over evidentiary facts); Note, supra note 333, at 784 ("where the judge himself,
rather than a jury, would find the facts at the trial, he may be less hesitant to dispense with a formal
trial"); cf Bogart, Summary Judgment: A Comparative Critical Analysis, 19 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 552,
578-79 (1981) (summary judgment not appropriate in negligence cases due to "great respect for the role of
the jury in these cases").
337. E.g., 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 322, § 2730, at 237-38 (summary
judgment inappropriate because credibility inquiry involves determination of party's state of mind from
factual differences over which reasonable persons may differ).
338. Eg., Louis, supra note 328, at 720 (summary judgment traditionally denied in state of mind
cases).
339. Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249, 256-57 (1948) ("summary procedures, however salu-
tary where issues are clear-cut and simple, present a treacherous record for deciding issues of far-flung
import") (footnote omitted); 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 322, § 2725, at 85-88
("the resolution of complex questions of law frequently requires a more concrete factual development than
may be obtained through summary proceedings," although the difficulty of the legal issue does not by
itself bar summary judgment); A. MILLER, supra note 284, at 8 ("If it is a serious case, a complicated case,
the kind of case that breaks your back, you are swimming upstream against the current if you try to grant
the [summary judgment] motion.") (citing Poller).
340. Hays, The Use of Summary Judgment, 28 F.R.D. 126, 133 (1962); Note, Use of Summary Judg-
ment by Type of Case, 36 MINN. L. REV. 515, 518 (1952).
341. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 284, at 668-69 (Second Circuit cases generally follow views of Judge
Frank, a leading critic of summary judgment).
342. See generally Sandler & Corderman, supra note 333, at 15 (discussion of strategy underlying use of
summary judgment motions); Stamper, Rule 56: Using Summary Judgment Motions, LITIGATION,
Spring, 1981, at 36 (same).
343. See Littlejohn v. Shell Oil Co., 483 F.2d 1140, 1145 (5th Cir.) ("fatality rate in summarily dispos-
ing of litigation . . . is high indeed"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1116 (1973); Fellmeth & Papageorge, A
Treatise on State Antitrust Law and Enforcement: With Models and Forms, in Antitrust and Trade Reg.
Rep. (BNA) No. 892, Supp. No. 1, at 45 (Dec. 7, 1978) ("[i]n antitrust cases, a summary judgment for
defendants is difficult to sustain"); Pollak, Liberalizing Summary Adjudication: A Proposal, 36 HASTINGS
L.J. 419, 420 (1985); Sonenshein, supra note 331, at 775 n.5 (reversal rates in several jurisdictions exceed
50%); see also Neubauer, Snyder & Nolan, Judges Compare Courts, LITIGATION, Spring, 1985, at 15
(comment of District Judge Gadbois) (summary judgment is "a high-risk judicial decision, as we all
know"); id. (comment of District Judge Aspen) ("very difficult" to enter a summary judgment "that is
going to hold up" because "there is always some issue of fact or some question as to intent. .. that is
going to require some type of evidentiary hearing").
344. See Schwarzer, supra note 325, at 467 & n.9 (summary judgment affirmed by Ninth Circuit in
63% of decisions from January, 1979, to June, 1983; overall rate of affirmance varied between 69%-71%).
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undisputed facts. .. -345 Other observers, however, detect a trend toward in-
creased use of summary judgment.346 The few empirical studies of the use of
summary judgment generally confirm that it is used only in a small percentage of
cases, but find that, when summary judgment is sought, movants enjoy healthy
success rates.
347
The most important summary judgment study is probably the one conducted
by William McLauchlan. McLauchlan examined all of the cases filed in the
Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois during the 1970 fiscal
year. 348 Summary judgment was sought in 4.0% and granted in 2.3% of all
cases. 349 Motions were granted 51.6% of the time,3 50 or in 58.7% of the cases in
which a motion was filed.35 1 Defendants generally fared much better than plain-
tiffs; only 24.0% of plaintiff's motions were granted, whereas 62.1% of defense
motions were granted.352 Summary judgment motions played a particularly im-
portant role in contract cases, where they were sought in 7.4% of the cases. 353
Motions were granted in 63.6% of these cases.3 54 Excluding contract cases,
summary judgment was granted in only 2.0% of all cases.
McLauchlan also randomly sampled all reported federal cases from 1938-1968
in which a motion for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim was made. 355 Motions were granted in 58.3% of the cases in which
345. F. JAMES & G. HAzARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 274 (3d ed. 1985); see also Hays, The Use of Sum-
mary Judgment, 28 F.R.D. 126, 126-27 (1960) ("all of the surveys of reported decisions have revealed that
by far the larger number of motions for summary judgment are denied"); A. MILLER, supra note 284, at 8
(rules 12(b)(6) and 56 are "toothless tigers").
346. See Louis, supra note 328, at 709-11 (increased use of summary judgment in cases involving actual
malice determination); Sandier & Corderman, supra note 333, at 15 ("summary judgments are creeping
into favor").
347. Cohen, supra note 333, at 836 (of 250 summary judgment motions studied, 139 were granted);
Guiher, Summary Judgments--Tactical Problems of the Trial Lawyer, 48 VA. L. REv. 1263, 1271-72
(1962) (Fourth Circuit affirmed 27 summary judgment motions between 1938-1961 while reversing only
14); McDonald, The Effective Use of Summary Judgment, 15 Sw. L.J. 365, 384-85 (1961) (of 1,249 sum-
mary judgment motions made in 86 district courts in 1960, 71% were granted); McLauchlan, An Empiri-
cal Study of the Federal Summary Rule, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 427, 436 (1977) (summary judgment motion
granted in 310 of 531 cases); Note, supra note 340, at 518-19 (29 summary judgments granted in Minne-
sota federal district courts during 1948-1949; 11 were denied). See generally Bauman, A Rationale of
Summary Judgment, 33 IND. L.J. 467 (1958). But see Hays, supra note 340, at 126-27 ("all of the surveys
of reported decisions have revealed that by far the larger number of motions for summary judgment are
denied"); cf Grossman, Kritzer, Bumiller, Sarat, McDougal & Miller, Dimensions of Institutional Partici-
pation: Who Uses the Courts, and How?, 44 J. POL. 86, 105 (1982) (A study of sample of "middle range
disputes" ending in 1978 in five federal district courts revealed that the percentage of cases with trials
ranged from 3.3% (in Philadelphia) to 11.2% (in New Mexico) and the percentages of cases decided on
"motions" (considered to be a "rough index" of "judgments by the court") ranged from 17.9% (in Phila-
delphia) to 28.8% (in Los Angeles). In each district, a majority of dispositions were "dismissals," which
was considered to be a "rough index of settlements."). Summary judgment, as such, was found to have
been used in a substantial number of cases only in a Senate Commerce Committee study of class actions.
That study found that defendants won these motions in 11 (9.2%) of 120 unconsolidated, untransferred
class actions filed in federal district court between mid-1966 and the end of 1972, and plaintiffs individu-
ally or as a class won summary judgment in 12 cases (10%). CLASS ACTION STUDY, supra note 284, at
10.
348. McLauchlan, supra note 347.
349. Id. at 449-57.
350. Id. at 453.
351. Id. at 451.
352. Id.
353. Id. at 451.
354. Id.
355. Id. at 435-49. McLauchlan grouped summary judgment motions and motions to dismiss for fail-
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they were made; including partial grants, that figure rises to 73.4%.356 When
analyzed by type of action, summary judgment was least important in statutory
cases, where motions were granted in only 50.4% of cases where motions were
filed; including partial grants, that figure rises to 71.6%. 357 McLauchlan specu-
lates, probably correctly, that these figures are biased upward because his sample
included trial and appellate decisions, and only grants are appealable. 358 De-
fendants were more likely to move than plaintiffs; only 21.7% of the sampled
cases involved only motions made by plaintiffs. 359 Plaintiffs also were less suc-
cessful. They won 54.3% of their motions, and won or partially won 62.9%,
whereas defendants won 70.0% and won or partially won 73.9%.360
Since approximately 40% of his sample were appellate cases, McLauchlan as-
sumed that losing parties appeal approximately 40% of the time. Appellate
courts affirmed 51.4% of the cases. The affirmance rate varied among the cir-
cuits, from 37.5% in the First Circuit to 73.3% in the Fourth Circuit. 361 How-
ever, because McLauchlan reviewed only a handful of cases per circuit (8 and 15
in First and Fourth Circuits, respectively) conclusions cannot be made with sta-
tistical confidence.
2. Celotex and Anderson
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of summary judgment in a pro-
vocative trio of cases decided this year.362 Their central lesson is that "summary
judgment ... is properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but
rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole. ' '363 Correctly inter-
preted, the cases do little more than endorse standards already being applied by
the more thoughtful courts, but the cases are susceptible to misinterpretation.
Moreover, since many summary decisions turn less on precise phrasings of legal
standards than on attitudes toward the motion,364 the three cases' celebration of
ure to state a claim under the heading "summary judgment." Both motions are treated in similar fashion
here.
356. Id. at 437.
357. Id.
358. Id. at 436. Martin Louis reviewed the 243 motions for summary judgment reported in 28
U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1973) under FED. R. Civ. P. 56, at 35-66 and found that defendants were successful
45% of the time, plaintiffs 43%. Here, defendants filed 69% of all motions. Louis, supra note 332, at 745
n.4. McLauchlan responded that these results were statistically significant only at the .8 level, which is not
normally considered an acceptable level of confidence. McLauchlan, supra note 347, at 442 n.65.
359. Id. at 442.
360. Id. at 441.
361. Ido at 446-49.
362. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505
(1986); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986). Although in this work
as presented in November, 1985, the legal standards governing summary judgment were discussed princi-
pally to provide a context within which to evaluate empirical results that obviously were obtained before
these opinions were issued, failure to account for these cases would make the article's discussion incom-
plete and misleading. Moreover, as is seen infra, Matsushita provides important support for this article's
"equilibrating" thesis.
363. Celotex, 106 S. Ct. at 2555; cf Summary Judgment, Wall St. J., July 18, 1986, at 12, col. 1
(editorial hailing Anderson as a "less-noticed decision that will have a wide impact in the nation's court-
rooms, perhaps even marking the beginning of the end of the litigation explosion").
364. Cf. 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 322, § 2725, at 12 (Supp. 1986) (deci-
sions are case-by-case).
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summary judgment may be more important than any reformulation of
standards.
The holdings of the two nonantitrust cases, which will be discussed here, are
simple and the cases should have been noncontroversial. Both concern the de-
termination of whether a "genuine issue" exists.365 In Celotex Corp. v. Ca-
trett,366 a defendant in an asbestos products liability suit moved for summary
judgment more than a year after receiving the complaint. It argued that no evi-
dence connected the decedent with its asbestos, and that the plaintiff's interro-
gatory answers failed to identify any witnesses who could provide such a
connection. 367 The trial court granted summary judgment but was reversed by a
divided court of appeals, which wrote that rule 56 imposed upon the movant a
"burden of coming forward with proof of the absence of any genuine issues of
material fact." 368 Since the defendant had offered no evidence, the court rea-
soned, summary judgment must be denied, and since it found the defendant's
moving papers "patently defective," 369 it did not evaluate the plaintiff's evidence.
The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that in a proper case a moving party not
bearing the ultimate burden of proof may rely on the record to show the absence
of a genuine dispute about a material fact.370
This is an unremarkable, sensible holding, and indeed no Justice disagreed, 37 1
even though it might appear inconsistent with some authorities.372 Although
language in the opinion could be read to suggest that defendants may require
plaintiffs to prove their cases simply by filing unsupported motions,3 7 3 a careful
reading of the opinion and of Justice White's essential concurring opinion makes
365. See supra text accompaning notes 327-32.
366. 106 S. Ct. 2548 (1986).
367. Id. at 2551.
368. Catrett v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 756 F.2d 181, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (footnote omitted).
369. Id. at 184.
370. 106 S. Ct. at 2553-54.
371. 106 S. Ct. at 2556 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("I do not disagree with the Court's legal analysis.").
See generally id. at 2561 (Stevens, J., dissenting on other grounds). For analyses considerably more
thoughtful than the Court's, but reaching the same result, see Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190 (5th
Cir. 1986); In re Japanese Elec. Prods. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 238, 258 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd on other
grounds sub norm. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
372. 6 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 56.15[3], at 56-480
(moving defendant "has the burden of producing evidence, of the necessary certitude, which negates the
opposing party's (plaintiff's) claim"); see also FED. R. CIv. P. 56 advisory committee's note to 1963
amendment ("Where the evidentiary matter in support of the motion does not establish the absence of a
genuine issue, summary judgment must be denied even if no opposing evidentiary matter is presented.");
Kaplan, Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 1961-1963 (II), 77 HARV. L. REv. 801, 827
(1964) (nonmovant "need not come forward in any way if the moving party has not supported his motion
to the point of showing that the issue is sham"); cf Louis, supra note 332, at 758 (movant's submission
must either (1) be sufficient to support a finding that an essential element of nonmovant's case is absent, or
(2) show that nonmovant lacks or cannot obtain sufficient evidence to prevail). Compare 10A C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 322, § 2739, at 525 (nonmovant need not respond if "mo-
vant fails to meet his burden of showing the absence of any genuine issue of material fact") with id. § 2727,
at 130-31 ("movant may discharge his burden by demonstrating that if the case went to trial there would
be no competent evidence to support a judgment for his opponent," but movant "cannot sustain his
burden merely by denying the allegations").
373. 106 S. Ct. at 2552-53:
the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time
for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to estab-
lish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear
the burden of proof at trial.
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clear the limited nature of the holding.374
The other nonantitrust case, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,375 involved a
libel action against columnist Jack Anderson. To prevail at trial, plaintiff would
have to prove "actual malice" with "convincing clarity. '376 When ruling on a
defense motion for summary judgment, should the trial court's analysis subsume
this standard, thereby granting the motion unless it finds a "genuine issue" as to
whether actual malice could be shown with convincing clarity? The court of ap-
peals, speaking through Judge Scalia, answered in the negative.3 77 The Supreme
Court sensibly disagreed.378 The purpose of summary judgment is to look be-
hind the pleadings to learn whether trial is necessary,379 and the necessity of trial
can be determined only in light of the applicable law.380
Anderson has importance outside libel law because the Court announced, with
varying phrasings, a generally applicable test for determining the existence of a
"genuine issue."' 381 That test, according to the Court's first phrasing, asks
whether "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party. ' 382 The Court said this standard "mirrors the standard
374. See id. at 2553 (movant "bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis
for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a
genuine issue of material fact") (citation omitted); id. at 2555 (White, J., concurring) ("[Ihe movant
must discharge the burden the rules place upon him: It is not enough to move for summary judgment
without supporting the motion in any way or with a conclusory assertion that the plaintiff has no evidence
to prove his case .... It is the defendant's task to negate, if he can, the claimed basis for the suit."). The
dissent disagreed only with the application of the Court's fairly-read principles to the particular facts of
the case. Apparently the plaintiff had informed the defendant of her intention to call a Mr. Hoff as a
witness connecting decedent with defendant's asbestos, but this information was not included in plaintiff's
response to the summary judgment motion. Id. at 2560 & n.7 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Because defend-
ant agreed at oral argument that plaintiff's naming of a witness would prevent summary judgment unless
defendant could show the witness' testimony would not raise a genuine, material issue of fact, id. at 2556
(White, J., concurring), Justice Brennan argued that remanding was a "waste of time." Id. at 2560 n.7.
The majority and Justice White, following the lead of the court of appeals, "declined to address either the
adequacy of the showing made by respondent... or the question whether such a showing, if reduced to
admissible evidence, would be sufficient." Id. at 2555 (opinion of Court); see id. at 2556 (White, I.,
concurring) (court of appeals found it unnecessary to address respondent's assertion that she had revealed
sufficient evidence to defeat motion for summary judgment). Nor is it likely that defendants will file bare
bones motions for summary judgment seeking to put plaintiffs to their proofs. Not only would this be
inconsistent with the holding of Anderson, but lack of a basis for such a motion might expose lawyers to
sanctions under rule 11. See infra note 288. To guard against this, to increase chances of success, and to
educate the court on the merits of the case, summary judgment motions should continue to present full
discussions.
375. 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986).
376. Id. at 2508.
377. 746 F.2d 1563, 1570-71 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (to apply the "convincing clarity" standard at that stage
would require an impermissible weighing of the evidence).
378. 106 S. Ct. at 2514.
379. FED. R. CIv. P. 56 advisory committee's note to 1963 amendment ("The very mission of the
summary judgment procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in order to see whether
there is a genuine need for trial.").
380. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger, argued in dissent that the Court's refinement of
the summary judgment standard in libel cases would change few outcomes and create unnecessary confu-
sion. 106 S. Ct. at 2521-23 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan's dissent challenged the Court's
various phrasings of the standards generally applicable in summary judgment cases. 106 S. Ct. at 2519
(Brennan, J. dissenting).
381. In a marvelous if slightly unfair analogy, Brennan likened the Court's exercise to a child's game of
"telephone" in which, with each restating, "the original understanding is increasingly distorted." 106 S.
Ct. at 2518-19 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
382. Id at 2510.
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for a directed verdict ... which is that the trial judge must direct a verdict if,
under the governing law, there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the
verdict." 38 3 Both of the leading treatises make the same comparison, 384 as has
the Court before.385 The Anderson standard applies only after there has been
"ample opportunity for discovery," 386 and, as is discussed below but is not ex-
plicit in the opinion, the standard must be applied with sensitivity and with a
careful consideration of the interaction of rule 56(c), which authorizes summary
judgment, and rule 56(f), which governs cases where nonmovants cannot yet
support their claims.387
Although Celotex and Anderson do not greatly change summary judgment
doctrine, they perform an important pruning function, removing some of the
misleading judicial supplementations to the rule. For instance, the court in
Adickes388 said a moving defendant had to prove facts that were inconsistent
with the plaintiff's theory (specifically, in that case, that no police officer was in
the store in question),38 9 and some courts still seem to regard this as good law.390
Even Justice Brennan, dissenting in Celotex, rejects this approach.3 91 It is
enough for a moving defendant to show that plaintiff will not be able to prove its
case at trial.
Similarly, numerous cases say that summary judgment should be denied un-
383. Id. at 2511. The Court's test in Anderson is virtually identical to one endorsed by all nine justices
in Matsushita: "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the
non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (citing First Nat'l Bank v.
Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)); accord 106 S. Ct. at 1363 (White, with Brennan, Blackmun &
Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (agreeing on test).
384. 6 J. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, supra note 372, % 56.02[10], 56.04[2] (theories underly-
ing both motions are "essentially the same" and "essence of both motions is that there is no genuine issue
of material fact to be resolved by the trier of the facts," although mechanics of the motions differ and
burden on movant may be different); 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 322, § 2713.1
(theory and basic determination the same, although courts may be more reluctant to grant summary
judgment because it comes relatively early, and courts should not decide summary judgment by anticipat-
ing a ruling on a judgment n.o.v. motion); see also Currie, Thoughts on Directed Verdicts and Summary
Judgments, 45 U. CHl. L.R. 72, 79 (1977) (summary judgment should be granted "if and only if the
evidence before the court would justify a directed verdict if presented at trial"); Schwarzer, supra note
325, at 481, 484 (1984) (genuine dispute if evidence sufficient to get to jury).
385. Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 745 n.11 (1983).
386. 106 S. Ct. at 2511 n.5.
387. Justice Brennan, in dissent, points to the Court's rephrasing of its test to ask whether the evidence
"is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law," id. at 2512, and worries that judges are
being invited to replace juries. 14 at 2519 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He also questions the consistency of
this with the summary judgment cliches repeated by the Court: "[Alt the summary judgment stage the
judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to deter-
mine whether there is a genuine issue for trial," id. at 2511 (opinion of the Court); Anderson
by no means authorizes trial on affidavits. Credibility determinations, the weighing of the evi-
dence, and the drawing of legitmimate inferences from the facts are jury functions, not those of a
judge .... The evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to
be drawn in his favor.
Id. at 2513 (opinion of the Court) (citation omitted). Justice Brennan is correct that there is a tension
between giving great deference and asking whether there is only one reasonable conclusion, but this ten-
sion is inevitable whenever a directed verdict or summary judgment is sought.
388. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
389. Id. at 157.
390. E.g., Lee v. Flintkote Co., 593 F.2d 1275, 1281-82 & n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (movant had to prove
exclusive selling rights not awarded).
391. 106 S. Ct. at 2558-59 (Brennan, J., dissenting); cf supra note 331.
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less it is "quite clear what the truth is."'392 Anderson and Celotex redirect atten-
tion from "truth" to the plaintiff's case, although courts are still warned to be
cautious.393 Courts are reminded that "[o]nly disputes over facts that might af-
fect the outcome of the suit . . . will properly preclude the entry of summary
judgment. '394
Another example of judicial rule-supplementing concerns issues of "state of
mind." It is said that summary judgment often is inappropriate in such cases.395
Anderson explains that rule 56 applies in a "state of mind" case just as in any
other, and a plaintiff that has enjoyed ample discovery may not rest on its plead-
ing in the face of a properly supported motion even where the evidence is in the
defendant's possession. 396
The most important contribution of these cases to summary judgment doc-
trine will be their refocusing of attention on rule 56(f), the provision to be used
when nonmovants cannot present sufficient evidence. Rule 56(f) resolves the
tension between the Anderson directed verdict test and the superficially puzzling
statement in Celotex that the nonmoving party need not "produce evidence in a
form that would be admissible at trial in order to avoid summary judgment.' 397
Where a nonmovant has had insufficient opportunity for discovery, under rule
56(f) a court should deny summary judgment.398 Where a diligent nonmovant
has acquired significantly probative information supporting its theory but the
information is inadmissible, a court should deny summary judgment where the
392. Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 368 U.S. 464, 467 (1962) (quoting Sartor v. Arkansas Natu-
ral Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627 (1944)); see also 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note
322, § 2725, at 102 ("only in clear cases"); id. § 2727, at 124 (movant held to "stringent standard"; before
summary judgment, "it must be clear what the truth is") (footnote omitted).
393. Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at 2513-14 ("Neither do we suggest that the trial courts should act other than
with caution in granting summary judgment or that the trial court may not deny summary judgment in a
case where there is reason to believe that the better course would be to proceed to a full trial.") (citing
Kennedy v. Silas Mason Co., 334 U.S. 249 (1948), a leading case supporting the principle that summary
judgment may be inappropriate in complicated, important cases).
394. 106 S. Ct. at 2510; cf supra note 326.
395. 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 322, § 2730, at 238 (state of mind often can
be determined only by drawing inferences as to which reasonable persons may differ); see also Poller, 368
U.S. at 473.
396. 106 S. Ct. at 2514. This discussion also clarifies the confusion created by the footnote in Hutchin-
son v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979), stating that proof of actual malice "does not readily lend
itself to summary disposition." Anderson explains that this was simply an acknowledgment of the Court's
reluctance to create special procudural rules over and above the constitutional protections for defendants
in libel actions. 106 S. Ct. at 2514 n.7.
397. 106 S. Ct. at 2553-54 (adding that "Rule 56 does not require the nonmoving party to depose her
own witnesses"); see id. at 2556 (White, J., concurring) ("if respondent has named a witness to support
her claim, summary judgment should not be granted without Celotex somehow showing that the named
witness' possible testimony raises no genuine issue of material fact"). Although rule 56 is not altogether
clear on the question, the leading authorities had thought that summary judgment motions must be sup-
ported and opposed by relying on admissible evidence, 6 3. MOORE, W. TAGGART & J. WICKER, supra
note 372, % 56.11 [L.-8] (should not consider material not admissible or otherwise usable at trial); 10A C.
WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 322, § 2721, at 40, § 2722, at 49, § 2727, at 156, § 2738, at
470 (court may consider any material admissible or usable at trial, but only admissible portion of deposi-
tion may be introduced), but that rule 56(f) explanations for inability to produce evidence may cite other
sources, 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 322, § 2740, at 530 (rule 56(f) affidavit
need not contain evidentiary facts). As was explained by the reporter to the advisory committee when
rule 56 was amended, "[u]nder Rule 56(f) the adversary need not even present the proof creating the
minimal doubt on the issue of fact which entitles him to a full trial; it is enough if he shows the cirum-
stances which hamstring him in presenting that proof ...." Kaplan, supra note 372, at 826.
398. Cf Celotex, 106 S. Ct. at 2554 (premature motions should be handled under rule 56(f)).
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nonmovant can demonstrate a reasonable chance of perfecting the informa-
tion.399 Where a nonmovant identifies a witness whose testimony will provide
significantly probative evidence, and the movant cannot rebut this, summary
judgment should be denied.4° But there is no need to proceed to trial where the
plaintiff's evidence has been assembled and would not support a jury verdict.
This sharper focusing of the summary judgment inquiry should make courts
less hesitant to grant motions. Moreover, Celotex and Anderson, together with
the third case in the trio, signal an end to Supreme Court hostility toward sum-
mary judgment motions. 4° 1 More than any doctrinal change, this new receptiv-
ity-this legitimization of the motion-will be their most important legacy.
3. Conventional Wisdom in Antitrust Cases
Prior to Matsushita, commentators and courts expressed three views of the use
of summary judgment in antitrust cases. Some writers believed that summary
judgment is particularly inappropriate in antitrust cases. Others believed that
antitrust cases pose no special obstacles to the use of summary judgment. A few
writers were beginning to argue that summary judgment is particularly desirable
in antitrust cases.
The confusion over the proper role of summary judgment in antitrust cases is
in part a matter of semantics. In a much quoted passage from the majority opin-
ion in Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting System, 4°2 Justice Clark wrote that "sum-
mary procedures should be used sparingly in complex antitrust litigation where
motive and intent play leading roles, the proof is largely in the hands of the
alleged conspirators, and hostile witnesses thicken the plot.' ' 4°3 Does this lan-
guage mean that summary judgment should not be used frequently in antitrust
cases because "motive and intent play leading roles" in such cases, or does it
mean tlat-suinjmary procedures have little use in those antitrust (and other)
cases in which motive and intent happen to play leading roles? Logic would
suggest the latter, and the Court reinforced logic six year after Poller in First
National Bank v. Cities Service Co.404 In Cities Service, the Court declined to
read basic summary judgment principles out of antitrust cases.4°5 Nonetheless,
399. A court should be especially hesitant to grant summary judgment where a nonmovant's informa-
tion is inadmissible only because it is hearsay, since such information may be admitted where there are
adequate "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness" and "the interests of justice" would be served by
its admission, FED. R. EVID. 803(24). These interests may be difficult to determine early in a proceeding.
400. Of course, this is a key difference between summary judgment and a directed verdict. Whenever
the demeanor of a witness may be material, courts will be more hesitant to grant summary judgment. See
Catrett v. Johns-Manville, 756 F.2d 181, 188 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork, J., dissenting); Currie, supra note
384, at 79 n.39.
401. Cf A. MILLER, supra note 284, at 8 (speaking in 1984, Professor Miller told a judicial workshop
that summary judgment is "not really an effective screen. The Supreme Court has told you people time
and time again: 'Oh, summary judgment is wonderful device, but maybe you shouldn't grant it in any
serious case.' ").
402. 368 U.S. 464 (1964).
403. Id. at 473 (footnote omitted). The Court continued: "It is only when the witnesses are present
and subject to cross-examination that their credibility and the weight to be given their testimony can be
appraised. Trial by affidavit is no substitute for trial by jury which so long has been the hallmark of 'even
handed justice.'" Id.
404. 391 U.S. 253 (1968).
405. Id. at 289-90. The Court wrote that rule 56(e) makes clear that
a party cannot rest on the allegations contained in his complaint in opposition to a properly
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the felicitous words of Poller are ambiguous and acquired a charmed life of their
own.
Justice Clark's statement in Poller is regularly quoted by commentators and
judges, some of whom seem to adhere to the view that summary judgment is
inappropriate in antitrust cases. Professors Wright, Miller, and Kane state that
antitrust cases "are by their very nature poorly suited for disposition by sum-
mary judgment.' '4° 6 Commerce Clearing House's Trade Regulation Reporter
states that summary judgment "is used in antitrust cases, but not to the same
extent as in other lawsuits.' '4° 7 Von Kalinowski writes that "[t]he Supreme
Court has indicated that summary judgment should be granted sparingly in com-
plicated cases, particularly antitrust cases.' ' 4 s Thus, Poller's words have been
given prescriptive, as well as descriptive, effect.
Even before Matsushita, both uses of Poller came under assault. At various
times during the past fifteen years commentators have discerned a trend toward
increased use of rule 56 in antitrust cases. 4°9 Some commentators have expressly
advocated increased reliance on summary judgment in antitrust cases.410 The
force of this assault has shifted the conventional view concerning the appropri-
ateness of antitrust summary judgments toward equality with nonantitrust cases.
For some, moreover, the pendulum has swung past the point of equality.
supported summary judgment motion .... To the extent that petitioner's burden-of-proof argu-
ment can be interpreted to suggest that Rule 56(e) should, in effect, be read out of antitrust cases
and permit plaintiffs to get to a jury on the basis of the allegations in their complaints, coupled
with the hope that something can be developed at trial in the way of evidence to support those
allegations, we decline to accept it.
Id. For discussion of Cities Service's limiting of Poller's expansive holding, see 2 P. AREEDA & D. TUR-
NER, supra note 3, 316; Rogers, supra note 328, at 686; Sonenshein, supra note 331, at 790-91; Note,
Conscious Parallelism: The Business Judgment Defense in a Summary Judgment Context, 35 HASTINGS
L.J. 115, 118-19 (1983).
406. 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 322, § 2732.1, at 313; accord, e.g., Tiftarea
Shopper, Inc. v. Georgia Shopper, Inc., 786 F.2d 1115, 1116 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam) (summary
judgment should be used sparingly in antitrust cases because of factual nature).
407. 2 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 9196, at 15,455 (1971).
408. 10 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION 113-5 (1985); see also R.
POSNE R & F. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST: CASES, ECONOMIC NOTES AND OTHER MATERIALS 598 (2d
ed. 1981) ("Poller has set the tone of antitrust litigation. Courts are quite unwilling to grant summary
relief, for either side, unless the case is overwhelming.").
409. See GARVEY STUDY, supra note 3, at 30 (quoting Robert Pitofsky); Schwarzer, Techniques for
Identifying and Narrowing Issues in Antitrust Cases, 51 ANTITRUST L.J 223, 226-27 (1982) (courts be-
coming more "sophisticated and understanding"); Lifland, Antitrust, 172 N.Y.L.J., July 19, 1974, at 1,
col. 1 ("[A]s I look to what the district courts are doing--obviously they can't overrule the Supreme
Court's decision in Poller-but they certainly are ignoring it and avoiding it. So you're getting lots of
summary judgment dispositions in private treble damages cases.").
410. See, eg., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 288, 21.34 (mentioning survey of
issues in antitrust cases where summary judgment granted); NAT'L COMM'N FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTI-
TRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, supra note 167, at 68-70 (rule 56 viewed "as compatible with more
effective use of summary adjudication"); see also 2 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, supra note 3, 316 (sum-
mary judgment appropriate in many antitrust cases); Recommendations of the American College of Trial
Lawyers on Major Issues Affecting Complex Litigation, 90 F.R.D. 208, 226 (1981) (courts should be recep-
tive in complex cases); Blecher & Carlo, Toward More Effective Handling of Complex Antitrust Cases,
1980 UTAH L. REV. 727, 751 ("[t]he court should not be opposed to granting summary judgment on some
issues"); Rogers, supra note 328, at 689 ("the judiciary should be urged to realistically and effectively use
summary judgments to scale down and simplify the complex, interminable antitrust litigation that plagues
the federal courts"); Withrow & Larm, The "Big" Antitrust Case: Twenty-five Years of Sisyphean Labor,
62 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 30-36 (1976) (when used correctly, summary judgment speeds resolution of
complex antitrust cases). See generally Marcus, supra note 290, at 484-91 (calling for more flexible use of
summary judgment).
1120 [Vol. 74:1065
EQUILIBRATING TENDENCIES
These authorities point to the treble damages remedy (and the related complex-
ity of litigation) as reasons why summary judgment has an especially important
role in antitrust cases. This view had its genesis in Justice Harlan's dissent in
Poller. He argued that, "having regard for the special temptations that the statu-
tory private antitrust remedy affords for the institution of vexatious litigation,
and the inordinate amount of time that such cases sometimes demand of the trial
courts, there is good reason for giving the summary judgment rule its full legiti-
mate sweep in this field."'411 Justice Harlan's dissent has been cited with increas-
ing frequency in the past decade.412 The most prominent pre-Matsushita judicial
endorsement of the favored status of antitrust cases for summary judgment is the
Seventh Circuit's decision in Lupia v. Stella D'Oro Biscuit Co.,413 but there are
other examples. 414 As.in Justice Harlan's Poller dissent, the focus in these opin-
ions is the appropriateness of summary judgment in complex antitrust cases
where treble damages are at stake.
Although there has been much discussion of the use of summary judgment in
antitrust cases, there have been few empirical studies. McLauchlan's sampling
of all reported federal cases between 1938 and 1968 found that summary judg-
ment motions were granted outright in 54.2% of the antitrust cases where
sought; including partial grants, that figure rises to 68.5%.415 Comparable
figures for all cases were 58.3% and 73.4%.416 Antitrust's "win ratio" for out-
right grants was higher than the comparable figure of 50.4% for all statutory
actions. 417 McLauchlan attributed this difference to the supposed amenability of
per se violations to summary treatment.418
DuVal's study of Chicago class actions examined the frequency with which
411. Poller, 368 U.S. at 478 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
412. A Westlaw search for citations to Justice Harlan's dissent revealed six appellate decisions dated
1978 or later and only one dated earlier. Seven of the 12 district court cases were dated 1976 or later.
(Search request: Poller /s Dissent.)
413. 586 F.2d 1163 (7th Cir. 1978), cert denied, 440 U.S. 982 (1979). In Stella D'Oro, the Seventh
Circuit said
[t]he very nature of antitrust litigation would encourage summary disposition of such cases when
permissible. Not only do antitrust trials often encompass a great deal of expensive and time
consuming discovery and trial work, but also... the statutory private antitrust remedy of treble
damages affords a special temptation for the institution of vexatious litigation .... The ultimate
determination, after trial, that an antitrust claim is unfounded, may come too late to guard
against the evils that occur along the way.
Id. at 1167.
414. See, eg., In re Municipal Bond Reporting Antitrust Litig., 672 F.2d 436, 440 (5th Cir. 1982)
("strong argument can be made, in an appropriate case, for the particular applicability of the summary
procedure in antitrust litigation."); Ralph C. Wilson Indus., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 598 F.
Supp. 694, 699 (N.D. Cal. 1984) ("Given the enormous expenditure of time and other resources com-
monly necessary in antitrust cases, the complexity of the issues and general inexperience of jurors in this
area, as well as the need for uniformity and foreseeability in interpretations of the antitrust laws, the court
should... be particularly alert to granting summary judgment in appropriate cases.").
415. McLauchlan, supra note 347, at 440.
416. Id. at 438.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 439. Others have pointed to per se rules as accounting for many antitrust summary judg-
ments. See 6-PART 2 MOORE & J. WICKER, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACrCE 56.17[5], at 56-741 to 56-
742 (2d ed. 1985) (summary judgment proper where defendant has committed per se violation of antitrust
laws; otherwise, parties should go to trial); see also 10 J. VON KALINOWSKI, supra note 408, § 113.02, at
113-5.
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summary judgment was granted in antitrust cases.419 Summary judgment was
granted in only seven, or 3.7%, of the 191 terminated cases in his sample-once
for a plaintiff and six times for defendants. Excluding class actions, in which it
was never granted, summary judgment was granted in 5.0% of all terminated
cases. 420
Finally, use of summary judgment in antitrust cases was included in a study
for the A.B.A. Antitrust Section conducted by National Economic Research As-
sociates, Inc.421 After reviewing all private antitrust suits pending in the South-
ern District of New York during part or all of 1973-1978, the study reported that
"summary judgment and other motions" by defendant-apparently including in-
voluntary motions to dismiss-represented 13% of all terminated cases, com-
pared to the 81% of all terminations accounted for by settlements and voluntary
dismissals.422 Only 2.5% of all cases were tried.423
Only defendants won on summary judgment motions.424 When viewed by
type of case, summary judgment occurred most frequently in cases where the
primary violation was boycotting (5 out of 31 cases), exclusive dealing (3 of 24),
price discrimination (2 of 17), dealer predatory pricing (1 of 8), horizontal merg-
ers (1 of 8), patent technology abuses (1 of 8), and dealer termination (2 of
24).425
This modest amount of empirical work suggests that Poller never entirely suc-
ceeded in discouraging parties from seeking, or trial courts from granting, sum-
mary judgment. The importance of summary judgment in antitrust litigation
also was supported by the surprisingly large number of Supreme Court decisions
upholding or ordering summary judgment.426 However, those cases principally
reflect plaintiff (typically government) victories, a pattern very different from the
Georgetown data set.
4. Matsushita
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,427 the Supreme
Court changed some common conceptions about the role of summary judgment
in antitrust cases. Matsushita is a difficult, confusing case with unique, almost
419. DuVal, supra note 304.
420. Id. at 1304, 1306 (data computed from charts separating "clustered" and "unclustered" cases).
421. NATIONAL ECONOMIC RESEARCH ASSOCIATES, INC., A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF PRIVATE
ANTITRUST LITIGATION: FINAL REPORT (1979).
422. Id. at 44.
423. Id.
424. Id. at B23.
425. Id
426. See Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 335-36 (1982) (district court should
have ordered partial summary judgment in maximum-fee per se price fixing); Citizen Publishing Co. v.
United States, 394 U.S. 131, 136 (1969) (partial summary judgment for government affirmed; "[t]he joint
operating agreement exposed the restraints so clearly and unambiguously as to justify the rather rare use
of a summary judgment in the antitrust field"); First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 299
(1968) (summary judgment for defendant affirmed); Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 7
(1958) (summary judgment for government in tying case affirmed); United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345
U.S. 629, 630-32 (1953) (summary judgment for defendants in moot Clayton Act case affirmed); United
States v. United States Gypsum Co., 340 U.S. 76, 82, 83-88 (1950) (summary judgment for government on
price fixing liability affirmed); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947) (judgment
on pleadings for government in tying case affirmed); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 22, 23
(1945) (summary judgment for government affirmed).
427. 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
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bizarre, facts that will make it always distinguishable, but with language that
will find wider application. 428 The case provides important support for the the-
sis of this article, that there is an equilibrating tendency in antitrust law.
Matsushita was the quintessential overblown antitrust case. The published
opinions of the trial court "would fill an entire volume of the Federal Supple-
ment."429 By the time the court granted summary judgment for defendants in
1981,430 the record had ballooned so that the "essence of the evidence" filled
forty volumes.4 31 Judge Becker, who ruled much of the evidence inadmissible
and granted summary judgment, said the "enormous record ... may be the
largest summary judgment record ever developed." 432 To manage this record he
required plaintiffs to file a "final pretrial statement" detailing every fact they
hoped to prove at trial, and all evidence that would be offered to prove these
facts. The final pretrial statement was to have preclusive effect: except for good
cause, no other facts or evidence could be offered at trial.433 Plaintiffs' final pre-
trial statement totaled 11,500 pages, not counting a 6,000 page appendix that
cross-referenced 250,000 pages of documents.
434
The Third Circuit largely reversed the summary judgment. In In re Japanese
Electronic Products Antitrust Litigation,435 an opinion anticipating much of the
Supreme Court's opinions in Anderson and Celotex, the Third Circuit ruled that
defendants could win summary judgment without introducing evidence, simply
by showing that plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case-a standard
"closely analogous" to that for directed verdict.436 However, the Third Circuit
concluded that the admissible evidence, which included much of the evidence
excluded below, would support a plaintiffs' jury verdict.437 The Supreme Court
in turn reversed, 438 disagreeing not so much with the Third Circuit's legal stan-
dard as with its application.
428. For a brief but thoughtful discussion of the implications of Matsushita for predatory pricing law,
see Calvani & Lynch, Predatory Pricing After Matsushita, ANTITRUST, June, 1986, at 22.
429. 106 S. Ct. at 1351.
430. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 513 F. Supp. 1100, 1333-34 (E.D. Pa. 1981),
affd in part and rev'd in part sub nom. In re Japanese Elec. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 319 (3d Cir.
1983), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986). The district court had previously granted defense motions for sum-
mary judgment on claims under the Antidumping Act of 1916. 494 F. Supp. 1190, 1245 (E.D. Pa. 1980),
affid in part and rev'd in part sub nom In Re Japanese Elee. Prod. Antitrust Litig., 723 F.2d 319 (3d Cir.
1983), rev'd on other grounds, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1352 n.3 (1986). The Supreme Court declined to review the
Antidumping Act decision because those claims were not included in the questions presented for review.
106 S. Ct. at 1352 n.3.
431. 106 S. Ct. at 1351.
432. 513 F. Supp. at 1121.
433. Id. at 1130-31; see Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 478 F. Supp. 889, 946-60
(E.D. Pa. 1979) (Pretrial Order No. 154) (requiring final pretrial statements). Appendix B to the Pretrial
Order sets forth Judge Becker's delightful "Time Out" rule. This rule allowed each side's "Designated
Whistler" three pretrial opportunities to visit the offices of opposing lead counsel, blow a court-issued
whistle three times, and thereby halt all proceedings for a week. These time outs were to be invoked "[f]or
no good cause shown," defined as "family events... laziness, genuine ennui (pronounced NUE); drunk-
enness; firm events, such as annual dinner dance or outing; and anything else which helps attorneys to
keep their sanity during the course of these proceedings." Id. at 959 & n.*. In Pretrial Order No. 154,
Judge Becker threatened to invoke the time out rule himself "if conditions do not improve." Id. at 956.
434. 513 F. Supp. at 1130.
435. 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nor. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp,
106 S. Ct. 1348 (1986).
436. Id. at 258.
437. Id. at 259.
438. 106 S. Ct. at 1362.
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More so than with most cases, Matsushita can be understood only in light of
the plaintiffs' unusual theory. The audacity of the claim is stunning. Plaintiffs
claimed that since the 1960's twenty-one firms, including some of the largest
Japanese television manufacturers and their affiliated trading companies, con-
spired to fix artificially high prices in Japan and artificially low prices in the
United States, to the detriment of the plaintiffs, domestic United States competi-
tors.439 As part of this conspiracy, plaintiffs alleged, defendants (1) agreed to
stabilize prices in Japan; (2) limited each Japanese producer to only five Ameri-
can distributors; (3) with Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry,
fixed minimum prices, referred to as "check prices," for U.S. sales; and (4) un-
dercut these "check prices" with a number of secret rebate schemes.44° These
steps assertedly injured plaintiffs by boosting profits in Japan to subsidize U.S.
sales, and by minimizing competition in the United States market between Japa-
nese manufacturers in order to facilitate predation against U.S.
manufacturers. 441
The Supreme Court considered the scenario preposterous, as have others. 442
The Court reasoned that single-firm predatory pricing is "rarely tried, and even
more rarely successful," 443 and such a large number of actors would make suc-
cessful predation "incalculably more difficult." 444 The Court also reasoned that
the fact that the two leading firms in the U.S. market continue to be American,
and together enjoy a 40 percent market share, reflects the apparent failure of the
scheme after its alleged operation for two decades.445 The Court saw this as
"strong evidence" of the absence of a conspiracy.446 Finally, the Court saw no
need to be overly concerned with such a conspiracy to predate, because it could
reap benefits (and harm U.S. consumers) only by converting to a clearly unlaw-
ful, challengeable conspiracy to charge artificially high U.S. prices. 44 7
The Court measured this alleged scheme against a standard very similar to
that espoused by the Third Circuit and almost identical to one the Court would
later adopt in Anderson: "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a
rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no 'genuine issue
for trial.' 448 All nine Justices subscribed to this test,449 differing only on its
application. The five-member majority noted that plaintiffs could not recover for
price-fixing in Japan,450 or for agreements increasing U.S. prices (thus benefitting
439. See id. at 1353; 723 F.2d at 306-11.
440. 106 S. Ct. at 1353; 723 F.2d at 306-11.
441. 106 S. Ct. at 1353; 723 F.2d at 311.
442. See 6 P. AREEDA, supra note 145, 1 1435, at 217 n.12 (a "peculiar" and "unlikely" scenario);
Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEx. L. Rav. 1, 26-27 (1984) (theory "does not make sense").
443. 106 S. Ct. at 1357-58. For the implications of the Court's espousal of this view for predatory
pricing law, see Calvani & Lynch, supra note 428.
444. 106 S. Ct. at 1358.
445. Id
446. Id. at 1359.
447. Ia at 1360.
448. Id at 1356 (citing First Nat'1 Bank v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968)).
449. See 106 S. Ct. at 1363 (White, J., dissenting) ("I agree that '[w]here the record taken as a whole
could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party, there is no "genuine issue for
trial .... ).
450. See id at 1354 (alleged supracompetitive pricing in Japan not a cognizable claim).
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plaintiffs),451 and said that, in any event, the claim "simply makes no economic
sense" and thus the evidence reviewed by the court of appeals would not support
a jury verdict for the plaintiffs.45 2
Read broadly, Matsushita results in the wholesale transplantation of Mon-
santo's principles-originally crafted for use in a vertical restraint case after trial
on the merits-for use in all antitrust summary proceedings. 453 Matsushita cites
Monsanto as saying that "courts should not permit factfinders to infer conspira-
cies when such inferences are implausible, because the effect of such practices is
often to deter pro-competitive conduct." 454 Similarly, the Matsushita Court
wrote that
[A]ntitrust law limits the range of permissible inferences from ambigu-
ous evidence in a § 1 case. Thus, in Monsanto... we held that conduct
as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspiracy
does not, standing alone, support an inference of antitrust conspiracy
[citing Monsanto and Cities Service]. To survive a motion for summary
judgment or for a directed verdict, a plaintiff seeking damages for a
violation of § 1 must present evidence "that tends to exclude the possi-
bility" that the alleged conspirators acted independently.455
This reliance on Monsanto is somewhat unfair, because the referenced discus-
sions are closely tied to concerns peculiar to vertical cases.456 However, Cities
Service holds that when an action (there a refusal to deal) is no more likely to
have resulted from a conspiracy than from other factors (there "overwhelming"
evidence of a substantial fear of nationalization) the action has no "probative
force" and alone is not sufficient to support a finding of conspiracy. 457 If Matsu-
shita means no more than this, or that summary judgment will be granted when-
451. See id. at 1354, 1356 (alleged conspiracies, other than that to monopolize American market by
predatory pricing, would have benefitted plaintiffs).
452. Id. at 1356, 1361-62. The case was remanded to the court of appeals to permit it "to consider
whether there is other evidence that is sufficiently unambiguous to permit a trier of fact to find that
petitioners conspired to price predatorily for two decades despite the absence of any apparent motive to do
so." Id. at 1362. The four dissenters showed greater credulity toward plaintiffs' claims, criticizing the
majority for assuming that the defendants operated as profit maximizers. Id. at 1365 (noting defendants
had patiently incurred substantial U.S. losses). The dissent found sufficient evidence to support a jury
verdict. Id. at 1366-67.
453. This transplantation had already begun. See Cooper v. Forsyth County Hosp. Auth., 789 F.2d
278, 281 n.l 1(4th Cir. 1986) (Monsanto applied to affirm summary judgment in group boycott case); cf
Fisher v. City of Berkeley, 106 S. Ct. 1045, 1049 (1986) (Monsanto cited in decision upholding rent con-
trol program imposed unilaterally by city).
454. 106 S. Ct. at 1360. Monsanto is discussed supra text accompanying notes 204-05.
455. 106 S. Ct. at 1357 (quoting Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764).
456. Cf. Special Issue on Distribution After Monsanto, 30 ANTrrruST BULL. (1985) (no discussion of
implications for purely horizontal cases); Hutchinson, Antitrust 1984: Five Decisions in Search of a The-
ory, 1984 Sup. Cr. REv. 69, 112-23 (same). According to the current peculiar state of vertical restraint
law, even very severe nonprice restraints are likely to be lawful and expressly sanctioned by United States
v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 305-07 (1919) (manufacturer may refuse to sell to distributors who sell at
too low a price), and Continental TV, Inc., v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 57-58 (1977) (reversing per
se rule against vertical restraints on retail locations, as such restrictions "are widely used in our free
market economy" and have "economic utility"). However, vertical price agreements (which can be al-
most indistinguishable from lawful nonprice agreements) are per se illegal. In Monsanto, the Court
warned that "[i]f an inference of such a [a vertical price-fixing] agreement may be drawn from highly
ambiguous evidence, there is a considerable danger that the doctrines enunciated in Sylvania and Colgate
will be seriously eroded." 465 U.S. at 763.
457. 391 U.S. at 277-80; see also Matsushita, 106 S. Ct. at 1356 (summarizing Cities Service).
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ever a rational (or reasonable) factfinder would have to find for the defendant,
the Court added nothing to the basic summary judgment standard.
But Matsushita may mean something more. The apparently referenced dis-
cussion in Monsanto, unlike that in Cities Service, recognized that the conduct at
issue (dealer complaints) had probative force.458 For vertical restraint policy
reasons the Court was simply unwilling to let complaints alone support a con-
spiracy finding. Perhaps Matsushita will impart a similar hesitancy to allow
other conspiracy cases, or even nonconspiracy antitrust cases, to proceed.459
In dissent, Justice White worried that the Court's language "suggests that a
judge hearing a defendant's motion for summary judgment in an antitrust case
should go beyond the traditional summary judgment inquiry and decide for him-
self whether the weight of the evidence favors the plaintiff.'' 460 He wrote that
such a proposition is not supported by Monsanto and would be "overturning
settled law."' 461 As noted above, in one sense he is right. Monsanto can also be
read, however, as an example of a broader concern about the consequences of
treble damages. In Monsanto the Court stated that "[t]o permit the inference of
concerted action on the basis of receiving complaints alone and thus to expose
the defendant to treble damage liability would.., inhibit management's exercise
of its independent judgment. '462 The Court noted that it is important clearly to
distinguish unlawful vertical price restraints because they "are subject to per se
treatment and treble damages. ' 463 Monsanto thus can be read to suggest that
treble damages should make courts slightly more hesitant to entrust cases to a
jury. So read, its lesson supports a similar implication in Matsushita.464
The context of this caution makes clear that it is not to be applied unthink-
458. Monsanto, 465 U.S. at 764 n.8.
459. Moreover, a footnote apparently intended to restate previously announced principles includes lan-
guage likely to be misinterpreted: "We do not imply that, if petitioners had had a plausible reason to
conspire, ambiguous conduct could suffice to create a triable issue of conspiracy. Our decision in Mon-
santo... establishes that conduct that is as consistent with permissible competition as with illegal conspir-
acy does not, without more, support even an inference of conspiracy." 106 S. Ct. at 1362 n.21. This
should not prevent ambiguous evidence from supporting a conspiracy finding; the first sentence should be
read only in light of the second. Antitrust conspiracies routinely are inferred from such ambiguous evi-
dence as unexplained secret meetings, unnatural identity of prices or parallelism of certain conduct, and
geographically adjacent conspiracies. See 6 P. AREEDA, supra note 145, 1416-1427 (1986). The Court
could not mean to change so much settled law so casually.
460. 106 S. Ct. at 1363-64 (White, J., dissenting).
461. Id. at 1364.
462. Id. at 764 (quoting Edward J. Sweeney & Sons, Inc. v. Texaco, Inc., 637 F.2d 105, 111 n.2 (3d Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 911 (1981)).
463. 465 U.S. at 763.
464. Although the Matsushita dissent complains that the majority invites trial judges to weigh the
evidence, 106 S. Ct. at 1363-64, some evaluation is an inevitable part of deciding motions for summary
judgment and directed verdict. The genuine dispute between the majority and the minority concerns the
appropriate breadth of the jury's discretion and the persuasiveness of the plaintiffs' case.
Petitioners' focus on the use of summary judgment in antitrust cases for equilibrating reasons obliquely
suggests that the Matsushita Court supported this rationale. Petitioners asserted that the Third Circuit's
decision
unravels in one stroke what years of case law and scholarly work have only recently accom-
plished-the use of summary judgment as a meaningful tool for managing large and complicated
antitrust cases. This result directly undermines the decisions ... which have recognized that
because of the enormous burden that complex antitrust cases often place on the judiciary, and
the chilling effect which vexatious treble damage actions can have on competition, such cases
need to be carefully managed by the district courts-and that summary disposition may often be
the best tool for achieving this end.
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ingly to every antitrust case. Matsushita urged courts to scrutinize predatory
pricing rigorously, because antitrust law is intended to encourage price competi-
tion and because predatory pricing is likely to fail. This makes for an "unusually
one-sided" balancing. More commonly, concern about overdeterrence "must be
balanced against the desire that illegal conspiracies be identified and pun-
ished." 465 But because much of the grist of the antitrust mill is ambiguous con-
duct, and because defendants can so facilely characterize almost any conduct as
procompetitive, the equilibrating lesson of Matsushita will not be easily
cabined.466 It can be expected to extend to summary judgments in other kinds of
antitrust cases, and also to motions to dismiss and for directed verdicts.
C. FINDINGS FROM THE GEORGETOWN DATA SET
The Georgetown data set provides a rich, though flawed, collection of infor-
mation on the use of summary motions in antitrust cases. The strengths and
weaknesses of the data set were described by others at the conference, although
points of particular relevance to this article's discussion are also noted herein.
To make available the findings of the data set concerning summary motions,
what follows in this section and the accompanying tables is a detailed presenta-
tion of information on the use of these motions in varying kinds of private anti-
trust cases. Some of this is of only tangential relevance to the principal theme of
the article, and is presented for general information only.
Findings from the data set also support the article's principal theme, however,
in several ways. First, the information shows that summary motions are unex-
pectedly common in antitrust cases, including jury cases, apparently because the
stakes are high. Second, the information suggests that some recent changes in
antitrust law that may have resulted, in part, from a reaction to the spectre of
trebling have made courts more hospitable to summary motions. Third, the in-
formation demonstrates that defendants have unexpectedly good success in par-
ticular cases where antitrust stakes are high (in class actions and where
requested damages are large).
Two econometric models were formulated to help explain the circumstances
under which pretrial motions for dismissal and motions for summary judgment
are granted.467 In model I, the dependent variable (the number of cases in which
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit at 17,
Matsushita.
465. 106 S. Ct. at 1360.
466. Cf SCM Corp. v. Railinc Corp., No. 82 C 7583 (N.D. Ill. June 6, 1986) (LEXIS, Trade library,
Dist file) (in granting defendant's motion for summary judgment on Sherman Act § 1 charge, the court
interpreted Matsushita to mean that the "burden" on nonmoving plaintiffs "is particularly heavy in § 1
actions where the permissible inferences to be drawn from ambiguous facts are limited"). But cf Marsann
Co. v. Brammal, Inc., 788 F.2d 611, 612, 613 n.1 (9th Cir. 1986) (in reversing summary judgment in
Sherman Act § 2 predatory pricing case, the court noted that Matsushita "discusses only the amount of
evidence required to allow a factfinder to infer the existence of a conspiracy punishable under section 1").
467. David Tyler, Jr. (M.S. in Economics, University of London; J.D. expected 1987, Wayne State
University) and George Spasoff (M.A. in Economics, Wayne State University, 1985), organized the data
and helped formulate and prepare the frequency tables and econometric models from the Georgetown
Private Antitrust Litigation Project for this article. The data base was analyzed at Wayne State Univer-
sity on the Michigan Terminal System (MTS). All data processing (frequency counts, cross tabulations,
bivariate measures of association for categorical variables, and regression equations) was performed on the
Statistical Analysis System (SAS). Although the research began by preparing econometric models,
problems in organizing the data required running regressions more than once. By the time the most
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one or more defense motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim were granted)
was regressed on twenty-one independent variables. In model II, the dependent
variable (the number of cases in which one or more defense pretrial motions for
summary judgment were granted) was regressed on twenty-two independent
variables. Both regression models were estimated using logit analysis, and ex-
cluded cases that were pending or on appeal, or whose file was lost or outcome
was unknown.
Descriptive statistics on the use of motions to dismiss and motions for sum-
mary judgment also were developed. The data set shows that the most impor-
tant motions are defendants' motions for summary judgment and motions to
dismiss for failure to state a claim. Accordingly, unless otherwise specified the
data presented herein are limited to these two defendants' motions. The findings
are reported in tables following the article. With few exceptions, these tables
employ a common format. Information is provided both about cases in which
motions were filed or granted and about motions filed or granted. Using sum-
mary judgment in dealer termination suits as an example (see table 11), the ta-
bles report (1) the total number of dealer termination suits; (2) dealer
termination suits with one or more summary judgment motions filed, by number
and (3) as a percentage of all dealer termination suits (it is to this figure that
"use"-that is, by courts-refers); (4) cases with one or more summary judg-
ment motions granted, by number, (5) as a percent of all dealer termination
suits, and (6) as a percent of all dealer termination suits with one or more mo-
tions filed (success rate "by case"); (7) the number of summary judgment mo-
tions filed in dealer termination suits; and (8) summary judgment motions
granted in dealer termination suits, by number, and (9) as a percentage of mo-
tions filed (success rate "by motion").
Two important caveats should be noted at the outset. First, perhaps because
many sample sizes are limited, many differences are not statistically significant.
For most data, confidence levels have been determined, and where differences are
statistically significant this is noted.468 For descriptive purposes, some differ-
ences that are not statistically significant also are noted. Second, except for the
two econometric models and unless otherwise specified, all figures are based on
total cases in the data set, some of which are still pending. This does not materi-
ally affect success rates by motion, but it may mean that the importance of these
motions in disposing of cases is somewhat understated, particularly for recent
years.
The following pages highlight, discuss, and bring additional information to
bear on the data in the tables. The most important information reported only in
the text and footnotes concerns changes over time for particular kinds of cases.
The reader should be aware that for many categories the number of cases per
year is very small.
recent models were formulated, some of the descriptive information reported in tabular form had been
collected. Thus, these models are not examples of econometrics at its purest level. Moreover, some vari-
ables, such as jury demand, were included primarily because "conventional wisdom" would expect a
relationship.
468. Confidence levels were calculated by Alan Penskar, Wayne State University Law School class of
1988.
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1. Frequency
If the data set is a fair guide, prospects for a plaintiff seeking summary relief
are bleak (table 1). Plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment, partial summary
judgment, or something called "no substantive issue of fact in dispute" (which
appears to be summary judgment) were filed in only 95 of 1946 cases (4.9%) and
were granted or partially granted in only 16 (0.8%), for a success rate (by case)
of 16.8%. Plaintiffs filed only 53 motions specifically for summary judgment; 7
such motions were granted (13.2%) and 2 were partially granted.46 9 No longer
is there merit-if there ever was-in the suggestion that the simplicity of per se
rules accounts for the unexpectedly high use of summary procedures in antitrust
cases.470
For defendants, the picture is much brighter (table 2). Pretrial "motions for
dismissal" of one kind or another (including summary judgment) were granted
or partially granted in 900 cases. This would be 46.2% of the data set's 1,946
cases, but obviously it involves double counting.
Motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim were granted in 142 cases
(7.3%),471 and granted or partially granted in 179 cases (9.2%). If one adds
grants and partial grants of defense motions for lack of standing, "plaintiffs"
motions to dismiss counterclaims, and "plaintiffs" motions to dismiss for failure
to state a claim (the last two of which probably should have been included in
defense motions), motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim were granted, as
a practical matter, in 170 cases (8.7%) and were granted or partially granted in
216 cases (11.1%). By comparison, fewer than 6% of all cases were tried. Suc-
cess rates for motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim also were quite high.
Motions were granted in 44.0% of cases in which they were filed and were
granted or partially granted in 55.4%.
Summary judgment may be somewhat less important than motions to dismiss.
What the questionnaire calls "summary judgment" was granted for defendants
in 4.2% of all cases472 and was granted or partially granted in 5.3%. Motions
were successful in 53.6% of the cases in which they were made and successful or
partially successful in 68.0%. If one adds to defense "summary judgment" mo-
tions those defense motions labeled "no issue" and "no substantive issue," which
appear to be summary judgment motions, and defense motions for partial sum-
mary judgment, one finds motions being granted for defendants in 6.9% of all
cases and granted or partially granted in 9.1%.
Given the traditionally expressed hostility toward summary relief in antitrust
cases, both sets of results are somewhat surprising. The importance of motions
469. The data set also reveals grants or partial grants of plaintiffs' motions for "dismissal" in 11 cases,
of plaintiffs' motions for "dismissal of counterclaim" in 7 cases, of plaintiffs' motions to dismiss for "fail-
ure to state claim" in 8 cases, and of "other" pretrial motions for dismissal in 15 cases. The second and
third of these probably should be considered defense motions, since plaintiffs facing antitrust counter-
claims were to be regarded as defendants.
470. See supra note 418.
471. For all cases except those still pending or on appeal, whose outcome is unknown, or whose file is
missing, motions to dismiss were filed in 16.8% of the cases and granted in 7.9%. Success rates were
47.0% (by case) and 51.5% (by motion).
472. For all cases except those still pending or on appeal, whose outcome is unknown, or whose file is
missing, defense summary judgment motions were filed in 8.0% of all cases and granted in 4.5 %. Success
rates were 55.6% (by case) and 50.2% (by motion).
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to dismiss for failure to state a claim is especially remarkable. The frequency
with which motions are filed and granted is much higher than the figures sug-
gested for all cases by Charles Wright; however, the frequency with which they
are granted is comparable to results in the Chicago antitrust class action
study.473 The summary judgment figures also are surprising. Although sum-
mary judgment was granted in fewer cases than were dismissals, it was granted
in a higher percentage of cases (4.2%) than McLauchlan found was average
(2.3%). Success rates were only just below McLauchlan's averages. Since high
quality information about current use of summary procedures outside of anti-
trust cases is lacking, one cannot be certain that these procedures are used more
commonly in antitrust cases than elsewhere. But it seems unlikely that they are
used less commonly.
2. Over Time
Defendants have been markedly more successful in winning summary relief in
recent years. In both regressions, the parameter coefficients for date of last
docket entry, the nearest approximation for decision date, were positive and sta-
tistically significant (1% confidence level for summary judgments, 5% confi-
dence level for dismissals).
Dismissal for failure to state a claim was ordered at less-than-average rates
before 1980 (although the differences were not statistically significant), except for
cases with last docket entries in 1977, the year of Illinois Brick (table 3). From
1980 to 1983, the last complete year surveyed, motions were filed in increasing
numbers (in 25% of all cases ending in 1982-1983). Although success rates were
somewhat inconsistent, motions were granted in increasing percentages of cases,
rising to 11.2% of all cases ending in 1982 (significant at 5% confidence level)
and 15.6% of all cases ending in 1983, the year of Associated General Contractors
(significant at 1% confidence level). There is a sharp drop in all percentages for
cases with last docket entries in 1984. This appears to be an aberration, 474 but it
was only partially caused by inclusion of pending cases.4 75
Table 4 shows spurts in success rates and frequency of granting summary
judgment in 1976 and in 1978 (success rate significantly high at 5% confidence
level). The latter almost certainly reflects the important 1977 Supreme Court
473. See supra notes 283-84, 304-05 and accompanying text. Conceivably, the numbers from the data
set are inflated because motions are being granted with leave to amend, which merely delays the litigation.
None of the data disclose whether leave to amend was given. Moreover, as Prof. Joseph Brodley re-
minded me at the conference, complete dismissal and dismissal only of a small part of an interrelated case
are very different. However, my perusal of recent antitrust cases and preliminary returns from a sampling
of reported decisions for cases in the data set confirm that most dismissals seem to terminate lawsuits or
major parts of lawsuits.
474. My research assistant reviewed all antitrust decisions in the second half of 1984 reported by Com-
merce Clearing House. Of 26 cases deciding motions to dismiss, motions were granted or partially
granted in 18 cases, denied in 8, and allowed 15 days to amend in one. Thirty-nine opinions decided
defense motions for summary judgment, with motions granted or partially granted in 29, motions denied
in 16, and motion deferred pending completion of discovery in 2. There were 8 decisions of plaintiffs'
motions for summary judgment, with 2 granted (one of which was partial) and 6 denied (one of which was
partial). Totals exceed the number of cases because a single opinion may both grant and deny motions.
475. When pending cases and cases still on appeal, and cases without files or with unknown outcomes,
are excluded, motions to dismiss were filed in 20.0% of the cases with last docket entries in 1984 and
granted in 6.2% of them. Success rates are 3 1.0% by case (9 of 29) and 32.6% by motion (14 of 43).
Only the last figure is significantly lower than for cases ending earlier.
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decisions. 476 In the 1980's, except for 1982,477 defendants enjoyed success rates
of 50% or more, filed motions in increasingly large percentages of cases, and saw
summary judgment being granted in increasingly large percentages of all cases
(6.0% for 1983 cases-significant at a 5% confidence level-and 8.3% in 1984-
significant at a 1% level).47 8
3. By Court
Differences among the five jurisdictions-and particularly between San Fran-
cisco and the other four-are striking (tables 5-7). Summary procedures play a
more important role in the more active antitrust courts. Plaintiff or defense mo-
tions to dismiss for lack of standing or for complete or partial summary judg-
ment were granted in 20.2% of San Francisco's 485 cases, 12.5% of New York's
666, 12.1% of Chicago's 571, 10.2% of Kansas City's 88, and 7.4% of Atlanta's
136. 4 7 9
It is understandable that the more active antitrust courts might be more recep-
tive to summary procedures. Exposure to many antitrust cases should improve a
court's ability to identify unmeritorious claims and to identify disputes of fact
that are not genuine or not material. This experience also may heighten a court's
interest in limiting the burden of antitrust cases on judicial resources.
San Francisco stands out as unusually receptive to summary dispositions.
This may be a legacy of the IBM litigation,480 or it may reflect the admonitions
of Judge Schwarzer.481 Contrary to some suggestions, New York also is quite
476. Continental TV, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 720 (1977); United States Steel Corp. v. Fortner Enters., Inc., 429 U.S. 610 (1977); Brunswick Corp.
v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
477. Perhaps the 1982 dip is explained by the pro-plaintiff Supreme Court decisions in Blue Shield v.
McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982), Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332 (1982), and
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982).
478. Defense summary judgment motions were filed in 19.3% of the completed cases with known
outcomes and located fles with last docket entries in 1984, and these motions were granted in 11.7% of
such cases (statistically significant at 1% confidence level). Success rates were 60.7% (by case) and 60.9%
(by motion).
479. San Francisco's 20.2% is statistically significant at a 1% confidence level. Because of the influ-
ence of this high percentage, each of New York's, Chicago's, and Atlanta's figures is low to a statistically
significant extent. The numbers in the text are useful for comparisons but probably reflect some double
counting since motions to dismiss and motions for summary judgment may be entered in the same case.
The data set records that motions for "lack of standing" were filed in 37 of the 1,946 cases (1.9%), were
granted in 43.2% of the cases in which motions were filed (or 46.3% of the motions were granted), and
were granted in 0.8% of the 1,946 cases. This seems like severe undercounting; the researchers probably
categorized standing motions as motions to dismiss or for summary judgment. Accordingly, statistics for
"standing" motions are not further analyzed. They are included here because no defense motions for
summary judgment are recorded for the 88 Kansas City cases, whereas 4 motions for lack of standing, 3 of
which were granted, are recorded.
480. ILC Peripherals Leasing Corp. v. IBM, 458 F. Supp. 423 (N.D. Cal. 1978), affid, 636 F.2d 1188
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 972 (1981). Responding to the question of whether such complex anti-
trust cases should be tried to a jury, the foreman in the IBM case responsed sarcastically: "If you can find
a jury that's both a computer technician, a lawyer, an economist,'knows all about that stuff, yes, I think
you could have a qualified jury, but we don't know anything about that." 458 F. Supp. at 447. In light of
the foreman's statement and the jury's trouble throughout the trial in "grasping the concepts," the judge
struck the jury demand. Id. at 447-48.
481. Judge Schwarzer, a judge in the Northern District of California, is a leading advocate of the
increased use of summary judgment. See W. SCHWARZER, MANAGING ANTITRUST AND OTHER COM-
PLEX LITIGATION § 2-3(B), at 37-53 (1982) (procedures for narrowing and limiting issues); Schwarzer,
supra note 325, at 493 (use of summary judgment motions needs to be raised "to a more informed, sophis-
ticated and productive level").
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receptive to summary procedures. Perhaps in response to the perceived Second
Circuit hostility to antitrust summary judgment, however, motions to dismiss
appear partially to substitute for summary judgment.
4. By Demand/Damages
The limitations of the data cast doubt on any conclusions concerning use of
summary procedures in cases of differing dollar magnitudes. The best informa-
tion reveals only damages claimed in complaints, and this is available for less
than half the sample. As Susman noted at the conference, the more sophisti-
cated antitrust plaintiffs usually choose their damage figures later in the proceed-
ings.482 Moreover, the dollar figures reflected in the attached tables have not
been adjusted for inflation. Since summary procedures have assumed increased
importance in recent years, and more recent cases should have somewhat higher
demands because of inflation, the causal nature of any connection between high
demands and use of summary procedures is uncertain.
Nonetheless, it seems safe to conclude that defense motions for summary dis-
missal are being granted with regularity at all dollar levels. The conventional
wisdom, that summary procedures are used primarily in low dollar cases, is not
supported. In the summary judgment regression, the parameter coefficient for
damages claimed in the complaint was positive although it would be significant
only at a 15% confidence level; in the motion to dismiss regression it was nega-
tive but not significant. Tables 8-9 reveal use of summary motions at each of six
arbitrarily chosen levels of claimed damages. Summary judgment was ordered
most frequently at $500,001-$1,000,000 (10% confidence level), whereas dismis-
sal was ordered least frequently at the next lowest damage level ($100,001-
500,000) (5% confidence level). Results at the highest dollar level (more than $5
million) differ with statistical significance from other cases only in that the suc-
cess rate (by motion) for motions to dismiss was unusually high. Thus, summary
procedures seem to be used, if anything, more regularly when the dollars at issue
are large than when they are small.
5. By Plaintiff's Business Relationship to Defendant
Defendants hid greatest success winning dismissal of suits brought by stock-
holders and state or local governments (table 10). They had greatest success
winning summary judgment against terminated dealers and stockholders, and
least success against final customers or end users and against companies to which
defendant was a supplier (table 11).
In both regressions, the parameter coefficients for stockholders were positive
and significant. Five of the six motions for summary judgment were granted
(significant at 5% confidence level), and all other measures of success were high,
although the differences were not significant. Presumably shareholders have an
unusually serious standing problem. Also presumably on standing grounds, de-
fendants were quite successful in having suits by employees or former employees
dismissed. However, the differences are not significant and defendants had only
482. S. Susman, Remarks at Georgetown Conference on Private Antitrust Litigation (Nov. 9, 1985).
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average success in obtaining summary judgments.48 3 By all measures, defend-
ants did well in suits brought by state or local governments. The success rate for
motions to dismiss was significantly high (5% confidence level).
Summary judgment was granted in an unusually large number of terminated
dealer cases (1% confidence level, and the parameter coefficient was positive and
significant), which may reflect the maligned character of these suits. However,
dismissals were granted in a below-average percentage of cases, although the
difference is not statistically significant. For the general category of suits by dis-
tributors and dealers, defendants enjoyed above average success in winning sum-
mary judgment, but below average success seeking motions to dismiss. None of
the differences are significant. These defense motions were granted with much
greater regularity in the 1980's than before.484
Dismissal also was ordered more frequently than average in suits brought by
competitors, particularly competitors making the same product, which might
seem to support claims that these tend to be suits of questionable merit,485 but
the difference is not significant. Moreover, the relatively high rate at which these
cases are dismissed is accounted for only by increased filings of such motions; the
success rate (by motion) is low (10% confidence level for same product competi-
tor suits). Dismissals played especially important roles in suits ending in 1980
and in 1983.486 Summary judgment was used only at average rates in competitor
suits, but the importance of summary judgment in these cases has increased in
recent years.487
Finally, summary motions have been relatively unimportant in suits brought
by (a) final customers or end users, and (b) companies to whom defendants were
suppliers. By most measures, defendants have done poorly in seeking summary
judgment; success rate (by motion) against final customers or end users is signifi-
cantly low (10% confidence level), and use against these persons and against
companies to whom defendants are suppliers is below average (although not sig-
nificantly). In the regression, the parameter coefficient for the former is negative
and significant. Suits by these categories of plaintiffs also are dismissed at below
average rates, although the differences are not significant. Perhaps summary
motions are relatively unimportant in these suits because courts view the suits as
likely to have merit, or as too fact dependent. Surprisingly, over time, one sees
only a modest (and not significant) spurt for cases ending in 1977, the year of
Illinois Brick.
483. Motions to dismiss were granted in 6 of the 48 cases brought by employees or former employees, 3
with last docket dates 1975-1976, and 3 with last docket dates 1982-1983. The two employee cases in
which defendants won summary judgment had last docket dates of 1981 and 1984.
484. In suits by terminated dealers, dismissals and summary judgments were used significantly more
frequently (10% confidence level) in 1981-1983 than in other years. In suits by dealers, distributors, and
agents, summary judgment was used significantly more frequently in 1983 (10% confidence level) and
1984 (5% confidence level) than in other years, and dismissal was used significantly more frequently in
1982 (1% confidence level) than in other years.
485. See, eg., Easterbrook, supra note 442, at 33-36 (antitrust litigation frequently used to raise rival's
costs).
486. Seven of 10 motions were granted in 6 of the 30 suits ending in 1980; 17 of 23 motions were
granted in 12 of the 44 suits ending in 1983. These success rates are significantly higher than in other
years (confidence levels range from 1% to 10%). Use in 1983 was significantly higher (1% confidence
level) than in other years.
487. In 1980 and 1983, all measures of use and success were significantly higher than in other years
(confidence levels range from 1% to 10%).
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6. By Statute and Alleged Illegal Practice
Tables 12-15 report information about defendants' motions to dismiss and mo-
tions for summary judgment by the primary alleged illegal practice and by the
antitrust statutes allegedly violated. Patterns here are hard to detect, and one
fears a certain amount of miscategorization or unhelpful categorization. For in-
stance, the clear winner in use of summary motions was "Sherman Act Unspeci-
fied Sections." Small sample sizes also plagued many of the categories. For
instance, there were only 12 "naked cartel" cases and 33 "monopolization"
cases. But certain observations can be made when one also considers changes
over time for each category.
Predatory pricing. Recently, defendants enjoyed relatively high success in
predatory pricing cases, where the impact of the Areeda-Turner revolution
seems clear. For the entire sample of 84 predatory pricing cases, motions to
dismiss were granted at slightly less than average rates. However, these statistics
are burdened by the 26 cases with last docket entries before 1978, in none of
which were motions filed. Motions to dismiss were filed in 11 (24.4%) of the 45
cases with last docket entries 1980-1983 and granted in five (11.1%) of those
cases. Use in these years was significantly greater (5% confidence level) than in
other years.
Predatory pricing defendants did considerably better than other antitrust de-
fendants in winning summary judgments, but there were few cases and the differ-
ences are not statistically significant. Indeed, summary judgment only recently
became a factor in these cases. Motions were filed in only 2 cases ending before
1983, but 8 motions were filed in 5 cases (out of a total of 21) ending in 1983-
1984. Four of the 8 motions were granted in 3 of the 5 cases.
Defendants' greater success in recent years may be attributable to the rise of
cost-based pricing rules. As one of their principal virtues, these rules have in-
creased the ability of courts to dispose of troublesome cases on summary
motions.488
Robinson-Patman Act. Defendants did quite well in Robinson-Patman Act
cases, but the differences are not statistically significant.489 Overall, motions to
dismiss were granted in 8.0% of all Robinson-Patman cases (versus 7.3% aver-
age), but success rates were slightly below average. Summary judgment was
granted in 5.4% of all cases (versus 4.2% average), despite only average or
slightly above average success rates. In both regression models, the parameter
coefficients for Clayton Act section 2 (the Robinson-Patman Act) were positive
but not statistically significant.
488. See Jays Foods, Inc. v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 614 F. Supp. 1073, 1084 (N.D. I11. 1985) (applying cost-
based tests to disputed evidence to grant summary judgment for defendant thereby avoiding trial that was
"optimistically estimated to last six weeks" and "would expose Frito-Lay to treble damages"), reconsider-
ation denied, 635 F. Supp. 103 (N.D. Ill. 1986); P. Joskow, Comments on Pitofsky, in ANTITRUST LAW
AND ECONOMIcS 201-02 (0. Williamson ed. 1980) (Areeda-Turner rule was adopted to dispose of cases,
not because it represents "a triumph of economic efficiency").
489. Lessons based on "principal alleged violations" are uncertain, since separate records were kept for
"price discrimination" and something called "vertical price discrimination." "Price discrimination" saw
comparatively few dismissals (4.8%) but comparatively frequent summary judgments (also 4.8%),
whereas "vertical price discrimination" saw frequent dismissals (8.0%) and average use of summary judg-
ment (4.0%). None of the differences between these figures and comparable ones for the rest of the
sample are statistically significant.
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Changes over time seem dramatic. Dismissals were relatively infrequent until
1979 when they started being granted with ever-increasing frequency through
1983; use in 1980-1983 was significantly greater (1% confidence level) than in
other years. Similarly, summary judgment became important in Robinson-Pat-
man Act cases starting only with cases that ended in 1980; success rates (by case)
for cases ending in 1980-1983 were significantly higher (5% confidence level)
than in other years.490
Monopolization. Defendants in Sherman Act section 2 cases have also fared
much better recently. Overall, motions to dismiss Sherman Act section 2 cases
were somewhat, but not significantly, less important than in other cases, and
they were significantly less successful. Motions for summary judgment were
more important than in other cases (10% confidence level). Motions to dismiss
were filed and granted in significantly more cases (1% confidence level) ending in
1982-1983 than in other years. Summary judgment was not granted in the sam-
ple's Sherman Act section 2 cases ending before 1976, but it has been granted
regularly since then.
Sherman Act section 1. Use of summary motions in Sherman Act section 1
cases was about average. This is unremarkable since that section was cited in
many of the sample's cases. However, success rates for motions to dismiss were
significantly higher than for other cases. When viewed over time, again cases
ending in 1982-1983 stand out, here for the significantly higher frequency with
which motions to dismiss were filed (1% confidence level) and granted (5% con-
fidence level).
"Vertical price fixing or squeeze. " The tables indicate that summary motions
were granted less frequently in "vertical price fixing or squeeze" cases than in
other cases, but the differences in use are not statistically significant. Motions to
dismiss were filed significantly less frequently (5% confidence level). Summary
judgment motions were significantly less successful (5% confidence level).
"Horizontal price-fixing and market allocation." Figures for the 333 cases
with this as the primary violation are about average for summary judgment and
somewhat below average for motions to dismiss. None of the differences are
statistically significant.
"Exclusive dealing or tying. " Success rates for motions to dismiss cases in
which Clayton Act section 3 was allegedly violated were much lower than for
other cases (1% confidence level). For summary judgment, the data show aver-
age success rates but a somewhat (although not significantly) below average rate
of motion filing. Similarly, for motions to dismiss exclusive dealing or tying
cases, both use and success rates were below average, although not significantly.
Use of summary judgment in these cases was average.
Over time, these measures also seem consistent. After a not significant spurt
of activity for cases ending in 1976, dismissals of exclusive dealing/tying com-
plaints occurred with regularity in 1980-1983; success rates were significantly
higher (5% confidence level) than in earlier years. Clayton Act section 3 cases
showed a similar pattern, although none of the differences are significant. Sum-
490. In cases in which "price discrimination" was the principal violation alleged, dismissals were nu-
merous in cases ending in 1982-1983, and summary judgment was common starting only with cases end-
ing in 1980.
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mary judgment also showed a spurt of use for exclusive dealing/tying cases end-
ing in 1976-1978 (5% confidence level), but there was little other use until 1984,
when 7 motions were filed in 6 of the 35 cases (a significantly high rate of filing at
a 10% confidence level), and 3 motions (in 3 cases) were granted. The 1984
activity may reflect the Supreme Court's decision in Jefferson Parish Hospital
District No. 2 v. Hyde.491 The Clayton Act section 3 cases show the same 1976-
1978 spurt, although here it is not significantly greater than in other years, and
significantly greater use in 1981-1983 than in other years.
Refusal to deal. Motions to dismiss in refusal to deal cases met with signifi-
cantly less success than in other cases (10% confidence level), but otherwise
overall results are not markedly different. Motions to dismiss were granted regu-
larly in refusal to deal cases starting with cases with last docket entries in 1979.
Dismissal was used with significantly greater frequency (1% confidence level) for
cases ending in 1982-1983. On the other hand, the only significant change over
time in use of summary judgment in refusal to deal cases is that in 1984 defend-
ants' motions enjoyed significantly greater success (10% confidence level). This
may reflect the Supreme Court decision in Monsanto v. Spray-Rite Service
Corp. 492
Dealer Termination. By every measure-frequency of filing and granting mo-
tions, and success rates-defendants seemed to do unusually well in winning
summary judgment in suits where "dealer termination" was the primary offense.
However, the sample is small and the differences are not statistically significant.
Use of summary judgment has been significantly greater (1% confidence level)
for suits ending in 1981-1984. (Only 3 motions were filed in suits ending before
1980.) However, for motions to dismiss, use and success rates are about average
and show no trend over time.
Mergers. Courts dismissed the 119 Clayton Act section 7 cases with some-
what, but not significantly, greater frequency than in other cases (8.4% versus
7.3% average), and summary judgment was granted at average rates. More fre-
quent use of dismissals would not be surprising, given the problems of showing
standing to challenge mergers and acquisitions. 493
Inducing government action. Motions to dismiss suits challenging the petition-
ing of government were granted at a significantly high rate (10% confidence
level). However, motions were filed in only 2 of 9 such cases, so this success rate
may be deceptively high. The coefficient for this variable was positive but not
statistically significant in the regression model for motions to dismiss, the only
one for which a coefficient could be computed. No motions for summary judg-
ment were filed.
491. 466 U.S. 2 (1984).
492. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
493. Cf. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 784 (1986) (granting certiorari to review competitor's
standing). Data concerning "principal alleged illegal practice" are more confusing, however. Motions to
dismiss were filed in 25.0% of the "asset accumulation or patent accumulation" cases (significant at 10%
level) and granted in 9.4%, but they were filed in only 6.6% of the "horizontal merger/joint ventures"
cases (significant at 1% level) and were granted in 3.3%. Success rates for motions to dismiss both kinds
of cases were higher than average, but not significantly. Success rates for summary judgment motions in
both kinds of cases were significantly lower than in other cases. But although summary judgment was
ordered less frequently in these cases than in others, the differences are not statistically significant.
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7. Countersuits and Crossclaims
Countersuits and crossclaims, which are notoriously frivolous, were dismissed
in 13% of the cases in which they were filed. Although the difference between
this experience and that of other cases is not statistically significant, in the com-
parable regression the parameter coefficient for this variable is positive and sig-
nificant. No motions for summary judgment were fied in these cases.494
8. Jury Suits
Although commentators suggest that summary procedures are used more fre-
quently in nonjury cases, antitrust litigation does not fit this pattern. Instead,
summary procedures are used more frequently in jury cases than nonjury cases
(tables 16-17). Summary judgment was ordered more commonly in jury suits
(10% confidence level), and motions to dismiss were granted more commonly
but not significantly so. In both regression models the coefficients for jury de-
mand were positive, although not statistically significant.
9. Class Actions
Defendants had better success in obtaining summary decisions in class action
cases than in other cases, but the differences are not statistically significant.
Where a class action had been requested, motions to dismiss were filed in 17.7%
of the cases and granted in 8.5%. Where classes were certified and either not
appealed or appealed unsuccessfully, defendants filed for summary judgment in
10.7% of the cases and were successful in 7.1%. In both regressions, the param-
eter coefficients for these variables were positive but not statistically significant.
Sixty percent of the motions to dismiss and 46% of the motions for summary
judgment were granted.4 95
10. Appeals Over Time
An overwhelming majority of summary dispositions are affirmed if appealed
(tables 18-19). This is contrary to the conventional wisdom. Of 57 appeals of
dismissals for failure to state a claim, only 9 were granted (15.8%) and 5 were
partly granted (total: 24.6%). Of 49 appeals of grants of summary judgment, 10
were granted (20.0%) and 5 were partly granted (total: 30.1%).
This is not a new development. Rather, it is only recently (looking at the data
set's years, 1973-1984) that plaintiffs have started winning. Only 1 of the 18
appeals from dismissals in cases ending in 1973-1979 was granted, and of 11
appeals from defense summary judgments, only 1 was granted.
D. DISCUSSION
The most important finding in this article is that summary judgments and
dismissals for failure to state a claim appear to be ordered as frequently in anti-
494. Motions to dismiss were filed in 11 (23.9%) and granted in 6 (13.0%) of the 46 countersuits or
cases based on cross-claims, for a success rate (by case) of 54.5%. Comparable percentages for all cases
are 16.6%, 7.3% and 44.0%.
495. Only cases where classes were certified were considered when examining summary judgment be-
cause more often than not certification will have been decided before the summary judgment motion.
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trust cases as in other cases, and they may be ordered even more frequently.
Even in jury cases-indeed, especially in jury cases-courts regularly granted
these defense motions. Summary judgments and dismissals for failure to state a
claim each were ordered in more antitrust cases than went to trial, and grants of
both kinds of motions usually were affirmed if appealed. Further, both kinds of
summary dismissals were ordered with significantly greater frequency in recent
years. The role of these procedures is quite one-sided, however; plaintiffs have
had much less success than defendants in obtaining summary orders.
This relatively frequent use of summary orders takes on particular significance
when considered in light of traditional judicial hostility to summary procedures,
in antitrust suits. Given the enunciated standards for reviewing these motions
during the survey's time period, and given the complexity of many antitrust
suits, one would expect summary procedures to have been used relatively rarely,
but this is not the case.
This unexpected finding can be explained, at least in part, by the treble dam-
ages remedy. A number of courts recently have suggested that the in terrorem
effect of the treble damages remedy makes summary procedures particularly ap-
propriate in antitrust suits. The Supreme Court's decisions in Monsanto 4nd
Matsushita are consistent with this suggestion. The empirical findings that use
of summary procedures remains constant or rises with increasing damages re-
quests, and is as great or greater in class action suits as in other ones, also sup-
ports this conclusion. Conventional wisdom would predict a decline with
increasing complexity, and complexity should be associated with high damage
requests and class status. Apparently, some courts want to prevent finders of
fact from deciding high-stakes cases. 4 9 6
Courts appear more willing to grant defense motions for summary relief when
the costs of erroneous plaintiff verdicts are relatively high. A good example of
this is provided by the recent Supreme Court decision in Bose Corp. v. Consum-
ers Union of United States, Inc.497 At issue was the distinction between facts and
law that is so important in summary judgment, although the particular context
involved the scope of review under rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. The Court said:
A finding of fact in some cases is inseparable from the principles
through which it was deduced. At some point the reasoning . . .
crosses the line between application of those ordinary principles of
logic and common experience... into the realm of a legal rule ....
Where the line is drawn varies according to the substantive law at is-
sue. Regarding certain largely factual questions in some areas of the
law the stakes-in terms of impact on future cases and future con-
duct-are too great to entrust them finally to the judgment of the trier
of fact.498
496. On the use of summary procedures in complex, high stakes cases, see generally Cooper, Directions
for Directed Verdicts: A Compass for Federal Courts, 55 MINN. L. REv. 903 (1971); Schwarzer, supra note
325; Weiner, supra note 324.
497. 466 U.S. 485 (1984). See generally Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
229 (1985) (questioning expansive reading of Bose).
498. Id. at 501 n.17; cf Miller v. Fenton, 106 S. Ct. 445, 453-54 (1985) (voluntariness of a confession
should be treated as a question of law to avoid frustrating a federal right).
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Bose was a first amendment case, so the comparison to antitrust litigation is
imperfect. But the Supreme Court's recognition that the stakes of litigation
should affect the latitude courts give juries suggests that trebling increases the
use of summary procedures. 499
Additional support for the proposition that trebling has increased the use of
summary procedure is provided by reviewing the nature of the cases that ac-
count for the increased use of these procedures in the 1980's.500 Summary pro-
cedures are now being used frequently in predatory pricing cases, where courts
have turned to objective tests. And very recently, they are being used regularly
in price discrimination suits, where J Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors
Corp.501 has offered an easy route to the resolution of cases (by showing that
disputed issues are not material). Defendants also have enjoyed very recent suc-
cess in tying/exclusive dealing cases, where the increased clarity following Jeffer-
son Parish has enabled courts to decide cases as a matter of law, and in refusal to
deal and dealer termination cases, which may reflect Monsanto's limiting of jury
discretion. Defendants' recent successes in winning dismissal also can be ex-
plained by Brunswick, Illinois Brick, and Associated General Contractors. Thus,
several changes in antitrust law, some of which may have been affected by the
treble damages remedy, have made summary procedures more readily available.
It therefore seems likely that reduction of the stakes, by detrebling, would tend
to reduce the granting of antitrust defense motions to dismiss and motions for
summary judgment.
V. CONCLUSION
Where mandatory penalties are perceived as inappropriately severe, the legal
system will try, subject to institutional constraints, to prevent or reduce the fre-
quency of their imposition. This article reviewed evidence of this "equilibrating
tendency" in criminal law, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
law, and torts. The legal system reacted vigorously to circumvent the sanctions
of the criminal law's "Bloody Code." Although RICO's treble damages sanc-
tions are considerably milder, courts often perceive them to be inappropriatly
severe and thus are experimenting with ways to limit the reach of RICO. Simi-
larly, the tort law system has sought with considerable success to nullify the
perceived negative implications of contributory negligence. The article also re-
viewed the legal system's readjustment to the reduction of severe sanctions (re-
form of the criminal code) or to their elimination (the substitution of
comparative for contributory negligence).
499. It also is interesting to note the very high success rate (1% confidence level) of motions to dismiss
suits challenging the inducing of government action, which often implicate the First Amendment.
500. At the conference, Prof. Richard Schmalensee suggested testing the "equilibrating tendencies"
hypothesis by seeing whether summary motions were granted significantly less commonly in horizontal
price fixing or market division cases, which he presumed would be the cases in which trebling is regarded
as least inappropriate. If that is the test, it fails. Although summary procedures are used somewhat less
frequently in these cases, the differences are not statistically significant. The defect in Prof. Schmalensee's
test is that private plaintiffs' lawyers are aware both of per se rules and of the increasing judicial suspicion
of vertical cases. Accordingly, many lawsuits are inaccurately described in pleadings as horizontal price
fixing or market division cases. Prof. Schmalensee's test could be conducted only on accurately described
cases.
501. 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
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Against this background, the article explored the probable effect of the treble
damages remedy on substantive and procedural antitrust law. The mandatory
nature of that remedy and its apparently perceived severity would suggest that
the antitrust system has made adjustments to the penalty by reducing the
breadth of the antitrust laws. There is a countervailing tendency, however; that
remedy also may have induced private plaintiffs to pursue some theories that
otherwise would have been ignored. An admittedly speculative review of treb-
ling's probable effect on substantive antitrust law suggested that the effect has
not been unidirectional; were there no trebling some substantive antitrust stan-
dards would be broader and some narrower. It seems clear, however, that with-
out trebling, procedural antitrust law would be more hospitable to plaintiffs.
The final part of the article focused in greater detail on motions for summary
judgment and motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim in antitrust cases.
Findings from the Georgetown Project's data set concerning these motions were
presented. It was shown that summary procedures are used with at least as
much regularity in antitrust cases as in other cases, and that use of these motions
has increased in recent years. The frequency with which these motions are
granted is partly a function of trebling. One of the ways in which courts have
adjusted to the treble damages remedy is by being relatively more willing to keep
cases from going to trial.
What does this tell us about the consequences of any legislation to eliminate
the treble damages remedy? Existing legal standards would not instantly
change. Indeed, Congress might insist that legal standards be preserved. The
RICO experience shows that statutory mandates cannot always be overcome, or
at least not easily, by equilibrating forces. However, over time, adjustments
would come about. Suits could be expected to shift to state courts or feature
alternative, nonantitrust grounds of illegality. There would likely be fewer op-
portunities to expand the law, but also less pressure to limit access to the courts.
Gradual easing of procedural barriers to suits, especially standing rules, could be
expected, and plaintiffs would have greater success reaching trial. Perhaps,
although this is difficult to predict, the enforcement agencies might have more
success in advocating novel theories of illegality. What is clear is that changing
the penalty almost certainly would give rise to at least partially compensating
adjustments in substantive and procedural antitrust standards. Changes short of
complete elimination of treble damages, such as have been proposed, 50 2 would
result in similar but weaker adjustments.
502. S. 1300, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986), reprinted as reported, S. REP. No. 320, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 4
(1986) (claim reduction); S. 2162, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (limiting treble damages to persons
"overcharged or underpaid").
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Dependent Variable
Intercept Coefficient
Model Chi-Square
No. Independent Variables
No. Cases *
Cases with one or more motions to dismiss for failure to state a
claim granted.
-3.1422
28.25 with 21 D.F. with P-Value = 0.1333
21
1,737
Parameter Std. Chi- P-
Independent Variable Coeff. Error Square Test
Jury Demand** 0.1068 0.1939 0.30 0.5817
No. Defendants Named in Suit 0.0129 0.0096 1.82 0.1776
Crossclaim or Counterclaim 0.7641 0.4561 2.81 0.0939
Plaintiff's Bus. Relation to Defendant
(Competitor, Same Product) 0.2987 0.2210 1.83 0.1765
(Terminated Dealership) -0.2266 0.3502 0.42 0.5175
(Final Customer or End User) -0.3207 0.3982 0.65 0.4206
(Employee or Former Employee) 0.5910 0.4604 1.65 0.1993
(Lessee) 1.2779 0.8187 2.44 0.1186
(Franchisee) 0.8562 0.6653 1.66 0.1981
(Stockholder) 1.2856 0.7188 3.20 0.0737
Alleged Violation
(Sherman Act § 2) -0.2273 0.1913 1.41 0.2347
(Clayton Act § 2) 0.0641 0.2355 0.07 0.7854
(Horizontal Price Fixing) -0.1076 0.2720 0.16 0.6924
(Predatory Pricing) -0.4230 0.5386 0.62 0.4323
(Exclusive Dealing or Tying) -0.0633 0.2961 0.05 0.8305
(Refusal to Deal) 0.0574 0.2590 0.05 0.8246
(Vertical Price Fixing) -0.6306 0.5297 1.42 0.2339
Inducing Government Action 0.5681 1.1118 0.26 0.6093
Damages Claimed in Complaint -0.0007 0.0012 0.33 0.5652
Date of Last Docket Entry 0.0737 0.0310 5.63 0.0176
Class Action Requested 0.2420 0.2824 0.73 0.3915
Excluding those cases with missing files, missing values, or unknown outcomes, and cases pending
or on appeal.
** Defined as a dummy variable with 1 = Jury demand by plaintiff, defendant
or both
0 = No jury demand
EQUILIBRATING TENDENCIES
MODEL I. DEFENSE PRETRIAL MOTIONS GRANTED
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MODEL II. DEFENSE PRETRIAL MOTIONS GRANTED
Dependent Variable Cases with one or more defense motions for summary judgment granted
Intercept Coefficient -4.8187
Model Chi-Square 59.24 with 22 D.F. with P-Value=0.0000
No. Independent Variables: 22
No. Cases* :1,737
Parameter Std. Chi- P-
Independent Variables Coeff. Error Square Test
Jury Demand** 0.1623 0.2708 0.36 0.5490
Plaintiff's Bus. Relation to Defendant
(Competitor, Same Product) -0.1096 0.3059 0.13 0.7201
(Terminated Dealership) 0.5648 0.3403 2.75 0.0970
(Final Customer or End User) -1.3478 0.7573 3.17 0.0751
(Employee or Former Employee) -0.0347 0.7763 0.00 0.9643
(Stockholder) 1.9766 0.7150 7.64 0.0057
Alleged Violation
(Sherman Act § 2) 0.2457 0.2528 0.94 0.3311
(Clayton Act § 2) 0.3229 0.2885 1.25 0.2631
(Horizontal Price Fixing) 0.3386 0.3274 1.07 0.3010
(Predatory Pricing) -0.2791 0.6341 0.19 0.6597
(Exclusive Dealing or Tying) -0.0497 0.3913 0.02 0.8989
(Refusal to Deal) 0.0267 0.3369 0.01 0.9368
(Vertical Price Fixing) -0.3800 0.6163 0.38 0.5374
Damages Claimed in Complaint 0.0006 0.0004 2.14 0.1434
Date of Last Docket Entry 0.1377 0.0444 9.61 0.0019
No. of Depositions Noticed by Plaintiff -0.0039 0.0083 0.22 0.6384
No. of Depositions Noticed by Defendant -0.0077 0.0126 0.38 0.5380
No. of Inter. Noticed by Plaintiff 0.1108 0.0609 3.31 0.0689
No. of Inter. Noticed by Defendant -0.0512 0.0689 0.55 0.4572
No. Requests Prod. Documents by Plaintiff 0.0500 0,0702 0.51 0.4764
No. Requests Prod. Documents by Defendant 0.1746 0,0790 4.88 0.0271
Class Action Certified*** 0.5771 0.6039 0.91 0.3393
* Excluded those cases with missing files, missing values, or unknown outcomes, and cases pending
or on appeal.
** Defined as a dummy variable with 1 = Jury demand by plaintiff,
defendant or both
0 = No jury demand
*** Defined as a dummy variable with I = Class certified and either not appealed or affirmed
0 = Other cases
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